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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
 Enviado - 14 septiembre 2006 : 19:20:29
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KOSOVO / KOSOVA / KOSOVË: Actualitat / Actualidad
Després del canvi de status de Kosovo, que avui ha proclamat la independència, considerem convenient tancar aquest apartat, que vam inaugurar el 14 de setembre de 2006 (i que ja està força ple d'informació), i donar-li continuïtat en un altre que obrim amb el títol KOSOVO DES DE 2/2008. Actualitat / Actualidad (http://www.casadelest.org/foro/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=1205), en el qual es poden incorporar, des d'aquest moment, les notícies i els comentaris que tothom vulgui aportar.
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Después del cambio de estatus de Kosovo, que hoy ha proclamado su independencia, consideramos conveniente cerrar este apartado, que inauguramos el 14 de septiembre de 2006 (y que ya está muy lleno de información), y darle continuidad en otro que abrimos con el título KOSOVO DES DE 2/2008 - Actualitat / Actualidad (http://www.casadelest.org/foro/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=1205), en el que se pueden incorporar, desde este momento, las noticias y los comentarios que cada uno quiera aportar.
ELS MODERADORS DEL FÒRUM / LOS MODERADORES DEL FORO
17.2.2008
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KOSOVO/KOSOVA/KOSOVË: Actualitat / Actualidad
Obrim un nou debat sobre la situació en aquesta regió balcànica i la seva evolució. Tots els que tingueu interès per la qüestió esteu convidats a participar-hi.
Abrimos un nuevo debate sobre la situación en esta región balcánica y su evolución. Quienes tengáis interés por la cuestión, estáis invitados a participar.
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Editado por - alazaro a las 02 marzo 2008 01:28:48 |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 14 septiembre 2006 : 19:25:20
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 22 septiembre 2006 : 23:32:51
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Kosovo: The power of compromise
By Aleksandar Mitic, TFF Associate
September 21, 2006
A Serbian journalist and TFF Associate argues that only a genuine compromise over Kosovo's future status can guarantee stability. A true, balanced, and negotiated compromise on Kosovo's future status would swing the pendulum of Balkan stability towards the European path.
A manipulated, one-sided, and imposed decision would, however, open a Pandora's box of secessionist movements in the world and release the ghosts of a nationalist past in the Balkans.
As we approach the beginning of talks on the future status of the Kosovo province, it becomes crucial to grasp the full complexity of the Kosovo status issue.
There has been an attempt in the last year and a half to close down international debate before the status talks had even begun by suggesting that only independence is a viable solution for Kosovo.
The truth is, the issue of Kosovo's status is dependent on so many historical, legal, political, religious, economic, and demographic elements that it deserves, at the very least, a wide international debate on possible solutions and their implications.
To argue thus that only one solution is possible is not only flawed reasoning, but a dangerous and explosive recipe for future frustration, tension, and conflict.
There has also been an attempt to refocus and spin the talks in the direction of Kosovo's independence, from those who say that these are not really talks on the future status but rather on the terms of Kosovo's future independence to those who argue that the negotiations should be only about the position of the Kosovo Serbs in an independent Kosovo.
Some also argued that the talks will be about finding a way to impose independence upon Belgrade. While there are a few officials who have, often privately rather than publicly, indicated their preference for such approaches, it must be said that these are completely contrary to international law.
RISKY BUSINESS
The aim of the talks on Kosovo's future status is to finally provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region. The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunity and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without endangering the welfare of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. The interests of Serbia, of which Kosovo is a part, the stability of the Balkans, and the worldwide impact of these negotiations are also crucial factors which must be taken into account.
Within the principles of international law and the preset recommendations of the international community's informal "Contact Group" - no return to the pre-1999 Milosevic-era situation, no joining of neighboring states, no partition - a number of possible solutions for the future status of Kosovo deserve to be examined.
There is also a number of pre-conditions for successful talks that must be met: artificial deadlines such as end of 2006 must not be used to the detriment of a sound solution; and the outcome should be an agreed, negotiated compromise, not an imposed, one-sided decision.
The breaching of international law and the creation of worldwide precedents should be avoided for the sake of regional and world security. In this regard, it is of paramount importance that double standards must not be allowed to win over universal standards.
To claim that the Kosovo situation features "unique" characteristics and that its independence would not represent a precedent for triggering other crises elsewhere in the world is unlikely to convince everyone in the international community.
What is it that makes Kosovo so unique? Ten years of institutional discrimination? Several thousand victims of a conflict between a repressive state security force and a separatist guerilla force? A majority ethnic group actively seeking independence? But the very same characteristics are shared by dozens of similar regions around the world. If every such case is seen as unique, international law becomes irrelevant.
Independence for Kosovo would indeed be a risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately wrong solution. Why would one side get it all, the other one lose all? Why reward seven years of Albanian violence in post-war Kosovo? Why break up Serbia, the most ethnically diverse country in the Western Balkans and create a second ethnic-Albanian state on one part of its territory? Where is the logic of European integration in this pursuit of Balkanization of the Balkans?
A BLUFFER'S GUIDE TO INDEPENDENCE
Bluffs and spin must not be used as arguments. To say, for example, that Serbia already lost Kosovo in 1999 is only an interpretation and does not stand in any single international document, let alone in the UN Security Council resolution 1244 that ended the conflict.
In the resolution, "self-governing" is mentioned three times, "self-government" four times, "self-administration" once, "substantial autonomy" three times, whereas neither "self-determination" nor "independence" are mentioned at all. Did NATO intervene in 1999 to protect human rights or to provide the basis for secession? If Kosovo was lost to Serbia in 1999, why did it not obtain independence then?
As far as the so-called moral argument that it is the violence of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic which lost Kosovo for Serbia, the Kosovo Albanians should be least inclined to favor it since their massive and systematic violence and repression of the Serb community in the last seven post-war years has taken all the "moral credit" out of their hands.
The same goes for the often heard assertion that Serbia should choose between Kosovo and the European Union. In fact, under the EU Thessaloniki agenda on the Western Balkans, Serbia has a clear European perspective and as the Western Balkans' largest country, it certainly won't remain a black hole inside the EU. To suggest that Serbia should give up a large part of its territory - which has been the cradle of its civilization, culture, and religion for nine centuries now - for the sake of possibly entering a supranational integration process two or three years earlier does not make much sense. No international or domestic campaign aimed at convincing Serbian public opinion on this one would succeed.
One of the most common arguments for the independence of Kosovo is that if the ethnic Albanians do not get what they want, they will stage mass violence against the Serbs, other non-Albanians, and the international troops. The argument points to the massive riots in March 2004 as a warning of what could happen if ethnic Albanian desires are not satisfied. But is the world really so afraid of such threats that it does not dare stand up to them? NATO seems ready to call this bluff. The Alliance's Secretary-General has warned on several occasions that violence as means of promoting political objectives in the status talks would this time be met with a robust response from 17,000 NATO troops in the province. Indeed, threats of violence must not be legitimized nor used as arguments.
Finally, it is most worrying to suggest that some sort of "conditional independence" should be the outcome of the status talks. This empty formula is even presented by some as a compromise solution, because ethnic Albanians will have to wait a few more years for independence and give up on the idea of Greater Albania. Many of its backers suggest "conditional independence" means that Kosovo will be granted independence in phases, provided the majority ethnic Albanians finally start respecting the human rights of the Serbs and other non-Albanians. But this option is an insult to negotiators and 21st-century human-rights standards. If Belgrade is resolutely opposed to immediate independence, why would it accept independence two or three years from now? If even the most basic standards of human rights are not respected under international supervision, why should we expect that they would be in a conditionally independent Kosovo? And doesn't the "conditional independence" concept introduce a new kind of trade-off: respect for human rights in exchange for territory?
COMPROMISE: A WIN-WIN SOLUTION
Looking at the situation realistically and fairly, the most sustainable and just solution for the future status of the province lies between the standard type of autonomy, which ethnic Albanians now reject, and independence, which clashes with international law and is unacceptable for the Serbs in general and Serbia as a state.
A solution that would provide for a maximum of autonomy for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia could satisfy all the legitimate demands, including the Kosovo Albanians' demand to be self-governing, and it can protect the interests of non-Albanians in Kosovo and the interests of Serbia as a state. Such a solution would also comply with the principle of the inviolability of international borders.
Kosovo would enjoy full legislative, executive, and judicial capacity, a limited external representation - in particular regarding its full direct access to the international financial institutions - and most importantly, normalized relations with Serbia.
On the other hand, Serbia still has many positive things to offer Kosovo, including a strong push in its macroeconomic revival, a common market for goods, an integrated energy, electricity and infrastructure network, access to its health and education systems, a common fight against organized crime, and a joint contribution to regional stability and European integration.
At the same time, an autonomous Kosovo would still need to improve its treatment of the Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. A wide-scale decentralization including a horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities, which would benefit from the education, social, and health system of central Serbia, is a precondition for the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as suggested by UN special envoy Kai Eide.
This horizontal linkage is not a model for partition and conflict but, on the contrary, a model for integration and survival, as these municipalities would be fully integrated in the autonomous Kosovo system run from Pristina, while keeping some political links with Belgrade.
Considering all this, an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a maximum autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia appears as the most reasonable and viable long-term solution.
A WIN-WIN SOLUTION
More than anything, it is a win-win solution. The Kosovo Albanians would finally get the means to manage their future and so will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia would not have its borders changed and its historical and religious cradle amputated; Macedonia and Bosnia will receive guarantees that border changes in the Balkans are no longer tolerated; the EU would obtain regional stability and be able fully to take charge of its European perspective; the United States would be able to disengage its troops without losing its diplomatic leverage in both Pristina and Belgrade; Russia, China, India, and many other countries in the world would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous secessionist precedent; the UN will see a major crisis issue resolved peacefully and with full respect for international law.
It is time to respect international law; it is time to find a long-term solution for Kosovo; it is high time to be patient, fair, sound, and consistent.
It is time for a successful compromise for the first time in Kosovo's long history.
Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based journalist and one of the authors of the CD-ROM and Internet project Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise.
(From T F F PeaceBrowser. - http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2006/Mitic_KosovoCompromise.html) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 25 septiembre 2006 : 23:37:44
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AMNISTÍA INTERNACIONAL
Declaración pública
Índice AI: EUR 70/014/2006 (Público)
Servicio de Noticias: 249 /2006
22 de septiembre de 2006
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ESLEUR700142006
Kosovo (Serbia): Es preciso consultar a la sociedad civil y asegurar una protección eficaz de los derechos humanos
Mientras el enviado especial de las Naciones Unidas para el proceso relativo al estatuto futuro de Kosovo (UNOSEK) se dirige hoy al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para hablar sobre los avances de las conversaciones sobre el futuro de Kosovo, Amnistía Internacional vuelve a instar a la comunidad internacional a que se asegure de que las medidas para la protección de los derechos humanos de todas las personas de Kosovo ocupan un lugar central en el proceso de conversaciones y el acuerdo final.
Estas medidas deben desarrollarse en estrecha consulta con la sociedad civil, como ha dejado claro el informe sobre el Estado de derecho del secretario general de las Naciones Unidas.
El 20 de septiembre, los países del Grupo de Contacto autorizaron al Enviado Especial de la ONU a Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, a redactar un documento definitivo antes del final de 2006. En una declaración pública, el Grupo de Contacto instó a las Instituciones del Gobierno Autónomo Provisional de Kosovo a promover la reconciliación y consolidar la confianza entre comunidades étnicas. Lamentablemente, la declaración no pedía a los participantes en las conversaciones que se aseguraran de que existe un proceso significativo de consulta con la sociedad civil ni incluía la instrucción expresa de que el documento definitivo protegiera eficazmente los derechos humanos de todas las personas de Kosovo.
A Amnistía Internacional le preocupan los informes según los cuales, si no se llega a un acuerdo, podría imponerse una solución final sin consultar adecuadamente. Dado que hasta la fecha los participantes en las conversaciones no han llegado a acuerdos sobre ningún asunto sustantivo, a la organización le preocupa que una solución impuesta exacerbe las ya grandes tensiones existentes en Kosovo y pueda conducir a más violaciones de derechos humanos.
La organización sigue instando a que cualquier acuerdo definitivo se alcance en consulta con todas las comunidades de Kosovo y aborde los derechos de todas ellas, incluida la albanesa, la serbia, la romaní, la ashkalí, la egipciana, la bosníaca, la goraní y la turca, así como los de las mujeres, aunque dicha consulta exija más tiempo.
Información complementaria
Según la Resolución 1244/99 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, Kosovo sigue siendo una provincia de Serbia bajo la administración de la UNMIK.
En octubre de 2005, el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas autorizó al secretario general a que designara un enviado especial para el proceso relativo al estatuto futuro de Kosovo (UNOSEK), el ex presidente de Finlandia Martti Ahtisaari, para que impulsara y supervisara las conversaciones entre representantes del gobierno serbio y las Instituciones del Gobierno Autónomo Provisional de Kosovo a fin de acordar el estatuto definitivo de Kosovo.
Las conversaciones comenzaron en Viena el 20 de febrero de 2006 y hasta la fecha se han concentrado en "asuntos técnicos", como la descentralización del poder en favor de autoridades municipales definidas étnicamente. No se han ocupado de la protección de los derechos humanos, incluidos los de las comunidades minoritarias. En agosto, las autoridades serbias boicotearon un debate sobre los derechos de las minorías.
En un memorándum publicado en julio bajo el título Kosovo/Kosova (Serbia), Protección de los derechos humanos en Kosovo tras la determinación de su estatuto: Recomendaciones de Amnistía Internacional sobre las conversaciones relativas al estatuto definitivo de Kosovo/Kosova (Índice AI: EUR 70/008/2006), Amnistía Internacional instó a los participantes a asegurarse de que los derechos humanos fueran un principio primordial y unificador en todas las decisiones y acuerdos que se alcancen sobre el futuro de Kosovo. La organización instó también a que hubiera una consulta amplia y significativa con todas las comunidades de Kosovo, incluyendo en particular la plena participación de representantes de todas las comunidades minoritarias y las organizaciones de mujeres.
La organización instó a las partes a asegurarse de que se tomaran medidas para garantizar los derechos de todos los ciudadanos de Kosovo, sin discriminación e independientemente de su etnia. También deben abordarse los derechos de las personas refugiadas y desplazadas.
Amnistía Internacional también pidió que se aplicaran leyes que respeten los derechos humanos y se crearan instituciones que funcionen adecuadamente para garantizar la protección de los derechos humanos y poner fin a la impunidad de los crímenes de guerra y la violencia entre etnias. Son necesarias más medidas para garantizar que todas las personas con autoridad en Kosovo tienen la obligación vinculante de respetar, proteger y hacer realidad los derechos humanos.
Amnistía Internacional no se pronuncia sobre el estatuto definitivo de Kosovo.
La declaración del 20 de septiembre del Grupo de Contacto puede consultarse en
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/91037.pdf
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Índice AI: EUR 70/014/2006
22 de setiembre de 2006 |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 26 septiembre 2006 : 19:03:20
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Serbs and Albanians Play Politics with Heritage Sites
After a deal looked close, both sides appear to have decided that scoring points is more important than making a breakthrough
By Maja Radojevic in Kosovska Mitrovica
Balkan Insight, 25 Sept 2006
Protection for Serbian heritage sites in Kosovo could have been the first area in which Belgrade and Pristina reached a compromise in the ongoing talks on Kosovo's final status in Vienna.
However, a broad agreement on the protection of the protectorate's cultural heritage evaded negotiators after Belgrade and Pristina got close to a deal on a range of issues middle of September.
Analysts believe that the stumbling block was attempts by both sides to use the heritage issue for political gain - either as a bargaining tool to bolster claims for Kosovo's independence, or as a means to improve Serbia's chances of holding on to the territory.
Problems arose when Belgrade linked the issue of cultural heritage protection to the return of property to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and to decentralisation for Serbian municipalities.
On the other hand, Kosovo Albanians have insisted on treating heritage simply as Kosovo's heritage, not as Serbia's, for which no more than the observation of the relevant international conventions is demanded.
Kosovo has been a UN-run protectorate since summer 1999, when NATO's bombing campaign forced Serbian security forces to withdraw.
Although Kosovo has formally remained part of Serbia since the UN took control, power has increasingly flowed into the hands of Albanian-run institutions, which demand Kosovo's independence.
Talks on final status, which are being mediated by UN high representative Martti Ahtisaari and his deputy Albert Rohan, began in Vienna on March 20 but have made little progress.
Now it appears the question of cultural heritage, which initially appeared the least problematic of the issues facing negotiators, is also log-jammed.
However, some compromises have been reached to date. Belgrade has dropped its protection zone demands from 6,500 hectares to 5,500 hectares, while Albanians have agreed that 30 protections zones around monasteries should be in place. Serbs have promised to return archeological artifacts that were taken to Belgrade during the conflict in 1996. Both delegations acknowledged that some progress has been made.
The Serbian Orthodox Church, SPC, maintains that 176 monasteries and churches have been either burned down or destroyed since the arrival of the UN-led international mission to Kosovo. The majority of these were demolished during the March 2004 riots, when about 30 churches were burned.
The destruction of religious sites has not only been done by Albanians - more than 200 mosques were destroyed by Serbian forces during the Milosevic years.
The March 2004 violence halted what was then an ongoing process of devolving responsibility for the protection of Serbian Orthodox sites from the international KFOR troops to the UN police and Kosovo Police Service, KPS.
It had been planned, for example, that the KPS would first assume responsibility for the security of the prestigious Visoki Decani monastery, a UNESCO-listed heritage site.
But after March 2004, the monastery demanded and was granted a stronger presence of Italian KFOR troops instead. Most other church sites have been militarily reinforced in a similar way.
Kosovo Serbs see attacks on churches as a brazen attempt to erase their culture and spirituality, as the church has traditionally played a key role in Kosovo Serb life, particularly after the Serbian administration withdrew in 1999.
The church then remained almost the only functioning Serbian institution in Kosovo, with Artemije, the local bishop, effectively assuming the role of the leading Kosovo Serb representative to the world.
The SPC continues to exert a significant influence on Serbian policy in Kosovo and church representatives are closely involved in all talks on cultural heritage. This is why the issue of heritage protection has become so crucial in the eyes of the Belgrade government.
Talks with Pristina on heritage protection began as part of the negotiations on final status in late May 2006. So far, only three rounds of talks on the subject have taken place.
Belgrade has called for the creation of 39 protected zones covering more than 5,500 hectares, including well-known mediaeval monasteries such as Visoki Decani, the Patriarchate at Pec, the Bogorodica Ljeviska in Prizren, Sveti Arhandjeli, Zociste and others.
At the most recent meeting in Vienna on September 8, Belgrade agreed to return archaeological exhibits to the Pristina Museum that had been transported to Belgrade during the Nineties.
A joint decision was made to form a commission to supervise implementation of cultural heritage protection measures in Kosovo. The two sides agreed also to submit complaints concerning the other's activities to the UN high representative. At the same time, the Albanian delegation accepted in principle the number of protected zones proposed by Belgrade.
It was agreed that the protected zones would come under the control of the SPC and that any unauthorised construction would be prohibited within the protected zones, which would be guarded by international troops.
Sanda Raskovic Ivic, a chair of the Serbian government's Coordination Centre for Kosovo, explained what this would mean in practice.
"This means that no hydroelectric plant, mines, factories or restaurants can be opened on land belonging to protected monastery zones," she said.
Albert Rohan, the UN deputy envoy for Kosovo, praised the two sides for achieving an apparent breakthrough, noting that the Albanian side had compromised most. However, Rohan warned that a wider agreement on heritage was in danger if Belgrade insisted on linking it with the separate question of the return of nationalised property.
"The problem is that Belgrade links the cultural heritage protection issue to the restitution of Church property in Kosovo," said Rohan. "As soon as Belgrade gives up this demand, a solution is possible."
The diplomat was referring to land that the communists seized from the SPC, once a major landowner in Kosovo, more than 60 years ago.
However, Belgrade is standing firm. Dusan Batakovic, the negotiating team's coordinator for cultural and religious heritage issues, told Balkan Insight that Belgrade insisted on "the crucial issue concerning [church] ownership of land in the protected zones, which had been nationalised as far back as 1941".
Batakovic said protection of Serbia's religious and cultural legacy could be deemed secure only if the question of who owns the land is cleared up.
"The painful experience of Serbian church land ownership in the past decade and even the past hundred years, shows the need for this question to be resolved as soon as possible," Batakovic told Balkan Insight.
Although precise information is still being collected, no one doubts that the SPC once owned substantial holdings in Kosovo.
Kosovo Albanian leaders are wary of conceding anything that looks like restitution of nationalised Church property. They see Serbia's desire to restitute church land as an attempt to exert control over chunks of territory inside Kosovo, and are willing to offer protection of cultural and religious heritage only as part of Kosovo's national legacy and in accordance with international conventions.
Kosovo's prime minister Agim Ceku told the media recently that he wanted to protect "our common heritage". Protection zones must not been seen as a territorial exchange, or as a part of a secession plan, he added.
Another disagreement between Belgrade and Pristina concerns Belgrade's determination to link protection of religious sites with the planned decentralisation of municipalities with ethnic minority populations.
Belgrade says the heritage protection zones need to be linked physically to the nearest Serbian municipalities, a proposal that Pristina resists.
The UN's Albert Roan says that Belgrade and Pristina have adopted totally different approaches.
"Belgrade is suggesting a direct link between decentralisation and the matters of patrimony, wanting to include the churches and the church zones into an entity which will be composed of the Serb majority municipalities and the churches," he said. "Pristina envisages more direct, specific measures."
Ylber Hysa, the Kosovo negotiating team's coordinator for cultural and religious heritage issues, says the Serbian side is abusing the heritage issue by attempting to link it with the process of decentralisation.
"If there were less politics and less of a wish to manipulate things from Belgrade, the whole question could be resolved in minutes," Hysa told Balkan Insight.
With Belgrade and Pristina hurling accusations at each other, independent experts fear both sides are using the cultural and religious heritage problem to promote other agendas.
Nenad Djurdjevic, from the Centre for Non-Violent Resistance, said it was apparent from the start that both sides would try to politicise the question. He said that instead of trying to find a workable solution for both sides, "the whole discussion was focused on whether this heritage was Serbian or Kosovar".
The Albanian side, Djurdjevic added, tried to strengthen the case for Kosovo's independence by claiming Serbian heritage in Kosovo as solely Kosovar, which Serbs denied.
"On the other hand, Belgrade is also approaching the question in a political way," he went on. "It is certain that by expanding the territory in which construction is forbidden, Belgrade will indirectly gain influence over large areas in Kosovo."
One foreign expert - who has followed the cultural protection negotiations and who spoke on condition of anonymity - agreed with Djurdjevic's analysis.
This expert told Balkan Insight that professional and practical concerns for the protection of Kosovo's cultural heritage are not at the forefront of the negotiators' minds.
"The main protagonists are all trying to use Kosovo's cultural heritage and its protection as means of leveraging points that have to do with political issues, and to claim control over territory, funds, and decision-making authority," he said.
"If that were not the case, this issue could have been resolved long ago."
Maja Radojevic is a journalist from Mitrovica. Balkan Insight is BIRN's online publication.
This article was published with the support of the British embassy in Belgrade, as part of BIRN's Minority Media Training and Reporting Project.
(From: BIRN, Sarajevo. - http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_51_4_eng.php) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 30 septiembre 2006 : 21:45:48
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KOSOVO: Religion law fails to tackle contentious legal status question
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service <http://www.forum18.org>, and
Drasko Djenovic, Forum 18 News Service <http://www.forum18.org>
While some Protestants are jubilant that the new religion law approved by the Kosovo Assembly on 13 July has been amended by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to specify five of the faiths by name that enjoy rights and freedoms (Muslims, Orthodox, Catholics, Jews and Evangelicals) others are critical. "If it is true that the Evangelical (Pentecostal) church is mentioned it is not right, since all should be mentioned or none," Adventist pastor Nikola Aslimovski complained to Forum 18 News Service. UNMIK promulgated the law on 24 August, but only made this public on 20 September. The law fails to tackle the highly contentious issue of how and which religious communities will get legal status. "Everything should be nailed down in one law," one religious freedom expert told Forum 18. "Nothing should ever be left vague to be returned to later."
Kosovo's politicians and religious communities are yet to respond over the decision by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to amend the religion law approved by the Assembly on 13 July to specify by name five of the religious communities. UNMIK made the amendment when it promulgated the law on 24 August, although UNMIK did not publicly announce the promulgation until 20 September. Some Protestant leaders have welcomed to Forum 18 News Service the inclusion of the "Evangelical Church" among the five communities, arguing that this will help prevent any discrimination against them in future, though an Adventist pastor questions why some communities but not others have been singled out for mention.
But with the law's failure to cover the highly contentious issue of how and which religious communities will be able to get legal status, many believe the current law has not guaranteed free religious practice for the future. One religious freedom expert who has advised international organisations on drafting of legal texts argued to Forum 18 that the international community had made a mistake in not insisting that the religion law cover all aspects of religious communities' life – including how they gain legal status – in one text. "Everything should be nailed down in one law," the expert declared. "Nothing should ever be left vague to be returned to later."
Senior Kosovo officials – including Vedat Gashi, chief legal adviser to the prime minister, who has been heavily involved in the drafting of the religion law – are in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, so Forum 18 was unable to find out what further legal measures the government believes are necessary to tackle the issue of legal recognition of religious communities.
Many people have told Forum 18 that they believe the law was adopted in some haste merely to meet the demands of the international community.
Leading figures in various religious communities – including the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and some Protestant churches –told Forum 18 on 20 September that they have heard nothing about the new religion law's promulgation and have not seen the final text. Defrim Krasniqi of the Kosovo Assembly's department for legislation also told Forum 18 on 20 September that UNMIK had not yet notified it of the promulgation and the text of the new law has not yet been posted on the Assembly's website.
Ejup Ramadani, an aide to chief mufti Naim Ternava, told Forum 18 on 20 September that the Muslim community will have to study the final text, consult and then give its opinion about it, as well as whether it believes that the legal framework is now complete.
Many provisions have changed in successive versions in the long-drawn-out and often acrimonious preparation of this religion law. It was only in the final stages of its adoption – and with the deadline running out to adopt this law, one of the 13 priority laws required to meet standards on human rights laid down by the international community which currently governs Kosovo – the law was cut down to remove any references to registration of religious communities. What was left mainly covers general principles of religious freedom. However, secrecy and confusion surrounded the law's adoption right up to the end (see F18News 19 June 2006 http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=801).
Some have criticised the way UNMIK amended Article 5.4 to specify that the religious communities enjoying rights and freedoms included the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, the Jewish community and the Evangelical Church.
Nikola Aslimovski, a Seventh-day Adventist pastor in Pristina who heads the church in Kosovo as a whole, said he had not seen the final text of the law. "But if is true that the Evangelical (Pentecostal) church is mentioned it is not right, since all should be mentioned or none," he told Forum 18 on 20 September. "It is mentioned only because some UNMIK people belong to that church." He likened it to the situation in his home country of Macedonia, where he said the Methodist church was named as traditional "just because my late friend Boris Trajkovski [a Methodist] was the country's president".
Privately, UNMIK officials insist to Forum 18 that the naming of the five faiths was not to accord them any special status above other religious communities, but to ensure that pluralism is respected.
"The amendment of Article 5.4 does not add to or limit the rights of other religious communities not being listed, as it says 'including' which implies other communities as well," Alfons Lentze, a legal advisor in a European Union (EU) funded project to support the Assembly, run by the European Agency for Reconstruction, told Forum 18 from Pristina on 20 September. "But I do not know how UNMIK came up with it in its promulgation. Unfortunately that process on the level of UNMIK is not transparent and no dialogue obviously took place with the Assembly. Also, it happened during the summer recess."
However, other Protestant leaders are jubilant. Pastor Artur Krasniqi of the Evangelical Church (KPEC) – which brings together 31 members believed to represent some 85 per cent of Protestant organisations in Kosovo - describes this as "the most important part" of the law.
But Krasniqi concedes that the "big issue" is how the legal status of religious communities will be arranged. "The government is saying that the relevant ministry will draw up regulations governing this, but we don't know which ministry this will be," he told Forum 18. He said the Culture and the Public Services ministries have been mentioned, but added that the Islamic community has asked for a Religion Ministry to be established.
Lentze agrees that legal status of religious communities will be a very difficult issue. "This will be up to the legislative and executive bodies, and will not be considered until after Kosovo's final status is resolved," he told Forum 18. "But this will have to be monitored closely."
Krasniqi and other religious figures still suspect that some politicians intend to try to amend the new religion law once Kosovo's final status has been agreed. "Some people say unofficially they will do this," he maintained.
Confusion surrounds the issue of taxation of religious communities. Protestant churches complain that without legal status as religious communities they cannot claim tax-exempt status from the tax office. Adding to confusion is the Kosovo government's agreement – offered as part of the final status talks in Vienna - to give the Serbian Orthodox Church privileges over taxes and duties not offered to other religious communities.
Religious communities and the international community will also be watching the way religious freedom rights are enshrined in Kosovo's new constitution, which is now being drafted and which is set to replace the current interim constitutional framework approved by UNMIK in 2001.
Nekibe Kelmendi, a co-chair of the committee preparing the draft insists that the text will follow the wording of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "We have finished working on the basic principles and they now need to be approved by the Assembly," she told Forum 18 from Pristina on 20 September. "We don't yet know when the final text will be approved." She said she recognises the rights to hold, adopt, change and manifest one's religion, but added that the constitution will probably confine itself to a brief mention as "all the rights are spelled out in full in the separate law on religious freedom". (END)
For a personal commentary by a KFOR military chaplain on the future of Kosovo, see http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=449
For a personal commentary by an Austrian lawyer arguing (in relation to Serbia) that Austria's system of dividing religious communities into different categories with differing legal rights should not be followed, see F18News http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=403
A printer-friendly map of Kosovo & Serbia (map title Serbia and Montenegro) is available at http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/atlas/index.html?Parent=europe&Rootmap=yugosl. The map follows international legal usage in indicating the boundaries of territories. Kosovo is in international law part of Serbia & Montenegro, although administered by the UN.
(From F18News, FORUM 18, Oslo, Norway, 20 September 2006. - http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=843) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 17 octubre 2006 : 21:10:47
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Avanti tutta con l'indipendenza condizionata
Da Pristina, scrive Alma Lama
11.10.2006
Intervista a Veton Surroi, leader del movimento Ora e membro del gruppo negoziale del Kosovo nei colloqui sullo status a Vienna. Decentramento e presenza internazionale in un futuro Kosovo indipendente. L'incognita delle elezioni in Serbia. Dalla nostra corrispondente
Come stanno procedendo i negoziati? Avete raggiunto i vostri obiettivi come gruppo di negoziazione?
Ho l’impressione che il processo dei negoziati sia in ritardo. Si prevedeva che Ahtisaari, per i primi giorni di settembre, avrebbe consegnato nelle mani delle due delegazioni una proposta, e che si sarebbe aperta l'ultima fase negoziale. A questo punto avremmo dovuto essere qui a discutere dei dettagli, e non, come stiamo ancora facendo, dei principi. A me sembra che dopo l'ultima riunione del Consiglio di Sicurezza ci sia d'aspettarsi un prolungamento dei colloqui su questioni “tecniche” che si sono sviluppati sino ad ora a Vienna
Perché questo prolungamento?
Mi sembra che la Russia abbia un ruolo importante in tutto questo. Quest'ultima sembra abbia chiesto agli altri membri del Gruppo di Contatto perlomeno di fare qualche sforzo in più affinché le posizioni di Pristina e Belgrado si avvicinino. Questo ritardo dei negoziati però non è positivo perché a me sembra che a Vienna si sia arrivati ad un punto tale dove è difficile esca qualcosa di nuovo.
In Serbia è stato accolto in modo positivo quanto uscito dall'ultimo Consiglio di Sicurezza e dall'ultimo incontro del Gruppo di Contatto. Ritiene che Belgrado faccia bene a pensare che siano emerse garanzie in merito ad un rallentamento nel processo di definizione dello status?
Questa può essere una delle ragioni principali dietro a questo ottimismo. La Russia e la Cina hanno posizioni che dipendono da valutazioni di politica interna in merito allo status del Kosovo. Non hanno interessi strategici direttamente in Kosovo. Ma la questione del Kosovo rappresenta di per sé un interesse strategico: per confermare il loro ruolo di potenze a livello internazionale e la possibilità che hanno di porre il veto a decisioni del Consiglio ONU.
Utilizzeranno Cina e Russia questo potere di veto, come minacciano ultimamente?
E' da molto tempo che questi due stati non utilizzano il potere di veto ma quest'ultimo è utilizzato spesso più come una minaccia che effettivamente. La Russia è entrata nella fase delle minacce, un avvertimento con il quale cerca di avvicinare alle proprie posizioni i partner occidentali.
Ora si sta parlando di posticipare la questione dello status a dopo le elezioni politiche in Serbia. Ritiene che questa sia una soluzione che trova consensi in seno al Gruppo di Contatto?
Addesso chi è vicino alla Serbia sta cercando di legare la questione dello status alle elezioni in Serbia. La verità è che anche se si decidesse entro l'anno sullo status del Kosovo, tutto l'anno prossimo si sarebbe occupati nell'implementare la decisione e quindi in ogni caso si andrebbe a sovrapporsi con le elezioni in Serbia. Mi sembra che su questo però si stia insistendo in modo artificioso, per il fatto che non è rilevante chi vincerà le elezioni in Serbia in merito a questa questione. Questo non è un conflitto tra il Kosovo ed un governo specifico, questo è un conflitto secolare, che sta arrivando alla sua fase conclusiva. Inoltre non ritengo che alle prossime elezioni in Serbia si creerà una situazione politicamente e qualitativamente più favorevole, anzi, probabilmente si accentuerà la distanza tra Belgrado e Pristina.
Martti Ahtisaari, dopo l'ultima riunione del Consiglio di Sicurezza, ha affermato che sta realizzando un “pacchetto” per la soluzione dello status e che quest'ultimo non deve sorprendere nessuno. Come interpreta questa dichiarazione?
Non so, deve chiedere al signor Ahtisaari
Significa forse che nessuna delle due parti negoziali riceverà ciò che ha chiesto, e che quindi il Kosovo non avrà sicuramente fin da subito piena indipendenza?
Questo è un gioco di parole, dipende da come si interpretano le cose. I principi del Gruppo di Contatto hanno già determinato che si dovrà intervenire sulla sovranità del Kosovo: ma il Kosovo non può aspettarsi di avere una sovranità come la hanno Montenegro, Gran Bretagna o Spagna.
La comunità albanese accetterà questo?
Da parte albanese si è consapevoli di questo anche perché si è accettato di far parte del processo di negoziazione, si sostengono i principi sanciti dal Gruppo di Contatto, e da questi si deduce chiaramente che quando il Kosovo diverrà indipendente avrà anche una presenza internazionale forte, sia civile che militare.
Il gruppo di negoziazione, o Unity Team come viene chiamato recentemente, ha ricevuto dure critiche alcuni giorni fa dall'Assemblea del Kosovo. Potrebbe sembrare che voi non abbiate il sostegno né di quest'istituzione e neppure dai vostri partiti per quanto state facendo a Vienna ...
Si debbono fare i nomi dei partiti che operano così. Per me è stato molto strano che coloro i quali hanno sempre sostenuto il processo di decentramento ora lo critichino. Anche perché a questo proposito, negli ultimi tre anni, non è cambiato assolutamente nulla. Ma i partiti dell'attuale coalizione di governo non hanno mai criticato questo processo, se non ora. Si tratta di ipocrisia, nulla di più.
Sul decentramento sono state fatte molte concessioni alla controparte, sino ad arrivare ad una discriminazione positiva. Avete accettato veri e propri privilegi per i serbi. C'è un limite a questi privilegi?
Il limite viene posto dal funzionamento dello Stato del Kosovo. Noi non abbiamo avuto un approccio dogmatico, dicendo ad esempio che si rispettano determinati diritti per una determinata percentuale. Ma un approccio creativo, cercando di creare un futuro stato democratico.
L'Accademia delle Scienze del Kosovo ha ultimamente reagito negativamente al processo di decentramento sostenendo che lo si stia facendo su criteri etnici, e così anche in merito alla tutela dei beni culturali. A loro avviso ci si sta dedicando solo ai serbi. Che peso hanno queste critiche?
Questi reazioni arrivano tardi. Sono tre anni che il Kosovo ha a che fare con il tema del decentramento. Hanno avuto il tempo necessario per chiedere spiegazioni ulteriori. Io parlo da tre anni contro il fatto che il processo di decentramento avvenga su base etnica, ma non ho mai sentito che in Accademia si siano dette cose di questo tipo.
Non vi è il rischio, come dicono alcuni, che vi sia un'appropriazione dell'eredità culturale kosovara?
Non vi è alcuna appropriazione. Questi sono monumenti del Kosovo, nel Kosovo e che appartengono alla cultura del Kosovo. Sono della popolazione serba ma dentro il Kosovo esiste anche la cultura serba.
Recentemente vi siete espresso contro le modalità attuali di rappresentanza delle minoranze nell'Assemblea del Kosovo. Attualmente la Cornice Costituzionale riserva per le minoranze 20 seggi...
Chi è stato coinvolto nel redigere la Cornice Costituzionale del Kosovo ha accettato con molta leggerezza il termine “riservato” che ha permesso una rappresentanza più che doppia alle minoranze. Dopo le prime elezioni in Kosovo eravamo nella situazione assurda per cui la comunità serba, che rappresentava meno del 5% della popolazione, aveva 22 deputati in Assemblea
Cambierà questa situazione?
Io propongo si arrivi ad una riforma. Non può stare scritto nella Cornice Costituzionale che un ministro sia serbo o albanese. Non vi può essere un'etnicizzazione dei ministri. Questa mia proposta è stata accettata a livello della delegazione kosovara a Vienna.
A livello internazionale vige un principio per cui un diritto dato difficilmente venga tolto ...
#278; un diritto che è stato imposto dalla comunità internazionale. La Cornice Costituzionale non è stata votata dall'Assemblea del Kosovo.
Ritiene che Ahtisaari accetterà questa posizione?
Ritengo che la nostra proposta passerà. Vi sarà un accordo politico per cui, dopo la definizione dello status, per un certo periodo le cose rimarranno come sono ora, ma a livello costituzionale non vi possono essere regole che blocchino il buon funzionamento dello stato del Kosovo.
Voi però avete proposto un sistema di decentramento che è senza dubbio poco funzionale...
#278; vero ma il processo è stato avviato più di tre anni fa. E allora i partiti al potere diedero il loro avvallo, in modo a mio avviso irresponsabile. Oggi ci si ritrova in questa situazione.
Che tipo di presenza internazionale vi sarà in Kosovo dopo la definizione dello status?
Una cosa certa è che resteranno le forze della NATO. La KFOR rimarrà, ed è la benvenuta. La seconda cosa è che vi sarà anche una presenza civile che monitorerà il Kosovo indipendente e che potrà intervenire su questioni come i diritti umani, le minoranze e anche il sistema della giustizia. Potrà anche essere che la comunità internazionale intervenga anche su questioni che riguardano le dogane.
Sembra una struttura simile all'attuale UNMIK, si sta parlando quindi di status “futuro” e non certo “finale”...
Ciò a cui noi siamo interessati è definire la soggettività internazionale. Una volta per tutte i confini attuali del Kosovo devono divenire confini internazionali, questo deve essere riconosciuto da entrambe le parti e poi deve esservi un seggio presso l'Assemblea dell'ONU.
Cosa avverrà nel caso in cui il riconoscimento del Kosovo non verrà da tutti ma solo da alcuni Paesi, a seconda dei rispettivi interessi stategici?
Questo è uno scenario che non auspichiamo perché implicherebbe molto tempo per arrivare in fondo al processo. Per noi sarebbe molto importante che questo riconoscimento arrivi direttamente dal Consiglio di Sicurezza.
(Da OSSERVATORIO SUI BALCANI, Newsletter nº 40 / 2006. - http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/6251/1/51/) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 10 noviembre 2006 : 22:09:34
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Contact Group Postpones Plan for Kosovo
With Russia pulling one way and the West another, agreement at big power summit has been postponed
By Jeta Xharra in New York and Krenar Gashi in Pristina
(Balkan Insight, 10 November 06)
Representatives of the world's most powerful states met Martti Ahtisaari, the UN's special envoy for Kosovo, on November 10 in Vienna, in an attempt to hammer out a common approach to resolving Kosovo’s final status.
After the closed-door meeting, Ahtisaari said he would delay issuing a proposal on the future of the territory until after Serbian elections in January.
"I have decided to present my proposal for the settlement of Kosovo status to the parties without delay after the parliamentary elections in Serbia," said Ahtisaari, in a statement sent out by his office, UNOSEC.
This followed calls the same day from Serbian President Boris Tadic for a general poll on January 21, 2007.
Initially, Ahtisaari was expected to present his proposal to the so-called "Contact Group" and then to the UN Security Council, before the end of 2006.
But divisions in the Contact Group have become obvious, with Serbia's old ally, Russia, now seemingly ready to defend its initial position that only a solution supported by both Serbia and Kosovo will fly, and use its veto power in the UN Security Council if this is not forthcoming.
Andrei Dronov, the head of Russia’s office in Kosovo, said that “if there is an attempt to impose a solution that Belgrade doesn’t agree with, Russia will use its veto on the Security Council.”
Agim Ceku, Kosovo's prime minister, has meanwhile stated that, anyway, “Kosovo might declare its independence” rather than wait for consensus in the international community.
While Kosovo’s Albanian majority wants Kosovo to be independent, and very soon, Serbia remains irreconcilable to such an outcome.
Now this division is reflected also in the Contact Group, with its Western members broadly accepting the Kosovars’ right to go their own way, but Russia insisting quite the opposite.
Kosovo has been a UN protectorate since 1999, when NATO’s air campaign forced the Serbian administration to withdraw from the territory.
UN-led negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo on final status started in February 2006 under the auspices of special envoy Ahtisaari. But several months on, the talks are going nowhere.
Ahtisaari’s office in Vienna, UNOSEC, is now finalising a proposal on the future status of Kosovo for the Contact Group and UN Security Council.
While Ahtisaari’s report remains secret, most seasoned observers predict some form of supervised or conditional independence, with the EU playing a key role.
Brussels is already planning its international mission in Kosovo that will be in charge of key areas such as security and justice.
Sources in US State Department confirmed that Washington will support Kosovo’s independence, under international supervision.
Reminding the international community that Kosovo will anyway declare independence, Prime Minister Ceku articulated growing impatience in the disputed territory for the foreign powers' plan.
"This is not a threat. We see this as a possibility. Kosovo will be an independent state and now we are discussing the timeline and possibilities" said Ceku, after meeting Joachim Ruecker, the head of UNMIK, on November 9.
But Russia is not hiding its unhappiness with the drift of events. Andrei Dronov told Balkan Insight that Moscow will not back the imposition of any solution that Serbia cannot accept.
“The Contact Group does not have to accept the proposal from Ahtisaari,” he maintained.
Dronov added that if Kosovo’s status was resolved “without a resolution from the Security Council” – by countries choosing whether or not to recognise a unilateral declaration of independence – “it will set a dangerous precedent”.
The Russian diplomat was clearly referring to other secessionist disputes in Russia’s vicinity, above all in Georgia, where the break-away territory of Abkhazia is striving for independence.
However, Richard Holbrooke, the former American diplomat and wartime mediator in Bosnia, suggested Russia’s threats over Kosovo were mainly bluff. He said he did not believe that “Russians are that stupid” to use their UN veto over Kosovo.
“The Russians don’t give a damn about the Serbs,” Holbrooke added.
Kosovo's political leaders are reluctant to accept any link between their own status and that of other breakaway regions, such as Abkhazia, in Georgia, or Transdniester, in Moldova.
They say the Kosovo case is “sui generis” and will not serve as a precedent for other disputes.
Agim Ceku said he expected Ahtisaari “to propose Kosovo to be an independent state, with all the competences that a state has”.
Hua Jiang, UNOSEC spokeswoman, said the contents of the status envoy’s proposal remained secret – indeed, the text had not even been finished.
But Dronov remains adamant that completion of the envoy’s report will not necessarily end the final-status process.
“If the Contact Group agrees to Ahtisaari’s proposal, they will bring the solution back to the parties,” he said, referring to the Kosovo and Serbian negotiating teams, adding that “Russia would insist on a compromise between parties involved”.
One international official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Balkan Insight that with this lack of consensus between the western states and Russia, and elections now coming up in Serbia, Kosovo’s final status won’t be resolved until at least the middle of 2007.
Jeta Xharra is BIRN Kosovo Country Director. Krenar Gashi is BIRN Kosovo Assistant Editor. Bukurie Bajraliu also contributed to this article.
Balkan Insight is BIRN’s online publication. - http://www.birn.eu.com/en/58/10/1614/ |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 17 noviembre 2006 : 20:40:50
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La disillusione
Da Pristina, scrive Alma Lama
17.11.2006
Il 2006 si chiuderà con un nulla di fatto. E per la definizione dello status occorre aspettare perlomeno la fine del gennaio 2007. Sale il discontento in Kosovo e cresce la diffidenza nei confronti della comunità internazionale
Il capo-negoziatore Martti Ahtisaari non viene più visto in Kosovo come il Babbo Natale che porterà l'indipendenza. Al contrario. Tra i cittadini del Kosovo iniziano a sorgere dubbi sulla vera essenza della sua missione. La decisione di posticipare la definizione dello status, prevista per la fine del 2006, è stato uno degli elementi che li sta portando a queste considerazioni. “Non credo che la questione dello status la risolva Ahtisaari. Questa è una bugia dell'Europa, e non è la prima volta che viene ripetuta”, afferma Sami Sadiku, un cittadino di Pristina.
Feim Rushit, un ragazzo di trent'anni non la pensa diversamente. “Quanto fatto da Ahtisaari non è da noi accettabile. Sa bene in che condizioni stiamo vivendo. Siamo vittime di uno status quo che da sette anni non porta che disoccupazione e povertà”. Per strada, nella capitale kosovara, la pensano più o meno tutti così. Affermano di aver ricevuto da Ahtisaari una dura delusione, in particolare perché è stata proprio la Serbia ad averla vinta sul posticipare la decisione sullo status. In molti si dicono arrabbiati anche con la classe politica kosovara. “I nostri politici sono ciechi”, afferma Sami Sadiku “devono mettersi a fare qualcosa per migliorare la situazione”.
La sera precedente all'annuncio che la proposta ONU sullo status sarebbe stata presentata solo dopo le elezioni in Serbia, in programma per il prossimo 21 gennaio, i membri del Gruppo negoziale kosovaro avevano preso parte ad una trasmissione televisiva. Nessuno ha parlato con cautela, annunciando in pompa magna che oramai l'indipendenza era certa. Creando così grandi aspettative che in questo periodo stanno andando a braccetto con un innalzamento della tensione. E venendo smentiti, poche ore dopo, dai fatti.
In superficie tutto sembra calmo ma si teme basti una scintilla per far scoppiare il fuoco. Non è l'opinione di qualche isolato analista, è la stessa KFOR a pensarla così. Roland Kather, a capo dell'esercito multinazionale NATO in Kosovo, immediatamente dopo l'annuncio che la questione dello status sarebbe stata afforntata solo a partire da fine gennaio ha specificato che la situazione era calma, “ma non stabile”.
Su tutto il territorio kosovaro è evidente una maggiore presenza dei soldati KFOR, anche se questi ultimi ufficialmente non sono in pre-allarme. Il primo ministro kosovaro Agim Ceku non perde occasione per chiedere ai cittadini di essere pazienti e che i ritardi non muteranno i contenuti delle proposte che verranno presentate da Ahtisaari. “Crediamo si sia sbagliato a posticipare la decisione sullo status, ma siamo convinti che entro la primavera del 2007 il Kosovo sarà indipendente”, ripete spesso il premier.
Ramush Tahiri, un analista politico indipendente, non la pensa così. “Per Ahtisaari aver accettato le richieste della Serbia rappresenta un compromesso che spera porti alla vittoria delle forze democratiche alla prossime parlamentari. E spera che queste ultime accettino per il Kosovo un'indipendenza condizionata”.
Albin Kurti, leader del movimento "Vetevendosje" (autodeterminazione) afferma di non essere stupito da quanto avvenuto, perché era già nell'aria nei circoli internazionali. "Il fatto che sia legato alle elezioni in Serbia dimostra come il Kosovo dipenda in parte ancora da quest'ultima”. Il vero problema, secondo Albin Kurti, consiste nel fatto che il dibattito sulla tempistica sta di fatto allontanando l'attenzione dai contenuti “del pacco che verrà portato da Ahtisaari”.
“La proposta di Ahtisaari dirà chiaramente che il Kosovo non sarà uno stato indipendente e sovrano, non avrà un seggio presso l'Assemblea delle Nazioni Unite, non avrà un proprio ministero degli Esteri, non potrà autonomamente garantire la propria integrità territoriale”.
Subito dopo la notizia che i negoziati erano stati spostati a gennaio – appresa dal Gruppo negoziale kosovaro dai media - c'è stata una picola “ribellione”. Il premier Agim Ceku ha ribadito quanto aveva già affermato in un incontro con l'amministratore Joachim Ruecker: le autorità kosovare erano pronte a dichiarare unilateralmente nell'Assemblea kosovara l'indipendenza.
Una dichiarazione che ha avuto vita breve. Sono intervenuti subito sia Ruecker che il comandante della KFOR. “Ogni atto unilaterale rappresenta un passo controproduttivo”, ha dichiarato il responsabile dell'amministrazione UNMIK.
La pressione sulla classe politica kosovara è tale che nell'Assemblea del Kosovo non si è mai nemmeno discusso della questione dello status. Alla prima seduta successiva alla notizia del posticipo della decisione sullo status il Gruppo negoziale ha chiesto di riferire in parlamento quanto avvenuto, ma non è stato possibile. “Dobbiamo rispettare la procedura parlamentare”, è stata la risposta del Presidente dell'Assemblea Kolw Berisha.
L'unico, ma fuori dai confini del Kosovo, a reagire duramente è stato il primo ministro albanese Sali Berisha. Commentando alcune notizie secondo le quali si starebbe preparando una divisione del Kosovo ha affermato senza mezzi termini che questo “farebbe entrare i Balcani nei giorni più bui della loro storia”. Il premier albanese ha chiesto ufficialmente al Gruppo di contatto di non permettere una eventuale “Repubblica autonoma di Mitrovica” e non permettere che si facciano operazioni chirurgiche territoriali in Kosovo.
Il presidente kosovaro Sejdiu ha affermato che queste dichiarazioni sono del tutto “normali per un paese vicino” ma che comunque il Gruppo negoziale kosovaro non ha alcuna informazione in merito ad un'eventualità di divisione del Kosovo.
Il prossimo 21 gennaio in Serbia si terranno le elezioni politiche. I kosovari devono aspettare almeno altri due mesi per sapere cosa ne sarà del Kosovo. E sembra sempre più diffusa l'opinione che la collaborazione con la comunità internazionale non basti, perché non se ne vedono i risultati.
(Da OSSERVATORIO SUI BALCANI, Newsletter n. 45 / 2006. - http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/6422) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 20 noviembre 2006 : 21:34:17
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Ruecker y Rupel piden fijar estatuto Kosovo a comienzos de 2007
Terra Actualidad - EFE
20-11-2006
La decisión sobre el futuro y definitivo estatuto de Kosovo debe adoptarse a principios de 2007, sin que haya más aplazamientos, consideró hoy en Zagreb el jefe de la misión de la ONU en Kosovo (Unmik), Joachim Ruecker.
Por su parte, tras reunirse con Ruecker, el ministro de Exteriores de Eslovenia, Dimitrij Rupel, recordó que la fecha prevista para la solución del futuro de Kosovo ya ha sido aplazada debido a la convocatoria de las elecciones parlamentarias en Serbia para el 21 de enero de 2007.
Rupel coincidió con Ruecker en que 'no debería haber nuevos aplazamientos', según informó la agencia STA.
El jefe de Unmik consideró que aún después de logrado un acuerdo sobre el estatuto de Kosovo, provincia serbia de población mayoritariamente albanesa, permanecerá en la región la presencia militar y civil extranjera.
Recordó que las autoridades de Kosovo no pueden proclamar unilateralmente la independencia ya que se han comprometido a esperar la propuesta que presentará después de las elecciones serbias el enviado especial de la ONU para las negociaciones sobre Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.
Sus autoridades albanesas, que representan a más del 90 por ciento de la población, abogan por la independencia, mientras que la minoría serbia y Belgrado insisten en que Kosovo, aunque con gran autonomía, siga siendo de alguna forma parte de Serbia.
Kosovo, que se encuentra en el sur de Serbia, está administrada desde junio de 1999 por la comunidad internacional y su estatus debe ser definido en los próximos meses.
Mientras que los albano-kosovares, en torno al 90 por ciento de los habitantes de ese territorio, desean la independencia, el gobierno serbio la rechaza con vehemencia y ofrece a cambio una autonomía sustancial.
http://actualidad.terra.es/nacional/articulo/ruecker_rupel_kosovo_1221272.htm
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 22 diciembre 2006 : 19:56:16
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Kosovo, tra passato e futuro
Di Christophe Solioz*, Ginevra, 30 novembre 2006
(titolo originale: “Kosovo: No longer and not yet”)
Traduzione per Osservatorio sui Balcani: Carlo Dall'Asta
07.12.2006
Fin dal 1999 il Kosovo sperimenta un ''intervallo temporale determinato da cose che non sono più e cose che non sono ancora''. Un testo di Christophe Solioz redatto nel contesto della conferenza “Kosovo, regione d’Europa'', organizzata a Roma il 15 dicembre 2006 da Osservatorio sui Balcani
L’attuale situazione del Kosovo dimostra l’osservazione di Hannah Arendt secondo cui “pensiero e realtà si sono divisi, e la realtà è diventata opaca alla luce del pensiero”. Fin dal 1999, il Kosovo sperimenta “un intervallo temporale determinato da cose che non sono più e da cose che ancora non sono. Nella storia, questi intervalli hanno mostrato più di una volta di poter contenere il momento della verità” (1). La questione è come affrontare questo momento decisivo, ed è strettamente legata agli standard e allo status.
Lo Stato delle cose
La presenza internazionale in Kosovo di personale civile e di forze di sicurezza fu stabilita dal Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU nella risoluzione 1244 del giugno 1999 “per un periodo iniziale di 12 mesi, da prorogare successivamente salvo che il Consiglio di Sicurezza decida altrimenti”. La missione fu anche incaricata, nella fase finale, di “supervisionare il trasferimento dell’autorità, dalle istituzioni provvisorie del Kosovo ad istituzioni stabilite in seguito ad un accordo politico” (2). Sette anni dopo la risoluzione 1244, appare molto dubbio che questo esperimento di democrazia controllata abbia avuto successo, e che una soluzione politica per lo status finale della provincia possa essere raggiunta in tempi brevi.
In recenti esaustivi rapporti, il Segretario generale delle Nazioni unite dipinge un quadro deprimente. Nel febbraio 2005 egli affermò che – nonostante le pressioni internazionali – nessuno degli otto standard stabiliti in precedenza era stato pienamente implementato (3). Da allora, il focalizzarsi sulla questione dello status ha portato alla rapida implementazione di alcuni standard, ma ha anche ritardato le riforme, e soprattutto ha ostacolato l’effettiva implementazione e l’entrata in vigore di leggi già approvate. Infatti, il 25 gennaio 2006, il Segretario generale notò che il progresso nell’implementazione degli standard era più lento che in ogni altro periodo monitorato, e afflitto da numerosi ritardi e battute d’arresto (4). A metà agosto 2006, solo 5 implementazioni prioritarie su 13 erano considerate completate (5).
Analogamente, anche se il governo del Kosovo ha istituito una Agenzia per l’integrazione europea e ha adottato un piano d’azione per affrontare le priorità in vista del partenariato europeo, queste priorità, sul breve termine, sono state soddisfatte solo parzialmente (6). Nonostante questo impegno recentemente aumentato per l’implementazione degli standard – uno sforzo per migliorare la credibilità di Pristina ai negoziati di Vienna sullo status – complessivamente la situazione politica ed economica rimane cupa (7). I serbi del Kosovo continuano a rifiutarsi di participare alle istituzioni provvisorie. Nell’estate del 2006, le municipalità di Leposavi#263;, Zveçan e Zubin Potok hanno tagliato tutti i legami con le istituzioni provvisorie del Kosovo, pur mantenendo la cooperazione con l’Unmik. Il posto chiave di ministro dell’Agricoltura, delle Foreste e dello Sviluppo rurale, all’interno del gabinetto di governo, riservato ad un serbo kosovaro, è rimasto vacante. Ciò ha portato ad una pressoché completa assenza dei serbi del Kosovo dalla scena politica ed amministrativa.D’altra parte, i serbi del Kosovo settentrionale fanno parte della delegazione guidata da Belgrado ai colloqui sullo status.
Sul versante degli albanesi kosovari, quasi non ci sono segni che il Kosovo venga considerato un Paese multietnico: al di là della vuota retorica ufficiale, non c’è alcuna reale apertura verso i serbi kosovari, nessuna volontà di includere membri di minoranze non serbe nel team negoziale del Kosovo, nessuna garanzia istituzionale né alcuna esplicita discriminazione positiva per i non albanesi. I diritti di proprietà non sono né rispettati né tutelati, e nel complesso non c’è un processo di ritorno. Più che mai, il Kosovo è una società profondamente divisa – molto lontana dalla visione di un Kosovo aperto alle diversità e multietnico.
Il rapporto sui progressi dell’UE sul Kosovo pubblicato l’8 novembre 2006 nota che “strutture amministrative parallele finanziate da Belgrado continuano ad operare nella maggior parte delle municipalità a predominanza serbo-kosovara. Due distinti sistemi continuano a funzionare in Kosovo nei campi della giustizia, dell’istruzione, dell’assistenza sanitaria, dell’amministrazione e del servizio postale” (8). I serbi del Kosovo stanno sviluppando una società parallela, sostenuta da Belgrado – sull’esempio del modello degli albanesi kosovari prima del 1999 (9).
A completare il quadro, bisogna considerare che il sistema giudiziario è inefficiente e che la corruzione dilaga ad ogni livello. La situazione dei diritti umani è misera: le donne sono vittime di pratiche discriminatorie nella vita economica e sociale, i meccanismi di protezione per i bambini sono inadeguati, le comunità minoritarie affrontano discriminazione e gravi restrizioni, con serbi e rom vittime designate di molestie ed intimidazioni. La maggior parte dei rom, degli ashkali e degli egiziani non hanno accesso ai servizi pubblici, alle attività produttive e all’istruzione. Infine, ma non ultimo in ordine di importanza, pochi progressi sono stati fatti nella lotta contro il traffico di esseri umani, ed il Kosovo resta un Paese d’origine, di transito e di destinazione per il trafficking.
Questa situazione non ha dissuaso l’ambasciatore Kai Eide, Inviato speciale del Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite, dal raccomandare nell’ottobre 2005 l’apertura dei negoziati sullo status, nonostante l’opinione già precedentemente espressa, secondo cui sarebbe stato prematuro passare le consegne sulle competenze chiave alle autorità locali, e secondo cui non ci sarebbe mai stato un momento adatto per affrontare la questione del futuro status del Kosovo (10). L’argomento chiave di Eide era che una posticipazione del processo dello status non avrebbe “presumibilmente portato a ulteriori, tangibili risultati nell’implementazione degli standard” (11). Di conseguenza il Segretario generale decise il 7 ottobre 2005 che era “giunto il tempo di passare alla fase successiva del processo politico”, sottolineando però allo stesso tempo che “l’implementazione degli standard deve continuare con sempre maggiore impegno e risultati” (12).
Negoziati, ma nessun compromesso
Il processo di definizione del futuro status ebbe inizio a Vienna il 20 febbraio 2006, sotto gli auspici dell’Inviato delle Nazioni Unite ed ex Presidente finlandese Martti Ahtisaari. Ma questi colloqui vertevano essenzialmente sul decentramento e su altri aspetti piuttosto tecnici, come i diritti delle comunità, la protezione della Chiesa ortodossa serba e il patrimonio ed il debito dello Stato, anziché sullo status finale. Ancora peggio, essi non hanno fino ad ora portato ad alcun risultato concreto. L’esito, ampiamente annunciato, di una qualche forma di indipendenza per il Kosovo, chiaramente ha minato i negoziati. Nonostante la presenza a Vienna il 24 luglio 2006 dei Primi ministri e dei Presidenti di Serbia e Kosovo, non si è fatto alcun importante passo avanti, ed il summit si è concluso in una situazione di stallo. Ulteriori colloqui diretti tra le parti hanno rivelato che esse rimangono su posizioni molto distanti in merito alla maggior parte delle questioni (13).
Da parte degli albanesi kosovari, come è stato osservato dall'International Crisis Group (ICG), “l’idea di proporre diverse possibili sistemazioni per i serbi del Kosovo, o di addolcire la pillola alla Serbia, di modo che sia più facile per la comunità internazionale indurre una recalcitrante Belgrado ad accettare l’indipendenza del Kosovo, non si è realmente tradotta in pensiero politico” (14). Da parte dei serbi, ogni cosa è stata fatta per ritardare l’indipendenza, per separare i territori serbi dal Kosovo, e per opporsi ad un'indipendenza formale, in linea con lo slogan di Belgrado “più dell’autonomia, meno dell’indipendenza”.
Questo approccio obsoleto e legalista non ha considerato il fatto che il legame tra Stato e cittadini in Kosovo si è evidentemente spezzato, e che gli albanesi kosovari certamente non sono interessati ad alcuna forma di ampia autonomia all’interno della Serbia; ma anche che la Serbia – essa stessa in una situazione finanziaria critica – non si può permettere il fardello economico dello sviluppo del Kosovo. Se la Serbia non vuole vendere il Kosovo, non è neppure in grado di pagarlo. Una catarsi indotta dalla perdita del Kosovo appare oggi utopistica, ma chissà in futuro...
Dato che i colloqui sullo status secondo le previsioni si dovrebbero concludere all’inizio del 2007 (15), dopo essere già stati posposti una volta, è difficile prevedere come l’Inviato ONU Ahtisaari potrà completare la sua “mission impossible”. Contrariamente a quanto suggerisce il più recente rapporto dell’ICG (16), appare dubbio che Ahtisaari riesca a presentare un qualche pacchetto di proposte risultanti dai colloqui di Vienna o là sottoscritte. I colloqui sul Kosovo potrebbero perciò concludersi con una soluzione imposta dalle pressioni internazionali e basata su una nuova risoluzione del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU. Quest’ultima molto probabilmente non utilizzerebbe la parola “indipendenza” ma si limiterebbe a suggerire una sovranità condizionale o limitata, obbligando la maggioranza albanese del Kosovo a garantire un pacchetto di diritti per i serbi del Kosovo e per le altre minoranze nelle tre sfere delle istituzioni centrali, del decentramento e della salvaguardia dell’identità culturale. Non è in alcun modo certo che un tale status riappacifichi le parti (17).
La prevista risoluzione del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU, attesa per marzo 2007, darà anche con ogni probabilità mandato di trasferire la maggior parte delle responsabilità dell’Unmik, benché probabilmente in misura minore di quanto dapprima preventivato, al governo del Kosovo, ed incaricherà una missione post-status di supervisionare questo processo di transizione e di subentrare all’Unmik in via di smobilitazione. Il Gruppo di contatto (18) probabilmente coordinerà il progettato Ufficio civile internazionale (ICO), che inizialmente era inteso come una missione guidata dall’UE. Resta da vedere se una qualsivoglia presenza internazionale sarà efficace, con poteri inferiori a quelli dell’Alto rappresentante in Bosnia ed Erzegovina. Per esempio, è un mistero come la parte settentrionale del Kosovo possa essere incorporata senza almeno qualche potere di coercizione. È ovvio che la missione post-status non si può focalizzare solo sulla supervisione, ma dovrà intervenire in alcune aree chiave, specialmente in quelle di cui si è discusso a Vienna.
Una Regione dell’UE, che altro?
Una solida cornice, che contribuisca allo sviluppo sociale ed economico ed al consolidamento di strutture sostenibili e democratiche, come anche alla stabilità nella regione, può essere costruita solo sulla base di uno status specifico. Ma sono veramente realistiche le opzioni del protettorato o della sovranità?
Lo scenario del quasi-protettorato, così come è stato implementato in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, potrebbe apparire ad alcuni – specialmente a Belgrado – come la migliore via di uscita dal pantano, e permetterebbe ad una entità del Kosovo di avere speciali vincoli con Belgrado (19). Ma se si dovesse scegliere questa opzione, la missione post-status finirebbe per avere molta più autorità di quanto immaginato da principio.
Se la piena indipendenza sembra tuttora fuori questione, ci si potrebbe chiedere se nelle attuali circostanze l’indipendenza condizionale sia davvero una soluzione attuabile, per non dire se gli albanesi del Kosovo la accetterebbero. Se nei loro cuori c’è l’indipendenza, essi hanno meno comprensione per le esigenze di un’amministrazione statale qualificata. Certamente il processo di state-building nel Kosovo non ha avuto abbastanza successo – se mai ne ha avuto - da costruire uno Stato sostenibile e democratico.
Il tacito consenso che il Gruppo di contatto sembra aver raggiunto dietro porte chiuse – sul fatto che l’indipendenza condizionale sia la via di uscita – è controbilanciato dal fatto che nessuno di questi Paesi è preparato ad imporre una soluzione senza l’accettazione di Belgrado. Al massimo, la risoluzione del Consiglio di Sicurezza potrebbe sostenere un nuovo pacchetto sulla presenza del successore internazionale ed accettare un atto di autodeterminazione. In questo caso, il riconoscimento potrebbe non seguire immediatamente, frustrando le aspettative degli albanesi kosovari, mentre l’atteggiamento della Serbia potrebbe continuare a minacciare l’intera presenza post-status, così come pure il futuro del Kosovo.
Comunque, l’indipendenza con sovranità piena o condizionale non garantirà che la “sindrome da democrazia illiberale” da cui è attualmente affetto il Kosovo possa essere superata. Potrebbe esser giunto il momento di abbandonare i concetti, propri del diciannovesimo secolo, di Stato-nazione e di confini nazionali, e di spostarsi verso un'integrazione transnazionale, un processo che ha negli scorsi decenni rimodellato l’Europa? Come ha suggerito Carl Bildt, l’alternativa “ad istituire nuovi Stati-nazione nella regione è istituire nuove strutture europee e regionali” (20).
Indubbiamente gli Stati moderni si devono confrontare – in Kosovo come in ogni altro posto – con la realtà degli Stati multinazionali, e devono “imparare a convivere con il pluralismo culturale, e ad escogitare strategie per la coesistenza che non contraddicano i principi di libertà, giustizia e democrazia” (21). In questo campo, le raccomandazioni Lund (22) potrebbero suggerire dei princìpi base e delle buone norme pratiche su come implementare queste strategie di integrazione, e su come promuovere opzioni per l’autogoverno che non siano la sovranità e la secessione (23).
Per sfuggire all’attuale vicolo cieco della dicotomia ”indipendenza-autonomia”, si deve trovare una soluzione innovativa che servirebbe da ponte tra passato e futuro. Davvero è tempo di immaginare una soluzione su basi completamente differenti: il Kosovo come una autonoma Regione Europea, all’interno di una struttura legale regionale basata sulla legislazione dell’UE, potrebbe fornire delle reali prospettive per un avanzamento del “processo dello status” (24). Di conseguenza, il grado di intrusività esterna decrescerebbe, e la missione progressivamente si trasformerebbe, da una cospicua amministrazione internazionale – includendo in ciò l’attualmente esistente co-amministrazione ed il limitato trasferimento, già in corso, all’amministrazione autonoma locale – ad una di impronta più leggera, che si concentrerebbe sul monitorare e sul consigliare le autorità locali.
Un tale status, realmente unico, sarebbe sostenuto dal Consiglio d’Europa e dall’Unione Europea, introdurrebbe l’euro come moneta, compirebbe una effettiva smilitarizzazione, supervisionata da una forza di polizia a guida UE, liberalizzerebbe i visti alle frontiere, metterebbe in atto un organico programma nel campo dell’istruzione, la riduzione del debito pubblico, e una concreta assistenza allo sviluppo pre-accesso (25). Un’adesione facilitata all’FMI, alla Banca mondiale, e ad altre agenzie specializzate dell’ONU (quali l’Organizzazione mondiale della sanità, OMS, o l’Organizzazione mondiale del lavoro, ILO), completerebbe un pacchetto attraente per gli albanesi kosovari, e che potrebbe appianare le riserve di Belgrado, preparando la strada ad un’accettazione completa in Serbia.
Un tale approccio, focalizzato sullo status e sugli standard, rappresenterebbe chiaramente un compromesso, e richiederebbe concessioni di pari valore da entrambi i lati. Le forze populiste, tanto a Belgrado quanto a Pristina, dovrebbero trovare un terreno d’intesa mediano, e lasciarsi alle spalle quelle posizioni estremiste che appartengono ad un altro secolo. Tutto ciò, che potrebbe essere considerata una utopia concreta, potrebbe senza problemi essere immediatamente integrato in strutture già esistenti, come il Congresso delle autorità locali e regionali del Consiglio d’Europa, ed il Comitato delle regioni della UE; ciò corrisponde anche ad una crescente consapevolezza dell’importanza di sviluppare e rafforzare la rilevanza politica delle regioni dell’UE, e delle strategie di innovazione regionale.
Come si è detto, l’approccio regionale – in quanto concetto realmente dinamico – potrebbe accompagnare il passaggio da una missione post-Unmik verso una missione di monitoraggio, che usi poteri meno intrusivi ed una maggiore condizionalità. Potrebbe anche favorire un passaggio delle consegne ed una strategia di uscita ben regolati, come pure i passi successivi verso l'adesione all’UE e la piena indipendenza – con entrambi i processi che stanno richiedendo molto più tempo di quanto si pensasse inizialmente, sia a causa della lenta implementazione dell’acquis communautaire in Kosovo, sia a causa della “fatica dell'allargamento” avvertita in Europa.
Il Kosovo come Regione Autonoma EUropea – concepita come parte del processo dello status – fornirebbe alla UE una strategia chiara, che eviterebbe lo scontro di approcci: nel momento in cui il Kosovo avesse lo status di regione, la missione a guida UE avrebbe ancora alcuni poteri esecutivi, focalizzati su un insieme di parametri da raggiungere; una volta che il Kosovo avesse ottenuto l’accesso alla piena indipendenza, le azioni dell’UE si baserebbero solo sul monitoraggio e sull’implementazione delle riforme.
La struttura regionale – in quanto status chiaramente definito – potrebbe innanzi tutto aiutare a superare lo scarto tra imposizione esterna ed autogoverno, disponendo un consistente trasferimento di poteri e strategie dirette verso l’autogoverno e, in secondo luogo, fornire una cornice strutturale comune per l’integrazione del Kosovo settentrionale e la definizione di relazioni interfrontaliere sul modello di esempi europei come la Regione europea del Tirolo - Alto Adige - Trentino e la Regio Basiliensis. Questa reintegrazione sarebbe raggiunta da una missione transizionale a nord dell’Ibar, sul modello della pienamente riuscita missione ONU del 1996-1998 nella regione croata della Slavonia orientale (Untaes). In questo modo, le relazioni con la Serbia non minaccerebbero più l’integrità del Kosovo e contribuirebbero ad una complessiva normalizzazione.
Per il Gruppo di contatto ed i Paesi dell’UE, il valore aggiunto di simili innovativi e flessibili approcci sarebbe che questi permetterebbero alla comunità internazionale di muoversi verso una soluzione politica ed un intervento post-crisi dai costi adeguati. Ciò sarebbe particolarmente benvenuto, dato che è dubbio che questi Stati vogliano incrementare le risorse che essi impegnano nel Kosovo. Lo status sopra delineato favorirebbe una riallocazione dei fondi, dal settore militare allo state-building e alle priorità dello sviluppo.
Introdurre nuove regioni in Europa, un concetto familiare anche al mondo degli affari, potrebbe in questo momento fornire un potente strumento per risolvere conflitti irrisolti, non solo in Kosovo ma anche in Spagna (il conflitto basco), in Turchia (la questione curda), e in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, Ossezia del Sud e Transnistria (26). In ognuno di questi casi, un approccio regionale adattato alle specificità di ogni situazione e inserito nel contesto strutturale della membership o della Politica di vicinato della UE (ENP), potrebbe essere d’aiuto nel produrre soluzioni politiche, anziché militari.
Ginevra, 30 novembre 2006
Scritto nel contesto della conferenza “Kosovo, regione d’Europa. Il ruolo dei partenariati territoriali nella composizione dei conflitti”, organizzata a Roma il 15 dicembre 2006 da Osservatorio sui Balcani. Il testo inglese verrà pubblicato da South East Europe Review, Nomos, Baden-Baden, no. 4, 2006.
Note
1. Hannah Arendt, Tra passato e futuro, Garzanti, Milano 1991.
2. Unscr, Resolution 1244 (1999), New York: UNSCR, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 giugno 1999.
3. Unscr, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, Unscr, S/2005/88, 14 febbraio 2005.
4. Questi otto parametri – formulati nel 2002 dall’Srsg Michael Steiner e presentati in un documento di 10 pagine il 10 dicembre 2003 – fanno riferimento a: funzionamento delle istituzioni democratiche, legalità, libertà di movimento, ritorno e reintegrazione, economia, diritti di proprietà, dialogo con Belgrado, ed il Corpo di protezione del Kosovo. Vedi Unscr, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, Unscr, S/2006/45, 25 gennaio 2006.
5. Ci si riferisce alle 13 priorità individuate nel giugno 2006 dal Gruppo di contatto; vedi SRSG, “Technical assessment of progress in implementation of standards for Kosovo” allegato a Unscr, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, Unscr, S/2006/707, 1 settembre 2006, pp.9-20.
6. A metà del 2006 il Piano di azione per il partenariato europeo ha preso il posto del Piano per l’implementazione degli standard in Kosovo (KSIP), istituito nel marzo 2004.
7. Vedi Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report, Bruxelles, SEC (2006) 1386, 8 novembre 2006.
8. Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report, Bruxelles, SEC (2006) 1386, 8 novembre 2006, p.9.
9. Vedi Shkëlzen Maliqi, Kosova: Separate Worlds, Pec, Dukagjini, 1998.
10. Unscr, A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo, New York, Unscr, S/2005/635, 7 ottobre 2005.
11. Unscr, Ibidem, pp.18.
12. Unscr, Letter dated 7 October from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York: Unscr, S/2005/635, 7 ottobre 2005.
13. Unscr, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, Unscr, S/2006/707, 1 settembre 2006, p.1.
14. ICG, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, Bruxelles, ICG, Europe Report n.170, 17 febbraio 2006, p.19.
15. Tim Judah, “Fresh Delays Likely to Kosovo’s Independence,” Balkan Insight, 23 novembre 2006.
16. ICG, Kosovo Status: Delay is Risky, Bruxelles, ICG, Europe Report n.177, 10 novembre 2006.
17. Una condizione menzionata da Kai Eide; vedi Unscr, A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo, New York, Unscr, S/2005/635, 7 ottobre 2005, p.5 e p.19.
18. Formato nel 1994, il Gruppo di contatto raggruppa Stati chiave interessati ai Balcani: USA, Gran Bretagna, Francia, Germania, Italia e Russia.
19. Vedi Christophe Solioz, “L’avenir du Kosovo à la lumière des Accords de Dayton,” Diagonales Est-Ouest, n.38, gennaio 1996, pp.28-9.
20. Carl Bildt, “A second chance in the Balkans,” Foreign Affairs, 80, 1, 2001, p 157.
21. Will Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.157.
22. Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, L’Aja, settembre 1999.
23. Vedi Walter A. Kemp, “Between assimilation and secession: Integrating diversity in multi-ethnic states,” in: Daniel Warner e Valérie Clerc (a cura di), The OSCE in the Landscape of European Security (2000), Ginevra, HEI, PSIO, n.1, 2002, pp.37-67.
24. Kai Eide ha insistito sul concetto di “processo dello status” – una cosa che è sfuggita alla maggioranza degli osservatori – ed ha sottolineato che “entrare nel processo dello status futuro non significa entrare nella fase finale, ma nella successiva fase della presenza internazionale”; vedi Op. cit, p.22.
25. Alcuni di questi aspetti sono stati citati in ICG, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, Bruxelles, ICG, Europe Report n.170, 17 febraio 2006, p.30.
26. Vedi Christophe Solioz, “Décréter le Kosovo région européenne serait une solution originale et innovante,” Le Temps, 10 ottobre 2006, p.19 (riportato anche in eur|topics, Berlino, 10 Ottobre 2006; http://www.eurotopics.net).
*Nato a Brema nel 1957 come cittadino svizzero. Ha studiato filosofia, psicologia, pedagogia e letteratura italiana e tedesca presso le università di Zurigo e Ginevra. Dal 1992 è coordinatore di vari progetti nel campo dello sviluppo della società civile e dei processi di transizione e di democratizzazione in diverse repubbliche post-Jugoslave. Ex presidente dell’Assemblea dei cittadini di Helsinki svizzera (fino al 1997), fondatore della Associazione Bosnia ed Erzegovina 2005 (fino al 2005), attualmente direttore esecutivo del Centro per le strategie di integrazione europea (CEIS). Da 2000 è responsabile del progetto di ricerca “The Next Step” (“Il passo successivo”), sulle strategie per ampliare l’autogoverno in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, Croazia e Serbia. Suoi articoli sono stati pubblicati in Le Temps, Libération, Le Courrier des Pays de l’Est, come anche in Südosteuropa Mitteilungen. Con Svebor Dizdarevi#263; ha curato Ownership Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003) e, con T.K. Vogel, Dayton and Beyond (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004). È autore di L’après-guerre dans les Balkans (Parigi, Karthala 2003) e di Turning Points in Post-War Bosnia (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005; seconda edizione rivista, 2007)
CEIS homepage: www.ceis-eu.org
Contatti: csolioz@mac.com
(Da OSSERVATORIO SUI BALCANI Newsletter n° 48 / 2006.)
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Enviado - 29 diciembre 2006 : 19:30:42
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Il Kosovo sotto amministrazione internazionale
OSSERVATORIO SUI BALCANI
28.12.2006
Una comunità internazionale priva di orizzonte politico, la persistenza del “desiderio di Stato” nelle dinamiche politiche post-comuniste dei Balcani. Riceviamo e volentieri pubblichiamo la Master Recherche di Daniele Senzanonna per l'Istituto di Studi Politici di Parigi
Questa ricerca si propone di analizzare in maniera critica l’azione dell’amministrazione internazionale in Kosovo. Com’è noto, l’impegno assunto dalla missione è di grande portata, sia per le funzioni che per il numero degli attori coinvolti. Questo lavoro si focalizza sugli aspetti politici della missione, tentando di analizzarne i risultati alla luce degli obiettivi fissati.
L’organizzazione della ricerca si fonda sulla teoria di Françis Fukuyama che divide il processo di state building in due fasi. La prima fase vede la missione impegnata nelle operazioni necessarie per la stabilizzazione del paese, nell’offerta degli aiuti umanitari, nella ricostruzione delle infrastrutture e nel rilancio dell’economia. La seconda fase comincia quando una certa stabilità è assicurata, e la missione può intraprendere il processo di creazione di quelle istituzioni necessarie allo sviluppo di dinamiche politiche democratiche e alla crescita economica.
Sulla base di tale periodizzazione, fondata sulle variabili “tempo-funzioni”, si è organizzata la ricerca in due parti, assumendo come momento di passaggio tra le due epoche la promulgazione del “Constitutional Framework” (maggio 2001).
Adottando un metodo induttivo, lo studio qui presentato si propone di dimostrare tre fondamentali ipotesi.
Prima ipotesi: il limite maggiore dell’azione internazionale in Kosovo risiede nell’assenza di un qualsiasi progetto politico a lungo termine. La NATO ha intrapreso la guerra sulla base di una rappresentazione manichea della questione del Kosovo. Tale rappresentazione, molto forte presso i governi americano e inglese, contribuisce a spiegare l’incapacità della KFOR di far fronte alla vendetta dell’UçK contro le comunità serba e rom nell’immediato dopoguerra.
In questo senso, il vero limite dell’amministrazione internazionale non è nell’ambiguità del mandato creato dalla risoluzione 1244 del Consiglio di Sicurezza. In un primo momento, tale ambiguità avrebbe potuto presentare perfino alcuni vantaggi, in quanto dava all’amministrazione internazionale un ampio margine di manovra. Piuttosto, il limite è nell’incapacità della missione e dei paesi del Gruppo di Contatto di tracciare un orizzonte politico verso il quale dirigere la propria azione in Kosovo. In effetti, negli ultimi 7 anni, non è stato delineato alcun progetto politico davvero sostenibile a medio o a lungo termine.
La seconda ipotesi concerne i risultati dell’azione internazionale. Quest’ultima è da considerarsi “abbastanza efficace” quanto al processo di stabilizzazione, ovvero nella prima fase dello state building, durante la quale l’UNMIK è riuscita a creare un sistema di co-amministrazione (JIAS) che ha avuto il merito di evitare la completa albanizzazione del sistema politico-istituzionale del Kosovo. Tuttavia, nella seconda fase, la missione sembra aver perso il suo slancio, in quanto il “Constitutional Framework” del maggio 2001 non ha determinato alcun reale trasferimento di poteri dall’UNMIK alle nuove istituzioni locali, finendo piuttosto per gettare le basi di un protettorato di durata indeterminata.
In seguito – ed è la terza ipotesi – la reticenza della missione e dei paesi del Gruppo di Contatto ad affrontare la questione dello status del Kosovo, ha di fatto impedito la realizzazione di quei progressi necessari per intraprendere il percorso di costruzione di una democrazia.
Nel 2003, la missione ha lanciato la strategia degli “standards before status”, che condizionava l’apertura dei negoziati alla realizzazione di alcuni criteri tipici delle democrazie occidentali. L’errore politico non è stato nel voler fissare degli obiettivi democratici molto elevati, ma nell’aver vincolato l’avvio delle trattative alla realizzazione di questi ultimi. Il progresso democratico non è incompatibile con la definizione dello status. Al contrario, esso necessita di un quadro istituzionale sicuro e dunque di uno status chiaramente definito, o – quanto meno – di un processo di definizione.
Inoltre, mentre a livello ufficiale si creava una sorta di tabù politico, alcuni governi (in particolare quello americano e quello inglese) hanno lasciato officiosamente intendere agli albanesi che il Kosovo sarebbe divenuto presto uno Stato indipendente. Una prova di questo atteggiamento é individuabile nel modo in cui è stata gestita la smilitarizzazione dell’UçK, al quale si è di fatto permesso di perseguire il disegno politico della creazione del proto-esercito di un Kosovo indipendente.
Gli effetti negativi di questa strategia di rinvio nel tempo della questione dello status, risultano evidenti dall’analisi di tre settori. Sul piano politico, tale scelta ha ostacolato qualsiasi processo di responsabilizzazione delle élite serba e kosovaro-albanese, le quali – concentrando tutta l’attenzione pubblica su tale questione – hanno potuto evitare di impegnarsi nella definizione di un’efficace strategia di sviluppo politico ed economico per il Kosovo, qualunque sarà il suo status. Inoltre, tale tabù non ha certamente spinto né Belgrado né Pristina a moderare le proprie posizioni sulla questione dello status, posizioni che restano intransigenti ed incompatibili.
Sul piano delle relazioni intercomunitarie, da una parte gli albanesi continuano a percepire la presenza serba in Kosovo come una minaccia alla propria indipendenza, dall’altra Belgrado persegue la propria politica di sfruttamento degli sfollati serbi, impedendo la loro integrazione nel nuovo Kosovo o nella stessa Serbia. Il risultato è che gli sfollati serbi e rom vivono ancora nelle enclavi e non sono liberi di spostarsi liberamente sul territorio, se non sotto scorta.
Quanto al risanamento dell’economia, l’incertezza sullo status scoraggia l’afflusso degli investimenti esteri diretti e ostacola il meccanismo dei prestiti accordati dalle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali.
Sul piano teorico, la conclusione è duplice. I principali attori internazionali e quelli locali sembrano seguire gli schemi comportamentali della dottrina realista. La difesa della propria sovranità da parte serba e la speculare richiesta di “riconoscimento della propria indipendenza” da parte kosovaro-albanese dimostrano che lo Stato “resiste” quanto meno in termini di “desiderio di Stato” nelle dinamiche politiche post-comuniste dei Balcani (Samy Cohen, La Resistence des Etats, 2003). Inoltre, l’amministrazione internazionale, le Nazioni Unite e i paesi del Gruppo di Contatto hanno – fino ad ora – dato prova di una relativa incapacità a pensare la questione del Kosovo in una maniera non-realista.
Tuttavia, la creazione di un sistema politico democratico e il rilancio dell’economia non saranno possibili se gli attori locali e internazionali non saranno capaci di dare vita a delle forme reali di integrazione locale e regionale. E’ la via dell’ “indipendenza condizionale” e dell’integrazione nell’Unione Europea proposta dalla “Independent International Commission on the Balkans” già nel 2000. Soluzioni di questo tipo mettono l’accento su un approccio di tipo transnazionalista.
Il predominare di soluzioni realiste o transnazionaliste dipenderà dalla scelta cruciale che gli attori implicati in questo processo sapranno effettuare tra sovranità e integrazione.
[Vedi il documento ufficiale nel file (pdf) allegato al link / Vegeu el document oficial (pdf) accedint a l'enllaç ("File allegati") / Véase el documento oficial (pdf) accediendo al enlace ("File allegati): http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/6560/1/51/] |
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Enviado - 29 diciembre 2006 : 20:12:30
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Kosovo: Heroes and Villains
by Fatmire Terdevci
Transitions Online, 20 December 2006
Judging from their history classes, you might think Albanian and Serbian students in Kosovo lived through two different wars.
Arber Desku and Dejan Milic, both 17, live 11 kilometers apart. Arber attends Sami Frasheri gymnasium in Pristina and Dejan is a secondary-school student from the town of Lipjan.
They were both born in Kosovo, but the divide between them seems impassible. The differences between Arber, an ethnic Albanian, and Dejan, a Serb, go beyond ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. They have their roots in perceptions of the past, of who is a hero and who is a victim.
One side's heroes are the other side's terrorists. Even a history as recent as that of the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict, which both of them recall so vividly, looks very different from each side.
Those differences are only exacerbated each day when Arber goes to his Albanian school and Dejan to his Serbian school. That's because two histories are taught in Kosovo's schools, and as long as the recent conflict remains in living memory, it's nearly impossible to imagine a version of history that would suit both sides.
Although education officials from both sides say their textbooks are free of hateful or xenophobic language, Albanians are often portrayed in Serbian textbooks as foreigners on Serbian soil, while Albanian-language textbooks describe Serbs as colonialists who came from Russia.
The Albanian-language books are published in Kosovo under international supervision, while books for the Serbian minority are imported from Serbia.
According to Slavomir Miric, vice principal of the Serbian elementary school in Lipjan, the students mostly learn about the history of the Ottoman Empire and World War II. “There are five or six sentences about the NATO bombardment. Then there are two or three sentences about the end of the Milosevic regime. It says that he was defeated on the fifth of October 2000 and then democratic forces came to power in Serbia. That’s all.”
Miric says the Serbian heroes about whom students learn the most include Nikola Tesla, a pioneering inventor in the field of electricity; Aleksandar, king of Serbia at the turn of the 20th century; and Vuk Karadjic, a 19th-century linguist who helped devise the modern Serbian language.
Miric acknowledges, however, that in Serbian-language history and literature textbooks, Kosovo is referred to as "the cradle of the Serbian nation," a notion rejected by most Kosovan Albanians.
Maria Vasic, 14, says the hero she most admires from her history classes is Karadjordje Petrovic, leader of the first Serbian uprising against the Ottomans at the beginning of the 19th century.
For his part, Dejan admires a more modern figure. “I don’t know what others are learning about, but we mostly talk about Milosevic and how good and safe it was for us during his time here,” Dejan says, grinning. Then he backtracks a bit. “Maybe it’s not really like this in the books, but this is how the lecture is given by our history teacher,” Dejan says.
His Albanian counterpart, Arber, strikes a similar note. “You cannot avoid mentioning the [Kosovo Liberation Army], you cannot construct a history without the Jashari family, and you cannot just ignore all the massacres and killings and destruction that happened here. Then it would not be history, and a history without all these names and events is not our history,” Arber says.
Adem Jashari was a KLA commander killed, along with 28 members of his family, in a confrontation with Serbian forces in March 1998. He has become a legend among Kosovan Albanians.
A SCHOOLHOUSE DIVIDED
The war between Serbian military and police forces and the KLA ended in 1999 after 78 days of NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia. More than 10,000 Albanian Kosovans were killed and thousands went missing. After the war and the stationing of NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, local Serbs became the victims of retaliatory attacks, resulting in thousands of displaced people across Serbia and the region. Since the end of the war, a UN mission has run the province, whose status is expected to be resolved early next year. Most observers expect the UN's chief negotiator in the status talks to recommend some form of independence for Kosovo.
Albanian Kosovans suffered almost 10 years of segregation after the province lost its autonomy in 1991 under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, when Albanian teachers and students were expelled from universities and secondary schools. Albanian Kosovans established a parallel system of education using their own books and programs.
The Serbs have followed suit, despite efforts of the international community and local leadership to integrate them into the Kosovan education system. Most Serbian Kosovans, who account for less than 10 percent of the province's population, are reluctant to be included in the system. “That’s just impossible. What do we teach then, about Adem Jashari and KLA?" Miric, the Serbian vice principal, says.
Arif Demolli, who oversees textbooks for the Education Ministry, says that after the war all the books were rewritten. “These books are free of nationalism and xenophobia. There is no criticism of the Serbian people or any other people, but only of regimes such as Milosevic's."
The books in the Albanian language were compiled after the war, under the close supervision of the UN mission. The Ministry of Education, run by locals, was established in 2002. Before that, the province's education system was overseen by one international and one local official. “We have international observers here. We cannot publish books that afterward may be prohibited," Demolli says.
Aside from international supervision, the ministry might shy away from glorifying members of the KLA because since the ministry's inception it has been led by officials from the Democratic League of Kosovo, the party of the late president Ibrahim Rugova, which did not ally itself with the KLA.
The last war in Kosovo is taught in Albanian schools in the 13th grade, in a four-page chapter called, “The KLA War and NATO Intervention.” Asked if the teachers stick to the school programs and books, Demolli says, “It’s hard to know if they go beyond what they have in books. It’s impossible to check on each and every one.”
Many parents from both sides have strong feelings about what should go into their children's textbooks. “I don’t know why my child should not learn in the future more about our legendary hero Adem Jashari and other heroes of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who represent a crucial moment of our history,” says Hilmi Zekaj, father of a first-grader.
Zekaj says the next generation should learn more about what he calls the suffering of their ancestors.
Djurica Nedelkovic, a Serbian mother of two school-age children from Lipjan, says essentially the same thing. “No one can just leave out more than 10 years of our history and events only because there is a name that the international community and the Siptari (Albanian Kosovans) dislike. Of course, they should learn about Milosevic, of course they should see him as a national hero, just like every nation has its heroes,” Nedelkovic says.
Halim Hyseni develops training programs for the Kosovo Education Center, a nongovernmental organization funded by the Soros Foundation. He says the problem of distilling recent history into textbooks exists all over the Balkans. “All the history books in the Balkans are full of the language of hate and nationalism, giving too much space to the [issue of] ethnic identity. There are too many myths and historical distortions,” Hyseni says. He argues that textbooks should be revamped throughout the region, not just in one country.
Considering the fractured relationships and stubborn denial of crimes committed in the last decades among the Balkan nations, that might be Mission Impossible.
Fatmire Terdevci is TOL's correspondent in Pristina.
http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/printf.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=198&NrSection=3&NrArticle=18007&ST1=ad&ST_T1=job&ST_AS1=
1&ST2=body&ST_T2=letter&ST_AS2=1&ST3=text&ST_T3=aatol&ST_AS3=1&ST_max=3
Copyright © 2006 Transitions Online. |
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Enviado - 02 enero 2007 : 00:44:15
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La fine del partito di Rugova
Da Pristina, scrive Alma Lama
18.12.2006
E' il partito maggioritario in Kosovo, ed era stato fondato da Ibrahim Rugova. Scomparso il carismatico leader ora rischia di spezzarsi. La cronaca di una crisi annunciata in un Kosovo sempre più problematico
La Lega Democratica del Kosovo, meglio conosciuta come “il partito di Ibrahim Rugova” sembra sia entrata in una via senza ritorno. Rischia infatti di spezzarsi in due. Lo scorso 9 dicembre infatti l'elezione del nuovo segretario generale del partito - ha vinto l'attuale presidente del Kosovo Fatmir Sejdiu - è finita a cazzotti, sedie in testa e pistole sguainate da parte dei responsabili della sicurezza. Un precedente che fa capire come ormai vi siano poche possibilità per una serena convivenza tra le varie anime del partito.
Il presidente Sejdiu ha dovuto abbandonare il sesto convegno dell'LDK, dove aveva da poco vinto l'elezione alla guida del partito battendo l'ex presidente dell'Assemblea del Kosovo Nexhat Daci, circondato da un cordone di polizia. Un'immagine chiara del fatto che le contraddizioni in seno all'LDK sono ormai profonde e che fa capire come a breve potrebbero esserci ripercussioni anche sulla stabilità dell'attuale governo.
Sino all'elezione di Sejdiu tutto era andato bene. Al congresso erano presenti anche molti ospiti internazionali e Nexhat Daci aveva riconosciuto immediatamente la sconfitta. Ma poi si è verificata una vera e propria escalation, il braccio destro dell'ex presidente dell'Assemblea ha affermato che la lista dei candidati era stata manipolata e Sejdiu, il numero due del partito, era stato inserito sessantesimo in lista. Il dibattito si è surriscaldato e sono partiti i cazzotti.
Sejdiu ha continuato a ribadire la correttezza delle procedure eletorali. Sostegno gli è arrivato anche dalla rappresentanza USA in Kosovo. “Le elezioni sono state corrette”, ha affermato Tina Kaidanov, a capo dell'ufficio USA di Pristina dopo un incontro urgente con Sejdiu.
La polemica è eccheggiata anche sulla stampa locale e qualcuno si è spinto sino a definire Sejdiu un “dittatore". Quest'ultimo non si è scomposto ed ha dichiarato che a suo avviso i lavori del congresso erano ormai “chiusi”.
Il suo rivale Daci, e assieme a lui molti membri dell'LDK appartenenti alla diaspora, ha dichiarato che se non vi è spazio per la mediazione l'unica possibilità è ora di fondare un altro partito. “Solo un accordo tra le due parti può salvare l'LDK dalla divisione”.
Dopo la morte di Rugova era già emerso chiaramente che non vi era alcun leader capace di tenere unite le varie fazioni che costituiscono il partito più grande del Kosovo. Tant'è che per mesi si è scelto di non decidere e non convocare il congresso del partito. Sejdiu ha vinto le elezioni ma secondo i media ha perso la sua prima battaglia perché ha dimostrato di non avere la capacità di riunire il partito.
L'analista Ibrahim Berisha, ex-membro e tra i fondatori dell'LDK, ha affermato alla BBC che se non si raggiungerà un compromesso l'LDK si spezzerà e questo influirà negativamente sulle istituzioni kosovare.
Durante i giorni del congresso sono stati in molti a sottolineare come ormai in seno all'LDK mancasse l'apporto degli intellettuali. Sejdiu, nel suo intervento, ha affermato che a Daci mancava una vera e propria visione del futuro del partito e del Kosovo. Entrambi si sono poi definiti legittimi successori di Rugova. Nella realtà non è stato così.
Ora Sejdiu deve scegliere in merito a chi farà parte della direzione del partito. Se creerà altre persone scontente rischia di produrre una crisi politica seria che si ripercuoterà sul paese e sui negoziati sullo status. Sejdiu è infatti anche a capo del gruppo negoziale kosovaro.
L'attuale opposizione, guidata da Hashim Thaci, sta aspettando il momento più favorevole per un cambio di governo. Secondo molti analisti a questo punto sarebbe opportuna la costituzione di un governo di unità nazionale, per arrivare sino in fondo alle negoziazioni sullo status.
Infine un ultimo dettaglio. Secondo le cornice costituzionale kosovara Sejdiu non può essere contemporanemaente presidente del Kosovo e a capo dell'LDK. Lo stesso Rugova si era dovuto dimettere da quest'ultima carica. E Sejdiu non ha certo l'autorità di Rugova.
(Da OSSERVATORIO SUI BALCANI, Newsletter n° 49/2006. - http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/6543/1/51/) |
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Enviado - 02 enero 2007 : 23:22:18
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Kostunica afirma en Kosovo que la provincia es 'la parte más valiosa de Serbia'
KOSOVSKA-MITROVICA, 1.1.2007
(EP/AP)
El primer ministro de Serbia, Vojislav Kostunica, viajó esta mañana a Kosovo, donde en un mensaje de Año Nuevo pidió que la provincia, actualmente bajo administración de la ONU, siga perteneciendo a Belgrado.
Kostunica llegó a la localidad de Kosovska-Mitrovica (norte) en medio de fuertes medidas de seguridad y se entrevistó con miembros de la comunidad serbia residentes en el norte del territorio. En el resto de Kosovo la mayoría de la población es albanesa y partidaria de la secesión.
'Kosovo es la parte más valiosa de Serbia', afirmó Kostunica ante cientos de serbios que se reunieron para oírle. 'Mantener a Kosovo es vital para el futuro de Serbia', añadió.
La provincia se encuentra bajo administración de la ONU desde 1999, tras los bombardeos de la OTAN. Las negociaciones sobre su futuro no produjeron resultados en 2006, pero la ONU espera que se llegue a una propuesta este mismo mes de enero. Las autoridades serbias han propuesta una amplia autonomía, pero los nacionalistas albano-kosovares quieren la independencia.
Kostunica anunció que en su campaña electoral de cara a los comicios parlamentarios serbios del próximo 21 de enero propondrá la continuidad de Kosovo dentro de Serbia. 'Serbia está por la paz, por una vida pacítica y democrática en Kosovo', afirmó ante una multitud que gritaba '¡Kosovo es Serbia!'.
(Terra Actualidad - Europa Press. - http://actualidad.terra.es/internacional/articulo/kostunica_kosovo_serbia_1304103.htm) |
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Enviado - 09 enero 2007 : 20:24:14
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Enviado - 11 enero 2007 : 19:06:07
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Étvdes : « Le mythe d’un Kosovo multiethnique »
Janvier 2007, 10 euros
À lire dans la dernière livraison de la revue Étvdes, un article de Jean-Arnault Dérens : « Le mythe d’un Kosovo multiethnique ».
« Alors qu’approche l’heure de la définition du ’statut final’ du Kosovo, des voix de plus en plus nombreuses s’élèvent pour dénoncer l’échec des Nations Unies, qui n’ont pas su protéger ou reconstruire un Kosovo multiethnique »... Mais ce Kosovo « multiethnique » était-il vraiment l’objectif des bombardements de 1999 ? Et qu’est-ce que la « multiethnicité » veut dire dans le contexte du Kosovo ?
http://balkans.courriers.info/article7539.html |
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Enviado - 27 enero 2007 : 14:34:36
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Kosovo Nervous About Response to Final Status Ruling
Special negotiating team to deal with Kosovo's reaction to Ahtisaari's decision because government deemed by some to be too unstable to handle process
By Krenar Gashi in Pristina
Balkan Insight, 26 January 2007
Marti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo’s, will fly to Pristina and Belgrade on February 2 to present his solution for the territory’s final status.
But while Serbia’s reaction to the final-status plan will be in the hands of its government, Kosovo has made different arrangements.
There a five-member negotiating team, the so-called Team of Unity, set up in 2005, will decide Kosovo’s reaction to the UN envoy’s solution.
While some critics claim the team’s powers go against democratic principles, and that it lacks transparency, politicians maintain it will bypass delays and more efficiently handle final status business.
The international community supported the creation of the team. The big powers want to make sure acceptance of UN proposals –likely not to deliver the full independence Kosovars want - does not founder over a government crisis, or the government’s lack of a majority in the Kosovo assembly.
In this way, the fragile governing coalition, will share the responsibility of accepting the international proposal for the status, thus avoiding further criticism once the status is resolved.
The team was first formed and led by Kosovo’s late president, Ibrahim Rugova. After his death, several major changes occurred and it now includes the president of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, the speaker of the assembly, Kole Berisha, Prime Minister Agim Ceku and opposition leaders Hashim Thaci and Veton Surroi.
Representing a broad coalition of all major political parties, it has been seen as a factor of unity, though some complain of a lack of transparency in its work.
Nontheless, its competences have grown since it was established - one reason, say analysts, being that the current government is unstable, and may not have the required majority in the assembly to approve the UN proposal.
The current fragile administration, formed in 2004, comprises a coalition of Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK, and the Alliance for Future of Kosovo, AAK, led by Ramush Haradinaj.
Together, it originally held 66 of the 120 seats in the assembly, a narrow majority. But after the latest LDK congress in December 2006, the former speaker of the assembly, Nexhat Daci, and half a dozen followers walked out to form a new political party.
This new party, which yet to formally register, numbers at least six of the 49 LDK assembly members, which is enough to take away the government’s majority.
Sources in the Kosovo government say the opposition parties have since put pressure on it to hand more competences to the Team of Unity.
“This is absolutely convenient for the opposition as in this way they can make decisions and take no responsibility,” said a government source.
But opposition member Ylli Hoxha, of Surroi’s ORA party, said, "The government is in crisis. Indeed it was never efficient, which is precisely why we had to form this body [Team of Unity] in order to make decisions for the good of the people.”
Analysts believe that Haradinaj's absence from Kosovo while having to attend his war crimes trial in the Hague that starts on March 5 is further going to weaken this government, making it seem illegitimate.
Nexhmedin Spahiu, an analyst from Mitrovica, said the establishment of the Team of Unity is against the basic principles of democracy. “When you create such institutions over the government, you devalue your government,” said Spahiu.
Spahiu added that this was the result of having a weak government that barely had a majority in the assembly.
Ilir Dugolli, an analyst with the Kosovar Institute for Research and Development, KIPRED, agreed. “During the last four years, the government and assembly have shown that they are not capable of making any major decisions,” he said.
Dugolli added that pressure from international community had contributed as well. “This is convenient mostly to the international community,” he said. “It is much easier to make decisions within a group of five than with 120 members of parliament.
“This may be considered as an act against democratic principles, but it is the only way out from the transition period."
Skender Hyseni, spokesperson of the Team of Unity, said the process was “normal, as the Team of Unity consists of all the major parties in Kosovo.”
Krenar Gashi is BIRN Kosovo Assistant Editor. Muhamet Hajrullahu and Bukurie Bajraliu also contributed to this article. Balkan Insight is BIRN’s online publication.
(BIRN'S BALKAN INSIGHT, No.67, January 26, 2007. - http://www.birn.eu.com/en/67/10/2143/) |
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Enviado - 31 enero 2007 : 21:15:20
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Kosovo and the Phantom Republics
Written by Rene Wadlow
Monday, 29 January 2007
Image Martti Ahtisaari, the Finish mediator for the United Nations on Kosovo, withheld his suggestions for the next steps in Kosovo until after the late January elections in Serbia. As the status of Kosovo, still part of Serbia but functioning as a UN protectorate since the end of the 1999 war, is a hot political issue in Serbia, much of the electoral debate would have centered on Ahtisaari’s suggestions.
Now, the Serbian elections have been held although a coalition government has not yet been formed. However, the democratic, EU-oriented political parties have a two—thirds majority in the new Parliament. While the leaders of the two major democratic parties do not like each other as persons, their political outlook is close, and a coalition government should be formed quickly.
Ahtisaari’s suggestions, which will have to be debated and voted upon by the UN Security Council, call for “supervised independence”. Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority insists on independence. Already in 1991, the vast majority of Kosovars voted for independence in unofficial elections organized by the parallel governmental structures created by the Gandhian-influenced Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova. However, today, Kosovo state guarantees for its minority Serb population are likely to be ineffective without continued UN or EU supervision.
Since the death on 21 January 2006 of the Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, there has been no leadership in Kosovo devoted to non-violence and a broad spirit of compromise. Even under UN supervision, Kosovo is weakened by corruption, crime and violence. However, the UN has limited patience to keep administering Kosovo and limited power to fight corruption and crime. Lack of economic prospects is feeding narrow Albanian nationalism, and until Kosovo’s legal status is settled, anger and violence remain close to the surface. Currently, Kosovo’s major export is its young, unemployed people. No country can be expected to mature positively and to grow in an international no-man’s land.
The new status of Kosovo will have an impact on the wider area. Some political leaders in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina see the Kosovo precedent used to demand a break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Bosnia’s Serb Republic united with neighboring Serbia. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has warned that Kosovo would serve as a precedent for the Caucasus saying “If someone believes that Kosovo should be granted full independence as a state, then why should we deny it to the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians.”
The issue of what has been called “The Phantom Republics”: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechenya, and Kosovo are of importance to all of Europe. Each situation is separate and different, but all result from the break up of the federal states of the USSR and Yugoslavia. Each poses the question of the “rights of peoples”. Each of these “phantom republics” has carved out a de facto existence with the symbols of a state: a president, a parliament, and a militia. Negotiations carried out by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the UN have resulted in “frozen conflicts” but no settlement. Kosovo’s future may be set by the UN’s Security Council and for the moment Russian troops have kept Chechenya as part of the Russian Federation. Negotiations on the status of the other “phantom republics “ do not seem to be moving in a creative direction, leaving these republics in difficult economic situations and with authoritarian leaders.
One of our tasks is to look closely at each situation, to see what independent civil society groups exist and to encourage political creativity so that stable and just societies can develop.
René Wadlow
Gravières (France)
René Wadlow is editor of the online journal of world politics www.transnational-perspectives.org and an NGO representative to the UN, Geneva. Formerly, he was professor and Director of Research of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva.
(Source: L'Hebdo du Newropeans-Magazine. - http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5232&Itemid=259) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 01 febrero 2007 : 23:42:52
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Kosovo Final Status
INTERVIEW: EU Mission ‘to Coach Kosovo into Europe’
EU diplomat says new body will have fewer powers than its Bosnian counterpart
By Jeta Xharra in Pristina
Balkan Insight, 1 Feb 2007
The European Union Council’s representative to Kosovo and head of the preparation team for the International Civilian Office, ICO, Torbjorn Sohlstrom, says the new EU mission, which is expected to take over from UNMIK and help run Kosovo after a new UN Security Council resolution is passed, will soon be ready.
In a wide-ranging interview with Balkan Insight, Sohlstrom said they would be ready in two to three months. “It’s not going to depend on us. We will be ready as soon as we have to be,” he said.
Sohlstrom says a future International Civilian Representative will oversee two components: one will be the ICO, a team of less than one hundred international officials, whose role will be to monitor and assist implementation of the final-status settlement; the second will be an EU mission made up of more than one thousand experts in the field of justice and policing, whose specific focus will be on improving the rule of law in Kosovo.
Sohlstrom dismisses speculation about exactly when EU countries will recognize Kosovo’s statehood, noting that the UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari will first present his comprehensive proposal to Belgrade and to Pristina: “This will be followed with a period of engagement, of discussion, with the parties. Eventually this process will be concluded and I expect the European Union will respond to the conclusion of the process in a unified manner”.
He said many differences on Kosovo in Europe had already vanished. “There were big nuances between the member states of the European Union on the issue of Kosovo let’s say two or three years ago [but since then] there’s been a convergence of views,” he said, adding that “ongoing discussion” between the member states and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and others was reducing the remaining differences.
Kosovo has been a UN protectorate since 1999 when NATO forced out the Serbian authorities and assumed control. Negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo over a solution have been going on for a year but the two sides remain far apart.
Many have speculated that the new international authority in Kosovo will resemble the model used since 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the High Representative was granted wide powers that allow him, among others things, to dismiss elected officials and veto laws.
Sohlstrom says the mission in Kosovo will differ both from UNMIK and the Bosnian model.
“UNMIK has been responsible for everything in Kosovo; the future international presence will be responsible for very, very few things,” he said.
“Governance, the responsibility to govern Kosovo, will pass from the international community to the institutions of Kosovo,” he added.
“There will be certain competencies, certain possible powers for the international community to intervene if things go wrong in selected areas,” he continued.
These will include the topics raised in the Vienna talks, such as decentralisation, the protection of cultural heritage and minority rights.
“But there are a lot of things … where the international community will have no power whatsoever,” he pointed out.
The future international civilian representative will have the powers to take whatever measures he or she deems necessary to stop people from sabotaging implementation of the settlement.
Sohlstrom compares the situation in Kosovo to this metaphor: whereas UNMIK owned the Kosovo football club, the EU is going to be more like a coach.
“We don’t see that [Bosnian] kind of powers at the disposal of the international community in Kosovo,” he said. “We expect the status settlement to provide the international community, the EU, the US, with some specific clearly defined intervention powers to provide certain guarantees, but we don’t expect to get involved in every sector.”
He added: “Overall responsibility for governing Kosovo will be with the authorities of Kosovo and that’s the fundamental difference from what we have seen in Bosnia and with what we have seen in Kosovo for the past seven years.”
“We are not the solution. The solution is the authorities of Kosovo and they will have to assume responsibility for the economy, education and all these things that are important for long term development.”
Turning to the burning issue of the mainly Serbian north of Kosovo, where some local leaders talk of secession in the event of Kosovo’s independence, Sohlstrom is determined this will not occur.
“There will be no excuses not to implement the settlement in any part of Kosovo,” he said. “We know there are specific challenges across the north [and] I don’t expect these challenges to go away immediately but we will make the north of Kosovo a priority”.
He suggested that the mission in the north of Kosovo would probably comprise around 15 officials. Asked what would happen if Albanians made support for decentralisation conditional on a resolution of the situation in the north, he said such conditioning was out of the question.
“We expect everyone to play their role and uphold their obligations … and that no one will condition cooperation or compliance with the UN Security Council on what other people do,” he said.
Over the next few years, the way in which the EU is engaged in Kosovo will evolve. “In the beginning, we will all be focused on a number of short-term challenges linked to the implementation of the settlement,” he said.
“Later, if this goes well, we will be able to focus on structural reforms and economic development,” he added.
“We are not just carrying out a rule-of-law mission. We are putting together an assistance package that is more assistance per person than anywhere else in the world, just to help Kosovo to gradually grapple with the key reforms that eventually will help it move closer to Brussels.”
Asked when the mission would leave, Sohlstrom said it all depended on the pace of implementation. “When there’s no need for this [mission] we will not be here anymore; we don’t want to do this, we do it because we have to,” he said.
Once a settlement is implemented, there will be no need for an international civilian office. In the meantime, the EU is concentrating on its engagement with Kosovo, not withdrawal.
“The EU doesn’t have an exit strategy,” he said. “We have an entry strategy for Kosovo into the European Union.”
Jeta Xharra is director of BIRN Kosovo. Balkan Insight is BIRN’s online publication.
(Copyright BIRN 2007 - http://www.birn.eu.com/en/68/10/2184/?tpl=30&ST1=Text&ST_T1=Article&ST_AS1=1&ST_max=1) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 04 febrero 2007 : 01:26:56
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LIBÉRATION
Le Kosovo voit pointer son indépendance
A Pristina et à Belgrade, l'émissaire de l'ONU a présenté vendredi ses propositions pour un Etat kosovar
Par Olivier BERTRAND - Pristina envoyé spécial
samedi 3 février 2007
Dans le café, une serveuse monte le son de la télé, au moment où Martti Ahtisaari prend la parole. L'envoyé spécial de l'ONU vient présenter aux Kosovars ses propositions pour le futur statut du pays, exposées quelques heures plus tôt à Belgrade (lire ci-contre). Les consommateurs lèvent la tête, écoutent sans un mot. Les rues sont calmes, les abords du Parlement aussi. Pristina connaît depuis quelques jours l'essentiel des recommandations. Qui, du coup, semblent accueillies dans l'indifférence. «On n'a pas appris grand-chose, confirme Ahmed, 53 ans, mais ça fait du bien d'entendre l'essentiel : même si personne ne prononce le mot, on va vers l'indépendance et on ne sera plus rattachés à la Serbie.»
Xhevahir Kolgjini, 44 ans, professeur d'arts plastiques à l'université privée américaine, que fréquentent les enfants de l'élite kosovare, expliquait le matin que «les opinions ont été très préparées» à ces annonces. «Depuis des semaines, la télévision serbe annonce l'indépendance du Kosovo ; et la télévision kosovare prévient que le mot "indépendance" n'y figurera pas. Mais cela préoccupe moins les gens qu'ils l'imaginent.» Ces derniers jours, il a senti ses étudiants très concernés. «La séparation d'avec la Serbie, c'est comme le premier rendez-vous avec une fille. Cela semble acquis, mais, jusqu'au dernier moment, on a peur qu'elle ne vienne pas. Que le mot "indépendance" soit prononcé ou non, ils s'en fichent.»
«Package vide». Dans les locaux du mouvement Vetëvendosje! (autodétermination), les militants tiennent un discours très différent. Critiques vis-à-vis du processus, ils refusent toute négociation, exigent la souveraineté immédiate, sans conditions. «Puisque le package ne contient pas le mot "indépendance", il est vide», lance en introduction Glauk Konjufca, 25 ans, l'un des responsables du mouvement.
Les militants de Vetëvendosje! s'amusent à peindre le sigle «UN» sur les poubelles de Pristina et d'autres villes. Ils accusent la mission onusienne de gérer le pays à la place de ses citoyens, et de coûter cher. Les Nations unies sont critiquées depuis longtemps au Kosovo. Marié à une Américaine, Xhevahir Kolgjini, le prof d'arts plastiques, résume ce qu'il entend de toutes parts : «La mission de l'ONU dort beaucoup et ses fonctionnaires touchent trop d'argent pour cela. Mais il faut être réaliste : si on l'enlevait tout de suite, ce serait la catastrophe.»
«Fantasme». Shota, 23 ans, réalisatrice de courts métrages à Pristina, pense pour sa part que «les internationaux devraient préparer le Kosovo à devenir un Etat indépendant, à gérer, au lieu de nous assister, nous infantiliser.» Le retard pris par le processus l'exaspère. «Nous avons besoin très vite de ce statut pour rassurer les investisseurs. Quand les relations d'affaires se développeront, les fils se noueront aussi naturellement avec Belgrade qu'avec Tirana.» Les Serbes, selon elle, ne «fantasmeront plus» sur la constitution d'une grande Albanie.
Comme Shota, Krenar, 33 ans, mise sur «l'économique». Il travaille dans la sécurité à Rahovec, à soixante kilomètres de Pristina. Serbes et Albanais y vivaient très mélangés jusqu'à la guerre, particulièrement dure dans la région. Krenar gérait une société de bus, puis «tout a été incendié, véhicules, maison, atelier». Il raconte longuement les violences qu'il a vues, puis lâche : «Le temps de la vengeance est passé. Même si personne n'oublie, tout le monde attend la liberté et la possibilité de consommer. Les gens sont prêts à beaucoup de concessions pour obtenir le statut. Ils savent que c'est le passage obligé vers l'Europe.»
Dans le haut de la ville, les Serbes vivent désormais repliés dans un quartier qu'un no man's land de maisons brûlées sépare du centre-ville. Slobodan, 34 ans, y tient un petit bar, le Blue Laguna. Et tient le même discours que Krenar. «Ce que j'attends, c'est de retrouver un vrai job et une liberté de mouvement.» Depuis la guerre, il n'est jamais redescendu boire un café en ville. «Mais je ne crois pas que nous soyons encore menacés» , ajoute-t-il. Tout le monde n'est pas d'accord dans le quartier, que l'avancée des négociations inquiète. Slobodan rassure. «Ce pays ne sera plus ni serbe ni kosovar. L'indépendance sera tellement conditionnelle qu'elle nous fera tenir jusqu'à l'entrée dans l'Europe. Et, ce jour-là, les frontières deviendront beaucoup moins importantes.»
(Source: Newsletter Libération La quotidienne du 03/02/2007. - http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/monde/232853.FR.php?utk=0005a958) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 12 febrero 2007 : 23:04:56
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Le Courrier des Balkans
mercredi 7 février 2007
Statut du Kosovo : revoyez votre copie, M. Ahtisaari !
Les propositions de Martti Ahtisaari sur le statut futur du Kosovo sont inacceptables pour Belgrade, et en réalité bien décevantes pour les Albanais. Le Finlandais n’a pas réussi à trouver l’issue qui aurait pu débloquer des positions antagonistes. La copie pèche par manque d’originalité. Les mauvaises solutions appliquées par la communauté internationale en Bosnie produiront des résultats encore plus catastrophiques au Kosovo.
Par Jean-Arnault Dérens
Il faut le reconnaître, Martti Ahtisaari n’avait pas la tâche facile, puisque les positions des Serbes et des Albanais étaient et demeurent diamétralement opposées. Belgrade veut bien concéder la plus large forme d’auto-administration au Kosovo, pour peu que soit préservée la fiction juridique de sa souveraineté sur ce territoire, tandis que Pristina exige la reconnaissance formelle de son indépendance. Le document remis par le Finlandais ne représente pas la panacée qui aurait permis de sortir de cette impasse. Martti Ahtisaari n’a pas trouvé la solution à la quadrature du cercle. On ne saurait le lui reprocher, mais le « paquet » proposé par l’émissaire des Nations Unies laisse redouter le pire pour la région.
Indépendance ou pas ?
Les commentateurs analysant le texte de Martti Ahtisaari ont souvent souligné que le terme « indépendance » n’était pas utilisé. Faut-il rappeler des principes de base du droit international ? Le Conseil de Sécurité qui devra, in fine, statuer sur ces propositions ne peut pas décider de l’indépendance d’un territoire : cela serait formellement contraire à la Charte des Nations Unies. L’accession à l’indépendance d’un territoire résulte de deux actions : une proclamation d’indépendance et la reconnaissance de celle-ci par d’autres pays. Tel a, par exemple, encore été le cas au printemps dernier, lors de l’accession du Monténégro à l’indépendance.
Le document de M.Ahtisaari ne pouvait donc pas contenir de références à l’indépendance. Par contre, et c’est cela le point essentiel, il n’évoque pas la souveraineté territoriale de la Serbie. Or, le droit international ne supporte pas le vide. Si le Kosovo n’est plus placé sous la souveraineté serbe, il ne peut pas devenir pour autant une « terre de personne ». À moins qu’il ne soit rattaché à un État voisin ou formellement placé sous protectorat - deux hypothèses qui ne sont pas envisagées -, il devient souverain.
De surcroît, le document évoque très précisément tous les attributs formels de la souveraineté. Le Kosovo aura son hymne et son drapeau (ce dont peuvent aussi disposer des territoires qui ne sont pas souverains, comme la Catalogne ou le Pays de Galle), mais il pourra aussi adhérer à toutes les organisations internationales, dont les Nations Unies, dont ne sont membres que les États souverains.
Dans ces conditions, le texte prévoit très explicitement l’indépendance du Kosovo. Souligner que le mot n’est pas écrit, et même suggérer qu’il pourrait s’agir là d’une « concession à Belgrade », relève donc de l’ignorance ou de la mauvaise foi.
Inacceptable pour Belgrade
Ce texte est donc inacceptable pour Belgrade, et l’on ne saurait s’étonner de la réaction catégorique de rejet exprimée par tous les responsables serbes. Un politicien serbe qui accepterait officiellement l’indépendance du Kosovo signerait sa mort politique. On peut estimer que les arguments serbes sont illégitimes ou ne doivent pas être pris en compte. Par contre, l’honnêteté intellectuelle oblige à reconnaître que le texte de M. Ahtisaari n’est en rien un texte de « compromis », et qu’il ne tient nul compte des arguments de Belgrade.
Le principe d’une négociation aboutissant à un compromis suppose que les deux parties renoncent à certaines de leurs prétentions pour trouver un terrain d’entente acceptable. Dans le cas du Kosovo, il n’y a pas eu de compromis entre Belgrade et Pristina - peut-être était-il impossible d’en trouver. Il n’y a pas eu non plus de négociations. Les deux parties se sont bornées à exprimer leurs positions respectives, que M. Ahtisaari a écoutées pour, ensuite, élaborer seul le document qui devrait être soumis au Conseil de Sécurité.
Puisque le statut du Kosovo est actuellement régi par une résolution de ce Conseil - la 1244 - c’est en effet à cette instance qu’il appartient de modifier le statut du territoire. La possibilité que le statut futur du Kosovo soit défini par un accord bilatéral négocié entre Belgrade et Pristina n’a jamais été envisagée. Depuis l’adoption de la Résolution 1244, l’ONU a pris en main le destin du Kosovo, c’est donc à cette organisation qu’il revient d’en définir le futur statut. M. Ahtisaari n’avait pas d’autre mission que d’écouter les uns et les autres. Force est cependant de constater qu’il a davantage écouté d’une oreille que de l’autre.
Le futur statut devra être imposé à la Serbie, qui pourrait très bien ne pas reconnaître l’indépendance du Kosovo, le considérer comme un territoire « annexé », ou illégalement dissocié, et maintenir longtemps la fiction de sa souveraineté juridique.
Décevant pour les Albanais
Le Kosovo accèdera à une indépendance formelle. Cependant, celle-ci sera immédiatement limitée par la mise en place d’une lourde tutelle internationale, sans limitation de durée, au moins aussi pesante que celle qui prévaut depuis la fin de la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine avec les résultats décevants que l’on sait.
L’indépendance accordée au Kosovo ne sera que formelle, et peut-on croire que les citoyens et les politiciens albanais accepteront de bon cœur cette tutelle, au caractère objectivement anti-démocratique, comme le souligne Albin Kurti non sans arguments ? Lorsque la volonté des citoyens du Kosovo et de leurs élus légitimes n’ira pas dans le sens des desiderata de la « communauté internationale », celle-ci aura, en toutes circonstances, le dernier mot. Les conflits, on s’en doute, ne tarderont pas à se multiplier, et le mouvement Vetëvendosje aura sûrement encore le loisir d’organiser bien des manifestations...
Les effets contre-productifs de la tutelle internationale sont bien connus en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Cette tutelle confine les responsables politiques locaux dans l’irresponsabilité, en leur laissant tout loisir de s’abandonner aux joies douteuses de la surenchère démagogique. La tutelle est aussi génératrice d’une gestion opaque de l’argent, permettant d’acheter la « sagesse » et la « modération » des politiciens locaux. Elle est structurellement génératrice de corruption. On peut se douter que les mêmes causes ne manqueront pas de produire les mêmes effets au Kosovo qu’en Bosnie.
En réalité, M. Ahtisaari propose tout l’inverse de ce qu’il aurait fallu faire. Le Kosovo souffre d’une évidente carence d’expérience démocratique. Or, il n’y a pas de démocratie sans responsabilité des représentants politiques, qui doivent assumer pleinement leurs actes et leurs conséquences. Le Kosovo a dramatiquement besoin d’un véritable auto-gouvernement. Il a aussi besoin de l’aide, mais pas de la tutelle de la communauté internationale.
Si l’on avait voulu que le plan soit acceptable pour l’une et l’autre partie, il aurait fallu donner une véritable et complète capacité d’auto-gouvernement aux institutions du Kosovo, quitte à déplacer le sens de la souveraineté étatique. Il existe de par le monde un certain nombre d’exemples de pays s’auto-administrant avec le plus grand succès, sans avoir proclamé formellement leur totale indépendance.
Bien sûr, les Albanais rêvent d’une rupture formelle et sans retour des liens avec la Serbie et de tous les « colifichets » qui sont la marque de l’indépendance. Dans le double contexte de l’intégration européenne et de la mondialisation, l’indépendance d’un Kosovo pauvre, sous-développé et sous lourde tutelle internationale se réduira pourtant à bien peu de choses.
M. Ahtisaari aurait pu imaginer des solutions vraiment innovantes, s’appuyant sur une intégration européenne accélérée de tous les pays de la région, du Kosovo, de la Serbie, de l’Albanie et de leurs voisins. Bien évidemment, la crise politique structurelle de l’Europe, mais aussi le manque d’imagination et de volontarisme politique de la machine bruxelloise, ont bloqué cette perspective. Nombre de pays d’Europe - du Royaume-Uni à l’Espagne - demeuraient très méfiants envers toute forme de solution institutionnelle trop innovante, qui aurait pu susciter des vocations, de l’Écosse au Pays Basque... C’est pourtant dans cette voie-là qu’il aurait fallu se diriger, afin de trouver une solution qui aurait pu être acceptable pour Belgrade tout en répondant à la légitime aspiration des Kosovars à prendre véritablement en main leur destin. Ce sont les contours de la notion même d’État qu’il aurait fallu avoir le courage d’essayer de redessiner.
Décentralisation : la grande hypocrisie et le mythe de la « multiethnicité »
Le projet de décentralisation prévu par le document de M. Ahtisaari est particulièrement ambitieux. Le modèle suivi est celui des îles Aland, longtemps contestées entre la Finlande et la Suède, et dont le statut actuel est, à juste titre, considéré comme un exemple mondial de décentralisation et d’autonomie. Tout le problème est que le Kosovo n’est pas une île de la mer Baltique.
Dans la langue de bois de la communauté internationale, le mot « décentralisation » est devenu la manière politiquement correct d’évoquer les avantages et privilèges accordées aux Serbes du Kosovo pour essayer de les convaincre de ne pas fuir le territoire ou de ne pas faire sécession. Ainsi, les avantages proposés par le document Ahtisaari aux communes serbes du Kosovo sont-ils nettement plus substantiels que l’autonomie accordée à la Republika Srpska de Bosnie-Herzégovine. On crée donc une « Republika Srpska du Kosovo et Metohija », mais sans bien sûr en prononcer le nom. Dans cette opération, l’hypocrisie ne le cède qu’à la naïveté.
En effet, il est parfaitement illusoire d’imaginer que les Albanais accepteront sans rechigner cette amputation d’une part importante du territoire du Kosovo. Et il est encore plus illusoire de penser que les avantages qu’on leur promet convaincront les Serbes d’accepter de bon gré de devenir des citoyens de la République de Kosova...
Que se passera-t-il ? Le région nord du Kosovo fera-t-elle sécession d’un Kosovo se dirigeant vers l’indépendance ? Les Serbes des enclaves du sud, notamment celles pour lesquelles aucune forme d’autonomie communale n’est prévue (par exemple Velika Hoca et Orahovac), fuiront-ils le Kosovo dans un nouvel et dramatique exode ? Les éléments radicaux albanais créeront-ils des troubles sérieux dans les régions les plus affectées par la décentralisation, notamment celle de Gnjilane/Gjilan ? L’avenir le dira, mais aucun optimisme ne peut être de mise.
Le document de M. Ahtisaari insiste à plusieurs reprises sur l’objectif d’une société « multiethnique ». Un amateur de couleur et de décorations folkloriques ne peut qu’être esthétiquement emballé par la perspective d’un drapeau incluant les « symboles nationaux » albanais, serbes, rroms, turcs, bosniaques, ashkalis, égyptiens, sans oublier les Gorani de Dragas et les 300 Croates de Janjevo !
Comme toutes les sociétés des Balkans, la société du Kosovo n’a jamais été « multiethnique », du moins pas dans le sens où l’entendent les bons esprits internationaux. Différentes communautés nationales, linguistiques et/ou confessionnelles ont par contre su vivre sur ce territoire durant des siècles, en relativement bonne intelligence. Leurs rapports n’ont cessé d’évoluer et de se redéfinir au gré de différentes logiques d’intérêts, de conflit ou de coopération.
L’expérience historique des vingt dernières années (la violence du régime de Milosevic, le développement du nationalisme albanais, la guerre, l’infâme après-guerre où le Kosovo se morfond depuis bientôt huit ans) a coupé grand nombre des relations intercommunautaires. Alors que l’OTAN et la MINUK ont avalisé les innombrables violences commises par les extrémistes albanais, ont accepté l’exode des dizaines de milliers de Serbes et de Rroms, alors que la communauté internationale a abandonné les « standards » qu’elle avait elle-même fixés en 2003, notamment sur le retour des déplacés et des réfugiés et la liberté de circulation pour tous les citoyens du Kosovo, peut-on croire un seul instant que la nouvelle tutelle européenne pourra recréer les liens brisés ?
Le retour des Serbes et des autres non-albanais aurait supposé une politique volontariste et contraignante imposant leur réintégration dans leurs anciens domiciles et leurs anciens emplois. Il est sûrement trop tard, et les huit années de protectorat international, de ce point de vue, se soldent par un échec accablant. Oser parler d’un Kosovo multiethnique, de la part de fonctionnaires internationaux, relève d’un cynisme absolument confondant, car les premiers responsables des violences commises contre les communautés non-albanaises demeurent les troupes de l’OTAN, qui avaient un mandat de protection des populations civiles qu’elles n’ont pas respecté. Les gamins albanais qui ont jeté des pierres sur l’église de la Bogorodica de Prizren, le 17 mars 2004, portent une responsabilité bien moins lourde que les soldats allemands de la KFOR qui n’ont rien fait pour protéger ce sanctuaire.
Que signifiera la multiethnicité factice voulue par la communauté internationale pour le Kosovo de demain ? Probablement pas grand-chose. Tout au plus, quelques responsables communautaires largement autoproclamés pourront-ils profiter des prébendes du système, pour peu qu’ils acceptent de servir d’alibi ethnique...
La société du Kosovo a été profondément détruite par les traumatismes subis au cours des deux dernières décennies. Ce qui a été ne sera plus. Faire du Kosovo de demain une société dont tous les citoyens puissent vivre normalement, quelle que soit leur appartenance nationale ou confessionnelle, suppose trois choses : une véritable démocratisation, l’extirpation des réseaux politico-mafieux qui continuent de prospérer, et un réel développement économique. Le document de M. Ahtisaari n’engage pas le Kosovo dans cette voie, et le baratin « multiethnique » n’est qu’un cache-misère qui sera bien vite oublié.
La politique de l’autruche
Rien ne sert d’essayer de jouer les Cassandre, les prophètes de malheur. Cependant, on sait que l’évolution de la situation au Kosovo peut avoir des effets profondément déstabilisants sur la Macédoine, sur la Bosnie-Herzégovine où la Republika Srpska tirera argument de l’indépendance du Kosovo pour justifier ses propres aspirations à la sécession, et surtout sur la Serbie elle-même, en risquant de favoriser l’ascension de l’extrême-droite. On sait pourtant qu’il est impossible d’envisager uns stabilisation démocratique de l’ensemble des « Balkans occidentaux » sans une Serbie démocratique et pacifiée.
Dans sa gestion des guerres yougoslaves des années 1990, la communauté internationale a suivi deux principes également faux et contre-productifs : séparer les problèmes les uns des autres, et gagner du temps en différant la résolution des problèmes. Le document de M. Ahtisaari garde toujours l’inspiration de ces deux mauvais principes.
Croit-on que le Kosovo sera « plus apte » à se passer d’une tutelle internationale dans deux, trois ou cinq ans qu’aujourd’hui ? Croit-on que si l’on évite absolument de citer le nom de la Vallée de Presevo, cela suffira à faire disparaître, comme par enchantement, les aspirations des Albanais de cette région de Serbie à rejoindre le Kosovo ? La politique de l’autruche n’a pourtant jamais produit de résultats bien notables...
Aucune solution acceptable à la question du Kosovo ne peut pourtant être trouvée en faisant abstraction du contexte régional. Tout au contraire, le bricolage institutionnel que propose M. Ahtisaari pour le Kosovo, qu’il a « isolé » de son contexte régional comme un produit de laboratoire, risque bien de provoquer un nouvel incendie régional.
Le développement économique du Kosovo n’était pas le propos du document que devait remettre M. Ahtisaari. Cependant, ce document aurait pu imaginer des instruments de coopération du Kosovo avec tous ses voisins - y compris la Serbie - , d’intégration régionale et européenne qui sont la clé de la survie économique du territoire. Faute de quoi, le Kosovo restera un désolant îlot de misère et de sous-développement, qui a bien peu de chance d’offrir le terreau favorable à l’édification d’une société démocratique et « multiethnique ».
On dirait que M. Ahtisaari a « tiré les leçons » des erreurs commises dans les Balkans par la communauté internationale tout au long des quinze dernières années, avec les tragiques conséquences que l’on sait. Mais d’une façon bien surprenante : le document qu’il a remis reprend le pire de ce qui a été déjà fait, et se précipite, comme à dessein, dans toutes les impasses déjà expérimentées.
La question du Kosovo ne peut pas trouver de solution satisfaisante si l’on fait abstraction des deux grandes questions nationales transfrontalières qui sont aujourd’hui ouvertes dans les Balkans : la question nationale albanaise, et la question nationale serbe. Ces deux questions, dont il ne sert à rien de faire des tabous, ne peuvent connaître que deux types de solutions. Elles se résoudront par des modifications frontalières, qui entraîneront immanquablement de nouveaux conflits, voire une nouvelle guerre, ou bien par l’intégration européenne la plus rapide possible de l’ensemble de la région, qui aura justement pour conséquence de « relativiser » et de faire progressivement disparaître l’importance des frontières.
La copie remise par M.Ahtisaari est mauvaise, mais force est de reconnaître que la faiblesse et la couardise politique de l’Union l’ont empêché de proposer un schéma de résolution plus innovant et plus satisfaisant.
Tant pis pour l’Europe ! Celle-ci continuera à payer les frais de lourdes missions civiles et militaires, de vastes et inopérants programmes de reconstruction, sans oublier les juteux honoraires d’innombrables légions d’experts. Pour leur part, les pays européens devront accueillir les centaines de milliers de Kosovars chassés de leur pays par la misère, et qui franchiront toutes les frontières, aussi bien gardées soient-elles.
(http://balkans.courriers.info/article7673.html) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 05 marzo 2007 : 18:36:49
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Kosovo, lo spiraglio europeo
Arianna Acierno
“Tenere aperta la porta ai Balcani”. Questa frase suona come una parola d’ordine tra gli euro-palazzi di Bruxelles e tra gli esperti della Pesc (Politica estera e di Sicurezza Comune). Un motto che esprime una volontà e una convinzione, ma che allo stesso tempo si scontra contro una realtà complessa. Complessa come il Kosovo, dove la diplomazia europea cerca la strada verso il rispetto dei principi democratici, dove le tasche dell’Ue riversano risorse finanziarie per contribuire alla costruzione di infrastrutture necessarie. Ma il soft power dell’Ue deve aggirare gli ostacoli che si frappongono tra Pristina, Belgrado e la politica dell’Unione; la diplomazia europea, infatti deve fare i conti non solo con le difficoltà di mettere ordine in una situazione che oscilla tra il desiderio di indipendenza del Kosovo e le riluttanze serbe a non andare oltre la concessione dell’autonomia regionale, ma anche, dentro i confini europei, con i numerosi freni che mirano a rallentare le politiche di allargamento.
Eppure proprio l’Ue, puntando sull’allargamento, può contribuire seriamente a sbloccare una situazione che chiede di progredire dalla primavera del ’99, quando nella provincia serba, popolata per il 90% da albanesi, si stabilirono forze internazionali a seguito della campagna aerea di bombardamento della Nato che avrebbe dovuto riportare ordine nella regione, agitata da scontri etnici. La fine dell’intervento dell’Alleanza Atlantica è stata sancita il 10 giugno dello stesso anno dall’ambigua lettera della risoluzione 1244 del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, che prevedeva la promozione di una sostanziale autonomia e dell’autogoverno della provincia pur restando nel quadro della sovranità nazionale serba e dell’integrità territoriale della Repubblica.
La risoluzione istituiva contemporaneamente un’amministrazione internazionale interinale del Kosovo (Unmik) gestita da New York con la collaborazione delle organizzazioni regionali coinvolte e presenti sul territorio. Nella divisione dei compiti, all’Ue veniva assegnata la specifica missione di sostenere la ricostruzione e lo sviluppo economico del Kosovo, con un flusso di finanziamenti che ha inciso pesantemente sul bilancio di Bruxelles, ma non sempre è stato realmente utile a risollevare le pessime condizioni di vita e di mercato della regione.
L’Ue intanto affermava la propria volontà politica di rimanere impegnata nella zona attraverso l’iniziativa del Patto di Stabilità per il sudest europeo. Il progetto, del giugno del ’99, doveva servire a migliorare la cooperazione tra i Balcani e gli stati europei nel tentativo di assicurare una stabilizzazione dell’area in vista della sua futura inclusione nell’Unione.
Non solo, Bruxelles ha dato forma concreta a tale volontà politica con il programma di assistenza finanziaria a favore dei candidati potenziali all’adesione, nella cornice del processo di associazione e stabilizzazione con l’Ue, condizionando gli aiuti al rispetto dei principi democratici, alla costruzione dello stato di diritto e al ritorno in patria dei rifugiati. Da quest’anno tale progetto è stato inserito, insieme ad altri destinati ai paesi effettivamente candidati, nel nuovo strumento di assistenza pre adesione(Ipa), per dare più coerenza ed efficacia alle politiche europee di sostegno allo sviluppo dei Balcani. Inoltre, sempre l’Ue è la principale fonte di finanziamento della Kosovo Trust Agency, l’organismo che si occupa della gestione fiduciaria e della privatizzazione delle imprese kosovare che erano di proprietà statale.
La presenza europea non si è limitata ai finanziamenti, ma si è espressa in un intervento continuo e sempre più consistente negli affari della regione. Nel 2003 è stata Bruxelles ad insistere per la definizione di un nuovo quadro istituzionale per l’unione di Serbia e Montenegro su un piano di parità, tanto che il progetto è noto sotto il nome di “Solania”, in onore dell’Alto Rappresentante Europeo per la Pesc, Javier Solana.
Tante sono le dichiarazioni politiche che testimoniano l’impegno dell’Unione nei Balcani, a cominciare da quella della conclusione del Consiglio europeo di Feira nel 2000, in cui veniva affermata la possibilità per tutti i paesi dell’area di diventare futuri membri dell’Ue. Un’opportunità confermata nel dicembre dello stesso anno a Zagabria e ribadita nel 2003 al vertice di Salonicco, tappa fondamentale nella definizione di un approccio sempre più regionale verso l’integrazione dei Balcani, nel tentativo di ricostituire un’unità che la stessa Ue aveva contribuito a sfaldare nei primi anni ’90. Così, il legame tra questi paesi e l’Unione è stato rafforzato da continue promesse, riformulate, nel marzo del 2006, in occasione del vertice di Salisburgo. Soltanto che stavolta, insieme alla solita volontà di tenere la porta aperta ai Balcani Occidentali (definizione che comprende i paesi della Ex-Jugoslavia meno la Slovenia e più l’Albania) è stata avanzata la necessità di tenere in considerazione la “capacità di assorbimento” dell’Unione. Ecco quindi come il processo di avvicinamento di tali stati si è scontrato con i problemi interni ai membri dell’Ue, con la “enlargement fatigue”, la paura, soprattutto di certi paesi, di non riuscire a stare al passo con un ampliamento troppo rapido del club che comporti un aumento dell’ingovernabilità delle istituzioni comuni.
Questo il quadro europeo. Nel frattempo le vicende kosovare venivano scosse da nuovi eventi. La risoluzione 1244 aveva lasciato in sospeso il futuro della provincia, prevedendo una fase transitoria di implementazione di alcuni standard democratici a cui avrebbe fatto seguito un dibattito sullo status. Ma il clima di incertezza non ha fatto altro che alimentare lo scontento degli albanesi, delusi dall’amministrazione dell’Onu, percepita come una forma di neocolonialismo, e impazienti di vedere riconosciute le proprie velleità indipendentiste. L’impennata di violenza degli scontri del marzo 2004, culminati in moti contro i serbi e le Nazioni Unite, hanno costretto New York a ripensare al cammino che era stato previsto per il Kosovo e passare dalla politica dello “standard before status” a quella dello “standard and status”, nella consapevolezza che solo un processo parallelo avrebbe permesso di ottenere sforzi concreti dalle autorità locali e di tenere a bada le rimostranze degli indipendentisti. Così, è stato realizzato uno studio approfondito della situazione e nel febbraio del 2006 si sono aperti, a Vienna, i negoziati per la definizione dello status del Kosovo. I lavori, diretti dal mediatore dell’Onu Martti Ahtisaari, si sono protratti a lungo e solo da un paio di settimane il diplomatico ha reso noto il piano elaborato durante le trattative. Niente di particolarmente sorprendente: il progetto di Ahtisaari, pur volendo evitare una soluzione imposta e cercare la massima soddisfazione delle due parti, non riesce a superare l’impasse del contrasto tra il principio della sovranità nazionale e quello dell’autodeterminazione dei popoli, non parla di indipendenza ma, ancora una volta, di autonomia e lascia insoddisfatte sia Belgrado che Pristina.
Ma la proposta, seppur non innovativa, è interessante, specialmente per Bruxelles. Infatti, viene previsto nel piano il mantenimento di una presenza internazionale con caratteristiche diverse da quelle attuali e a guida Ue. L’organismo dovrebbe essere denominato International Civilian Office (Ico), avere poteri più limitati dell’Unmik e un’ingerenza meno massiccia negli affari interni della provincia. Il compito principale della missione dovrebbe essere quello di monitorare l’implementazione degli standard e di intervenire indirettamente solo nel caso in cui si registri una mancata collaborazione delle autorità locali. All’impegno nel settore civile si accompagnerebbe poi una presenza militare, sempre Ue, per garantire il mantenimento dell’ordine pubblico e lo svolgimento di attività di mentoring rivolte ad aiutare le forze di polizia locali a gestire le questioni più delicate e complesse.
La proposta non testimonia solo la volontà dell’Onu di sganciarsi progressivamente dall’affare kosovaro delegando competenze ad altre organizzazioni, ma costituisce anche un riconoscimento delle capacità che l’Ue ha cercato di sviluppare negli anni che hanno fatto seguito al conflitto jugoslavo, nel tentativo di migliorare la politica estera e di sicurezza comune e dimostrare una maggiore maturità nella gestione delle crisi.
Nonostante un percorso difficile e discontinuo, i Balcani sono stati un buon terreno di prova per Bruxelles, soprattutto nell’elaborazione di un approccio peculiare del crisis management che mira a combinare gli aspetti militari con quelli civili, integrando gli obiettivi della stabilizzazione e della sicurezza con quello della lotta contro il crimine organizzato e le mafie.
Per questo, un possibile coinvolgimento in prima linea delle istituzioni europee nel nuovo assetto del Kosovo sarebbe sicuramente un’esperienza preziosa per Bruxelles, per testare ancora una volta le soluzioni adottate in altri contesti e per studiarne di originali. C’è chi, come il diplomatico svedese Carl Bildt, già rappresentante europeo agli accordi di Dayton sulla Bosnia Erzegovina, ha proposto un legame ancora più forte tra la definizione dello status della provincia serba e il ruolo dell’Ue, nella prospettiva della configurazione del Kosovo come prima regione europea. Il progetto prevede una relazione speciale che permetterebbe a Bruxelles di monitorare lo sviluppo democratico ed economico del territorio, lasciando allo stesso tempo a quest’ultimo un’ampia autonomia e superando le resistenze interne rispetto ad ulteriori allargamenti dell’Unione.
Al di là delle soluzioni immaginate ed effettivamente formulate, è fondamentale che i 27 comprendano l’importanza di non abbandonare il loro impegno in Kosovo e nei Balcani. Non è solo una questione di credibilità e un dovere che deriva dal rispetto di certe promesse, ma è anche un contegno che comporta dei benefici per l’Unione stessa. L’ipotesi di una sovranità limitata o condivisa del Kosovo è possibile solo all’interno della cornice europea, perché quella dell’integrazione all’Ue sembra essere l’unica prospettiva ambita sia dai serbi che dagli albanesi e il solo fattore di moderazione dei loro leaders. Questi paesi sono già in Europa, sono circondati da tutti stati già membri dell’Unione e rischiano di continuare ad essere un buco nero foriero di nuove instabilità, soprattutto se l’attrazione esercitata dalle istituzioni europee perdesse forza e la cooperazione regionale venisse lasciata nelle mani degli unici attori che sembrano avere successo nel garantire l’unità della regione: le mafie. È quindi preferibile che tali paesi vengano a far parte di diritto nell’Unione, seguendo la strada disegnata da Bruxelles e subordinandosi al rispetto delle regole delle democrazia e dello stato di diritto, piuttosto che entrarvi di prepotenza richiamando l’attenzione dell’Unione su ulteriori crisi da gestire. E non bisogna lasciare che le indecisioni interne condizionino l’atteggiamento di Bruxelles, non è detto che allargamento e riforme istituzionali non possano essere portati avanti contemporaneamente, anche perché nessuna adesione dei Balcani Occidentali sarebbe prevista prima del 2014.
È pur vero che non si può dare per scontato che il piano Ahtisaari venga approvato nella discussione al Consiglio di Sicurezza prevista per metà marzo e comunque bisogna tener conto che le difficoltà nell’attuarlo saranno enormi, a partire dalle pessime condizioni dell’economia kosovara e dalle resistenze di tipo culturale e storico che caratterizzano lo scontro tra serbi e albanesi e che i dirigenti occidentali si ostinano a non capire.
Tuttavia, Bruxelles non deve perdere l’opportunità di giocare un ruolo fondamentale nella stabilizzazione della regione, cominciando proprio dal Kosovo. Vale la pena di cogliere la chance di dimostrare che il soft power europeo sa produrre risultati concreti anche, e soprattutto, in scenari geopolitici dove la realtà è assai complicata.
(Da Caffe'Europa, n. 317 - 16.03.07. - http://www.caffeeuropa.it/unione/317kosovo.html) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 08 marzo 2007 : 20:56:12
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Kosovo: el futuro se encuentra dentro de Europa
Mientras prosiguen las negociaciones sobre el estatuto de Kosovo, ¿qué piensan los serbios y albaneses sobre la identidad kosovar?
Chris Keulemans
CAFEBABEL.COM
Mitrovica / Priština - 28.2.2007
Traducción: Emma Aguilera
Mitrovica es una ciudad de historia explosiva en el norte de Kosovo, cuyo río separa las dos partes de la población. Bajo su claro cielo azul, atravieso el alambre de espino y cruzo el puente, observado por dos soldados franceses de aire indolente. En la terraza del café La Dolce Vita, me encuentro con Oliver Ivanovi#263;. Este líder del partido serbo-kosovar podría haber sido el hermano irónico de George Clooney: pelo canoso, mandíbula marcada y pequeña sonrisa siempre instalada en la comisuras de sus labios, los labios de alguien que sabe que todo el mundo estará en desacuerdo con él.
Permanecer Serbio
Para tratarse de un político serbio, su deseo de hacer frente a la realidad es extraordinario. “Mi postura sería la de autonomía máxima para Kosovo, no la de independencia. Sin embargo, si -y esto es una hipótesis que casi ningún político serbio se preocuparía en contemplar- este país fuera independiente, entonces yo permanecería como un serbio en Kosovo, al igual que ellos continúan siendo kosovares en Serbia. Todo el debate sobre la identidad nacional no es más que un proyecto.” Dice esto mientras en la primera página de la revista Java de esta semana se dice: “Si los serbios queremos vivir en Kosovo, tendremos que comunicarnos con los albaneses”.
“¿Qué es la identidad Kosovar sino una mera ilusión? La única identidad que compartimos es con Serbia. Somos más serbios que la propia gente de Serbia”, proclama Ivanovic acompañado de su pequeña sonrisa. Sobre lo de convertirse en una democracia al uso, asegura: “Podemos vivir y trabajar juntos, mientras los derechos de las minorías se garanticen. La comunidad internacional no garantizará la independencia albanesa hasta que hayan probado su capacidad para dejarnos tener nuestro lugar por derecho propio en el sistema. Veo nuestro futuro dentro de la UE, con dos ciudadanías constitucionales, como en Bélgica”.
¿Y está preparado para ser la voz de Serbia cuando Migjen Kelmendi (escritor editor de la revista Java y el hombre que impulsó el debate sobre la identidad kosovar) decida publicar la segunda edición de su libro sobre el debate acerca de lo que es ser kosovar? “Él también puede venir y entrevistarme. Diré punto por punto lo mismo que estoy diciendo ahora. Lo que pasa es que él está perdiendo terreno; quizás debiera volver a ser sólo escritor, como antes.”
El hombre más sensible de Kosovo
De vuelta a la capital, Prístina, el imam Shkelzen Maliqi, con la gorra de béisbol de un chaval y la barba blanca de un albanés maduro, disfruta del sol en el césped frente al café Toto. Los negocios y la política aquí parecen hacerse delante de un café y un vaso de rakija. Ramush Haradinaj, el joven ex primer ministro ahora en La Haya acusado por el Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Antigua Yugoslavia de crímenes durante los conflictos armados en Kosovo en 1998 y 1999, a menudo frecuentaba mesas de cafés como estos.
Estos cafés kosovares están regentados por pequeños empresarios testarudos acostumbrados a ocuparse sólo de sí mismos. No tendrían una tradición de autonomía como nación, y como individuos no tienen talento para la dependencia. Cuando ciertos informes sacaron a la luz el auge de la religiosidad entre los jóvenes y los desempleados, a menudo se trataba sencilamente de una práctica Sufi, más espiritual, más mística. Incluso para este imam, los kosovares no podrán transferir su independencia.
Maliqi es la personificación de esta independencia mental. Tildado como “el hombre más sensible de Kosovo”, este filósofo nunca se ha metido de manera activa en política. Cada vez que sus opiniones rebaten a las de la mayoría, tiene que escuchar que le recuerden cómo su padre era el dirigente de la policía secreta serbia.
El futuro de Europa: Balcánico
Fastidia estar de acuerdo con Ivanovic. “Las frustraciones serían menos si nos preocupáramos por mejorar la infraestructura, la agricultura y el mercado laboral. Los serbios tendrán que recibir garantías, incluidos fuertes lazos con la Madre Patria. Todo bajo la vigilancia internacional para empezar y, después, dentro de la UE. Una identidad compartida puede tener un efecto movilizador en tiempos de amenazas, pero la necesidad de esto desaparece una vez que éstas se van.”
Hoy en día, reconoce que las cosas están moviéndose. “Los ideales sobre los que se construyeron los partidos políticos –la guerra, la independencia– quedan atrás. La estructura de poder está cambiando; prósperos hombres de negocios recién llegados están apareciendo en escena. Una nueva generación se comunicará de manera diferente con los serbios y otras minorías.” Como un verdadero optimista, clama que esto es una cuestión de sentido común. “La generación cercenada por la ocupación y la guerra, le hará sitio a una más joven y flexible. Reunirá su identidad en un contexto más internacional y de esa manera pasará a ser cada vez menos ‘albanesa”.
Todos aquellos con los que hablo ponen el acento sobre la misma aseveración: el futuro se encuentra dentro de la Unión Europea. La ajada oposición entre los serbios y los albaneses tendrá que disolverse en la Europa de las fronteras fluidas y las identidades híbridas. Los intelectuales de la región apodan a los Balcanes como “el futuro de Europa”. No por sus primitivas aguas estancadas, sino por estar a la cabeza en el camino hacia una realidad en la que el debate sobre la identidad nacional se ha convertido en un anacronismo.
(http://www.cafebabel.com/es/article.asp?T=T&Id=10156) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 30 marzo 2007 : 23:39:13
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Decisioni difficili
scrive Saša Stefanovic
27.03.2007
Mentre all'Onu si definisce il destino politico del Kosovo, c'è chi, come i rifugiati serbi di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve deve decidere se rientrare o meno nel proprio villaggio ricostruito. Ancora una volta, però, i destini in Kosovo sembrano ostaggio di giochi politici.
Mentre il Kosovo aspetta che venga risolta la complessa questione del suo status, che la comunità internazionale si appresta a discutere attraverso un percorso che si preannuncia tutt’altro che facile, lontano dalla luce dei riflettori della scena politica molti dei suoi cittadini affrontano decisioni altrettanto importanti per il proprio futuro, e dubbi certo non meno difficili da sciogliere.
Per gli IDP (Internally Displaced Person, rifugiati stabiliti in altre località entro i confini del Kosovo) di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve, villaggio situato nella municipalità di Ferizaj/Uroševac la decisione di tornare nelle proprie case, accettando di vivere in Kosovo, è stata certamente una delle più importanti.
Il 20 dicembre 2006, durante una cerimonia carica di emozione ed orgoglio, ai “vecchi-nuovi” abitanti del villaggio sono state consegnate le chiavi di 75 case e della nuova scuola, ricostruite dopo esser state distrutte nel 1999. Alla consegna hanno partecipato i vari attori coinvolti nel progetto di ritorno, tra cui il presidente della municipalità di Ferizaj/Uroševac, l’ormai ex ministro per le Comunità e i Rientri Slaviša Petkovic e i rappresentanti di UNHCR, UNDP e dell’Ong European Perspective, che ha curato sul campo la realizzazione del progetto.
La cerimonia ha segnato il punto culminante di molti mesi di lavoro e di intensi incontri tra gli IDP di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve sia con le autorità locali e centrali che con i vari donatori che hanno reso il progetto possibile. Un processo, però, che si è rivelato tutt’altro che facile.
Tutti i passi intrapresi, a partire dal piano di rientri della municipalità di Ferizaj/Uroševac del 2004, per passare poi al coinvolgimento degli attori istituzionali, sia locali che a livello del ministero per le Comunità e i Rientri, per passare infine al finanziamento dell’UNDP e al lavoro sul campo di European Perspective, avrebbero dovuto essere sincronizzate alle reali possibilità di un ritorno sostenibile degli IDP, che doveva essere, naturalmente, l’obiettivo finale di tutte le attività.
A quanto pare, però, le cose non sono andate così.
Con la consegna delle chiavi, gli IDP hanno preso l’impegno di prendere possesso delle case ricostruite entro novanta giorni, insieme a quello di conservarle in buono stato durante questo periodo. La qualità dei materiali usati a Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve, porte, infissi, pavimenti, è probabilmente la migliore fino ad oggi riscontrata nei vari progetti di rientro in Kosovo, ma nonostante ciò, i rappresentanti degli IDP hanno deciso di posticipare la data del proprio rientro.
La decisione, hanno dichiarato, dipende da una serie di fattori: l’attuale non sostenibilità economica, problemi irrisolti col sistema fognario, alcuni piccoli incidenti legati alla sicurezza. Così che, mentre scade il termine previsto di novanta giorni le case di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve rimangono ancora vuote e in attesa dei loro futuri abitanti.
“Abbiamo deciso di tornare agli inizi di aprile, forse il primo, forse il 2, forse l’8”, ha dichiarato Novica Novakovi#263;, leader degli IDP. “Per allora speriamo che nelle case ci saranno anche i mobili e gli elettrodomestici che ci hanno promesso. Ci hanno anche assicurato che riceveremo un supporto finanziari di duemila euro a famiglia, ma durante alcuni incontri con l’UNDP e col ministro Petkovic abbiamo fatto presente che, con questa cifra, non possiamo fare molto, e abbiamo chiesto che la cifra venga portata ad almeno 2400 euro”.
Ad aumentare l’insoddisfazione dei rientranti ci sono state anche alcuni malintesi su regole e impegni legati all’accordo firmato col ministero delle Comunità e i Rientri e con European Perspectives all’atto di consegna delle chiavi. Alla fine, i rientranti di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve hanno deciso quindi di non rispettare gli accordi, facendo un passo indietro nella speranza di attirare maggiore attenzione verso i propri bisogni e di ottenere maggiori fondi.
“C’è un sacco di politica dietro questa decisione”, ci ha detto Michael Dixon, coordinatore per il progetto di rientri per l’UNDP. “Hanno già ottenuto molta attenzione e supporto politico, soprattutto dall’ex ministro Petkovic. Anche se l’ho incontrato solo una volta prima che fosse invitato da Ceku a rassegnare le dimissioni (diventando così il primo dei ministri accusati di corruzione a uscire dall’esecutivo, anche grazie ad un’intensa campagna mediatica N.d.R), parlando di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve mi disse chiaramente “Questo è il mio villaggio, questa è la mia gente, e nessuno può dirgli che cosa devono fare oppure no”.
Quando Petkovic ha perso il ministero, gli IDP di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve hanno deciso di esprimere a chiare lettere la propria insoddisfazione sui limiti finanziari imposti dal “Sustainable Return Manual” del governo kosovaro (che prevedono un sostegno di 680 euro in mobilio e 1000 euro in denaro), abbandonando gli incontri del “Return Task Force” tenuti periodicamente nel villaggio.
Inoltre, il 6 marzo, 74 capifamiglia hanno deciso di riconsegnare le chiavi ricevute a dicembre, e hanno ribadito la richiesta di un maggiore supporto finanziario, sottolineando come questo sia indispensabile, a parer loro, per far ripartire la vita economica del villaggio, e far sì che il loro rientro sia effettivamente sostenibile.
Sebbene le cifre richieste non siano poi molto più alte di quelle già stanziate, Dixon ritiene che la protesta sia in realtà un tentativo di fare pressione per ottenere condizioni più vantaggiose. Gli amministratori internazionali, però, nonostante molte pressioni politiche non sembrano essere molto propensi a lasciarsi convincere e a concedere una revisione degli accordi già presi.
Nel frattempo una serie di polemiche politiche ha reso la situazione ancora più complicata. Lo scorso novembre l’allora ministro Petkovi#263; criticò duramente l’UNDP e European Perspective, accusati di “ricattare i beneficiari del progetto di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve. Anche il nuovo ministro, Branislav Grbi#263;, insiste ora perché venga realizzata la parte relativa alla creazione autonoma di reddito in loco come parte fondamentale del progetto di rientro.
A febbraio la stessa European Perspective ha inviato una lettera agli IDP, invitandoli a rientrare nel villaggio entro i termini previsti, “altrimenti esiste il rischio concreto di perdere le loro case, insieme ad ogni opportunità di assistenza socio-economica”. L’accordo firmato, infatti, prevede che nel caso le abitazioni non vengano occupate entro novanta giorni, la loro proprietà passi alla Kosovo Property Agency.
Nelle ultime due settimane i rappresentati dei rientranti hanno insisitito nel loro boicottaggio. “Gli IDP di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve non si sono fatti vivi negli ultimi incontri, insieme ai rappresentati di European Perspectives”, ha dichiarato Xhevahire Dervishi responsabile per i rientri della municipalità di Ferizaj/Uroševac. Nel frattempo gli IDP chiedono di poter parlare direttamente al ministro per le Comunità e i Rientri e all’UNDP per spiegare le cause che hanno impedito le condizioni per il proprio rientro entro i previsti novanta giorni.
Visto che l’inizio di aprile si avvicina, UNDP ha riprogrammato la consegna di mobili e elettrodomestici, che, insieme agli aiuti destinati a creare piccole attività economiche nel villaggio, dovrebbero essere disponibili entro la fine di marzo. Anche la municipalità di Ferizaj/Uroševac ha investito sul terreno, creando a Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve le strutture per un allevamento di polli.
Mentre le case aspettano il ritorno dei loro “nuovi-vecchi” abitanti, una considerazione nasce spontanea: sembra che l’ex ministro Petkovic stia tentando di ostacolare il rientro degli abitanti di Srpski Babuš/Babush i Serbëve, probabilmente per utilizzare politicamente l’attenzione suscitata dalle polemiche che si addensano intorno a questo progetto. Ancora una volta, il destino di una comunità, in Kosovo, sembra essere nelle mani dei giochi politici dei propri rappresentanti.
(Osservatorio sui Balcani, Newsletter n° 10 / 2007. - http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/6951/1/51/) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 02 abril 2007 : 00:42:47
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Bill Clinton Forever
En lucha por su independencia, los albano-kosovares apuestan por su amistad con Estados Unidos
CAFE'BABEL
Saskia Drude - Prístina - 30.3.2007
Traducción: Marta Lozano Molina
Bill Clinton da la bienvenida a todo el que llega a la ciudad ya desde el aeropuerto. Un enorme cartel de ocho metros de alto con el ex presidente estadounidense saludando cuelga del muro de un edificio de doce plantas sobre el Bulevar Bill Clinton en Prístina, la capital de Kosovo, que ansía su independencia de Serbia. El policía que regula el tráfico en el bulevar lleva una gorra que recuerda al uniforme de la policía de Nueva York de los años veinte. En la valla de enfrente se ve un cartel sobre el Día de Acción de Gracias estadounidense del año pasado: “Thank you, America!”.
Boutique Hillary
Es un caso único en todo el mundo que en una ciudad con una predominante población musulmana domine semejante exaltación de Estados Unidos y que una arteria de tráfico central lleve el nombre de un presidente americano.
Durante el mandato de Bill Clinton cayeron, en marzo de 1999, las primeras bombas de la OTAN sobre objetivos yugoslavos. 78 días más tarde finalizó la guerra de Kosovo y las tropas serbias pusieron fin a la expulsión de los albano-kosovares.
Al final de la guerra, se bautizaron apresuradamente otras calles con nombres de libertadores, políticos y escritores albanos apenas conocidos; ni siquiera los taxistas de la ciudad consiguen aclararse. En lugar de eso, se orientan por lugares como mezquitas, bancos o tiendas. Como por ejemplo, el restaurante California o la pastelería Boston, las cafeterías Dallas o Manhattan, la librería Harvard, el supermercado Alaska o la boutique Hillary, situada en el Bulevar Bill Clinton.
Armas de Estados Unidos
“Los albaneses nos adoran”, afirma Robert Curis, que trabaja en Kosovo desde 2001. “Aquí nunca hago las cosas mal. Si conduzco muy deprisa, el policía hace la vista gorda, sólo porque soy americano”. Curis es decano de la Universidad Americana de Kosovo (AUK), que ofrece cursos de economía, gestión y otras titulaciones demandadas desde 2003.
“Los americanos son nuestros amigos”, dice Faik Fazliu, “siempre han estado de parte de los albaneses”. Fazliu, que entonces tenía 22 años, perdió una pierna en la última semana de la guerra. Ahora es Presidente de la Asociación de Veteranos de Guerra y Mutilados de Guerra del desaparecido Ejército de Liberación Kosovar UÇK. “Ya en 1998 el principal proveedor de armas del UÇK era Estados Unidos”, recuerda Fazliu. Los albaneses de Estados Unidos apoyaron al UÇK comprando en Estados Unidos armas que incluían desde rifles de asalto a lanzagranadas, en grandes cantidades y de manera legal. El armamento se pasaba desde Albania a Kosovo. Después de la entrada en la guerra, los norteamericanos establecieron campos de entrenamiento en Albania para los combatientes del UÇK.
Dinero para la democracia
Desde 1999, militares estadounidenses operan en Kosovo en el marco de la misión internacional KFOR. Camp Bondsteel, situado cerca de Ferizaj (en serbio: Uroseva#263;), es el campo militar estadounidense más grande de Europa.
Arrendado por un periodo de 99 años, ese tiempo es más que suficiente para extender su importancia estratégica más allá de Kosovo, que sólo tiene 2 millones de habitantes.
Estados Unidos también desempeña un papel importante en el ámbito civil. El puesto de delegado de la Administración Civil de la ONU -la MINUK- sólo puede ocuparlo un estadounidense, según su estatuto. La futura embajada de Estados Unidos y las oficinas de la Agencia de Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) están situadas en una amplia zona residencial de acceso restringido en la capital kosovar. Desde allí, se coordinan los proyectos de desarrollo y democratización financiados por el gobierno estadounidense.
Por otra parte, los americanos están representados en muchas organizaciones no gubernamentales pequeñas y grandes. Cerca de una docena de grandes ONG operan en Kosovo, de las cuales tres son estadounidenses, afirma Kristin Griffith, de Mercy Corps, en Prístina. Cuando Griffith visita las poblaciones del centro de Kosovo, siempre escucha la misma frase: “Bill Clinton y Dios han salvado a Kosovo”. El entusiasmo inicial con los americanos ha disminuido poco desde la guerra, afirma: “Kosovo es uno de los pocos países del mundo donde los americanos aún son absolutamente bienvenidos.”
"Fuck the Cola"
El joven veterano de guerra Faik Fazliu no sabe mucho acerca del compromiso de Estados Unidos con la democratización de Kosovo, pero ha aprendido la lección: “Kosovo será un Estado independiente que respetará a todas las minorías”, promete. Como muchos kosovares, Fazliu no deja de pensar en el ansiado día en que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU decida sobre el estatuto de Kosovo, en las próximas semanas.
Mientras que los estados de la UE no han podido alcanzar una postura común en la cuestión del estatuto kosovar, Estados Unidos querría ver a Kosovo independiente cuanto antes mejor. En el norte de Kosovo, de mayoría serbia, se considera a Estados Unidos como aliado de los albaneses en la expulsión de los serbios de Kosovo. Los cerca de 100.000 serbios que aún permanecen en Kosovo se concentran en el norte de la provincia y en unos pocos enclaves. “Fuck the Cola, Fuck the pizza, All we need is Slivovitza” (Fuera la coca-cola, fuera la pizza, lo que necesitamos es a Slivovitza), es el lema que aparece en carteles y posters de las tiendas de souvenirs de la parte serbia de la ciudad dividida de Mitrovicë (en serbio Kosovska Mitrovica). Los serbios confían en el apoyo tradicional de Moscú. Rusia, como miembro del denominado grupo de contacto de los Balcanes, ha anunciado en repetidas ocasiones que sólo apoyará una solución con la que estén de acuerdo todas las partes. Una solución común sobre el estatuto de Kosovo en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU podría fracasar con el veto de Moscú. La antigua división del mundo vuelve a ser visible en Kosovo.
Estos artículos sobre países del Este están firmados por autores de la red de corresponsales n-ost. n-ost nació en diciembre de 2005 en Berlín. Esta red organiza el trabajo de periodistas de 20 países, con la intención de acercar las visiones de la Europa oriental a la occidental. Abogan por la democracia y la libertad de prensa, y por una construcción europea impulsada por todos.
(http://cafebabel.com/es/article.asp?T=T&Id=10535) |
Editado por - alazaro a las 02 abril 2007 00:48:19 |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 02 abril 2007 : 23:26:56
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KOSOVAR PRISONERS JOIN POLITICAL HUNGER STRIKE
Kosova's Albanian-language media reported on March 26 that Albin Kurti, the jailed head of the hard-line nationalist movement Self-Determination, has been joined on a hunger strike by 15 other inmates at the Peje (Pec) prison. Kurti was detained in February after a demonstration organized by Self-Determination degenerated into violence, during which two protesters were killed by rubber bullets fired by UN police. Kurti has condemned the UN police for their handling of the February 10 demonstration and for his arrest, but Self-Determination gave the reason for his hunger strike as his objection to being "deliberately" fed food produced in Serbia. Kurti began his hunger strike on March 24, Self-Determination members told local media the same day. Kurti's move promises to gain additional coverage in the coming days, as Self-Determination on March 24 called a rally for March 31 to demand Kurti's release and to protest at the "provocation" of his being given Serbian food. The prisoners are also demanding more time to watch television in the evening. Kurti's movement wants immediate recognition of Kosova as an independent state and an immediate end to any political role for the international community in the region.
Under the UN-drafted plan presented to the Security Council on March 26, the province would be granted independence but an international envoy would be granted the power to veto laws and fire officials. AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 57, Part II, 27 March 2007.) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 03 abril 2007 : 00:26:27
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INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVA IMMINENT, BUT PITFALLS REMAIN
By Patrick Moore
The emergence of an independent Kosova appears to be only a matter of time. UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari has drawn up a clear road map for "supervised independence," including guarantees for minorities, as his plan for ensuring lasting peace and political and economic stability in the region.
Ahtisaari formally presented his long-anticipated recommendations for Kosova to the UN Security Council on March 26.
While the broad outlines and many of the specifics of his plan for "supervised independence" came as no surprise, he made it clear beyond any doubt that his recommendation is "the only viable option" for the province, which has a 90 percent ethnic Albanian majority.
He stressed that a return to Serbian rule is not realistic because of Belgrade's policy of repression there under Serbian and, later, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, whose rule there lasted from the late 1980s to 1999 and relied heavily on support from local Serbs. That period in Kosova's history culminated in the massive 1999 "ethnic-cleansing" campaign, which was ended only by NATO intervention in the spring of that year. Ahtisaari argued that the impossibility of a return to Serbian rule "is a reality one cannot deny. It is irreversible."
The former Finnish president noted that Kosova is the last chapter in the history of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, which began in 1991. Other observers have pointed out that Kosovar independence would also mean another step forward in the worldwide decolonization process based on self-determination and majority rule, which is associated with the decades following World War II.
Britain, which will chair the Security Council in April, and the United States, which most Kosovars regard fondly as the decisive factor in ending Serbian rule, were both quick to hail Ahtisaari's report on March 26. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said, "these proposals would give Kosova clarity over its future."
The U.S. State Department said in a statement that the "proposals will give the people of Kosovo clarity about their future for the first time in many years. They contain far-reaching guarantees to protect the rights and security of Kosova Serbs and other non-Albanian communities.... Ahtisaari has also proposed that Kosova become independent, subject to a period of international supervision." Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns added that "it's time the Kosovars received their just due.... The U.S. does support the proposal by Ahtisaari for supervised independence for Kosovo. We have not said that before."
Ahtisaari's study and the reactions to it from London and Washington reflect the conclusions reached in late 2005 by UN diplomat Kai Eide, who reported to Secretary-General Kofi Annan that protracted political limbo in Kosova is a recipe for instability and perhaps a renewal of the violence that shook the area in March 2004. Indeed, the emergence of violent protests by young people earlier this year suggests that continued delays might indeed lead to further radicalization.
The report nonetheless contains some provisions that have already proven controversial in the weeks since parts of the study began to be leaked to the media. For example, the report calls for establishing a powerful office for a foreign high representative on the model set down in the 1995 Dayton agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. In recent years, however, many observers, including Germany's Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who is Bosnia's current high representative, have concluded that foreign paternalistic rule only hinders democratic development in the Balkans.
A second questionable recommendation calls for the abolition of the Kosova Protection Corps (TMK), which has its roots in the former Kosova Liberation Army (UCK), but which was founded to deal with natural disasters and other domestic emergencies. It is Western-trained and supervised, and has generally received high marks for its professionalism. Its abolition would not only eliminate an important civil-defense organization but also take jobs away from at least 2,000 people, many of whom are very influential in their respective communities. But since Serbs and Kosovar Albanians alike regard the TMK as the nucleus of a future Kosovar army, it appears to have been sacrificed as a concession to Belgrade and local Serbs.
A third possible problem is the report's failure to explicitly rule out the future possibility of partition. The study excludes any union of Kosova with other states, which presumably means Albania, even though no mainstream ethnic Albanian political party in the Balkans calls for setting up a greater Albanian state.
By failing to exclude partition, the text appears to encourage some Serbian hopes that Serbian settlements in northern Kosova might at some point break away and join Serbia. These hopes will not be discouraged by some other of Ahtisaari's recommendations, which grant Belgrade a role in culture and other internal ethnic Serbian affairs. Kosova Albanian leaders have long argued, however, that the local Serbs must look to Prishtina - not Belgrade - for answers to their problems if Kosova is to become a state of its citizens and not a collection of rival ethnic groups.
These issues have nonetheless been on the regional political agenda for several years, and their emergence in some form or other at this point was predictable. Nor did it come as a surprise that most Belgrade politicians continue to reject independence for the province, even though it has enjoyed de facto independence from Serbia since 1999. They take this position because it is easier for them to criticize others over Kosova than to provide solutions for Serbia's real problems, which are crime, corruption, poverty, and a democracy deficit.
In a similar vein, Russia continues to object to Ahtisaari's plan. As former U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke recently pointed out, this is not because Russia really cares about Serbia or Serbs. Instead, Moscow seeks to use Kosova as a bargaining tool in its dealings with Washington and London on issues of more immediate concern to Russia, such as the "frozen conflicts" in the former Soviet Union. The question is whether Russia will bargain and cajole awhile longer, or actually veto the plan, which no Russian leader has explicitly said that Moscow will do. Some observers have suggested that Russia has leverage over the Kosova issue as long as it does not actually cast a veto, but would lose its room to maneuver as soon as it did so.
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 58, Part II, 28 March 2007.) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 06 abril 2007 : 12:52:36
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El Parlamento de Kosovo aprueba por unanimidad el plan de la ONU
EL PAIS.com
EFE - Pristina - 06/04/2007
El Parlamento de Kosovo aprobó el jueves [5.4] por unanimidad una declaración de apoyo al plan del mediador de la ONU, Martti Ahtisaari, que cede a la provincia serbia de mayoría albanesa una independencia bajo supervisión internacional.
La declaración fue aprobada dos días después de que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU celebrara en Nueva York su primera sesión dedicada a la propuesta de Ahtisaari, sobre la que ese organismo abrirá un debate para aprobar una resolución definitiva para Kosovo. Serbia, con el apoyo de Rusia, considera que la propuesta viola el principio de integridad territorial recogido en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
La declaración del Parlamento kosovar expresa la convicción de que el plan "representa una solución equilibrada y justa" y que está en conformidad "con la voluntad del pueblo de Kosovo".
"Este momento histórico es una piedra más en los fundamentos del Estado de Kosovo. Hay todavía mucho trabajo que hacer y retos que afrontar durante el proceso para que Kosovo se convierta en un país respetado en Europa", dijo el presidente del Parlamento, Kolë Berisha.
(http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Parlamento/Kosovo/aprueba/unanimidad/plan/ONU/elpepuint/20070406elpepiint_8/Tes) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 09 abril 2007 : 14:43:59
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL STARTS DEBATE ON INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVA,
WHILE NATO CHIEF RULES OUT PARTITION
On April 3 in New York, the 15 members of the UN Security Council began deliberations on a blueprint for supervised independence for Kosova drawn up by UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, international media reported the same day. The Ahtisaari plan was first presented to the Security Council on March 26 after Kosovar and Serbian negotiators failed to find common ground in 14 months of talks in Vienna. Kosova's large Albanian majority wants independence after almost eight years of UN supervision while Belgrade rejects anything exceeding substantial autonomy within Serbia. Russia, a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council, has said it will not support any solution imposed on Belgrade and is suggesting continued negotiations between Serbs and Kosovars as well as a fact-finding visit to the region, an idea that appeared to have some support in the council. The consultations by the Security Council are likely to go on for several weeks. Emerging from the closed-door session, Ahtisaari told reporters, "I wouldn't like to say that this is a marathon, but it may be at least a 10,000-meter run," according to AP. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica told the council that Ahtisaari's blueprint is an "unlawful and illegitimate attempt to dismember our state." Council members also met with Kosovar President Fatmir Sejdiu. AP reported that on the insistence of Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, the meeting with Sejdiu was held in a basement briefing room since Kosova's president, unlike Kostunica, does not represent a UN member state.
On a visit to Prishtina on April 2, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that the UN Security Council should neither rush nor delay a solution for Kosova, local and international media reported the same day. In a statement carried by KohaVision television, he said that NATO supports the Ahtisaari plan for supervised independence. In response to a statement by Oliver Ivanovic, a moderate ethnic Serbian politician in Kosova, that north Mitrovica with its concentration of Serbs would split from Kosova if the province became independent, de Hoop Scheffer said that "partition can never be an option and will never be an option." He added, "I would advise all those who favor partition that this is very wrong and it will not be tolerated." De Hoop Scheffer was visiting Prishtina with the 26 representatives of NATO member states that make up the North Atlantic Council, NATO's top decision-making body, and met with the heads of NATO's KFOR peacekeeping mission, the UN interim administration, and local politicians.
TV
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 63, Part II, 4 April 2007.) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 22 abril 2007 : 13:32:28
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OSCE CRITICIZES QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN KOSOVA
In a report released on April 12, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said that the population of Kosova is currently being given inadequate opportunity to redress administrative decisions that they believe are arbitrary and illegal. Kosova is currently administered by the UN, with the support of NATO-led KFOR peacekeepers. The local government has relatively few powers. The report identifies "the lack of judicial review of UNMIK and KFOR decisions" as one of four key concerns. The others are weak laws, "problems with administrative decisions," and problems with reviews of administrative decisions. In a statement, the OSCE said these "challenges to a functioning administrative justice system need to be tackled to help protect individual rights and the rule of law." The report calls for Kosova's Supreme Court to function as an appeals court, saying that individuals' right to an effective legal remedy are "arguably" being violated. It also said there is a need for administrative decisions to be "well reasoned" and to "comply" with the law. In Kosova, the role of the OSCE is to build up the region's institutions and democracy and to promote human rights and the rule of law.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 68, Part II, 13 April 2007.)
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 02 mayo 2007 : 14:06:53
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Fin de partida en Kosovo
JOSCHKA FISCHER
EL PAIS, Madrid, 01/05/2007
En los próximos meses se tomará una importante decisión que pondrá a prueba la capacidad de la comunidad internacional, sobre todo la de Europa, para resolver conflictos. El problema es el estatus de Kosovo: la última cuestión que queda por resolver del ensangrentado rompecabezas balcánico. Para serbios y albaneses, Kosovo es un lugar perseguido por la historia. Pero el mundo no debe permitir que sus sobrecargados relatos del pasado enturbien nuestras iniciativas para construir un futuro mejor.
En la década de 1990, después de sus atrocidades en Bosnia, el régimen serbio de Slobodan Milosevic abolió la tradicional autonomía kosovar, reprimiendo los derechos de la inmensa mayoría albanesa de la provincia. La OTAN, en lugar de limitarse a mirar horrorizada, como había hecho al comienzo de la guerra en Bosnia, decidió intervenir antes de que las fuerzas de Milosevic pudieran de nuevo devastar a uno de los grupos étnicos que formaban la antigua Yugoslavia. En juego estaban la seguridad de la Unión Europea y la responsabilidad moral de Europa después de los crímenes cometidos durante la II Guerra Mundial.
Tras la intervención de la OTAN, el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas adoptó por unanimidad la resolución 1244, que situaba a Kosovo bajo administración de la ONU. Desde 1999, las políticas de la comunidad internacional con respecto a esta provincia han contado con un amplio respaldo, el de Rusia incluido.
Ahora ha llegado el momento de resolver de manera permanente el estatus de Kosovo. De no ser así, la estabilidad que la ONU ha llevado a la provincia, y a la región, no durará. En la actualidad el desempleo llega al 40% en Kosovo y alimenta la inseguridad política. La economía de Kosovo, si no puede acceder a créditos exteriores del Banco Mundial o del FMI, seguirá estancada.
El esclarecimiento del estatus de Kosovo también es una necesidad para la minoría serbia de la provincia, que continúa viviendo en la incertidumbre, sin saber si ha de mirar a Belgrado o a Pristina en busca de protección para sus derechos. Además, dejaría las manos libres, tanto a Serbia como a la UE, para proceder a las reformas internas y la integración internacional que necesita la primera.
Ahora, el enviado especial de la ONU para el Establecimiento del Estatus Futuro de Kosovo, el ex presidente finlandés Martti Ahtisaari, ha presentado, después de 14 meses de intensas negociaciones con Belgrado y con Pristina, una propuesta de acuerdo al Consejo de Seguridad. La audaz propuesta de Ahtisaari, que recomienda la independencia de Kosovo bajo la supervisión inicial de una fuerte presencia internacional, tanto civil como militar, es la única opción viable para la comunidad internacional, y en concreto para Europa.
La reintegración de Kosovo en Serbia es indefendible. Desde el final del conflicto en junio de 1999, este país no ha ejercido ninguna autoridad gubernamental sobre la provincia. Bajo la administración de la ONU se han creado instituciones kosovares legítimas para gestionar su política interna. El pueblo de Kosovo, una vez establecidas dichas instituciones, cuenta con alcanzar un mayor autogobierno.
Por desgracia, Belgrado, al concebir la vuelta de Kosovo al dominio serbio, aunque sea con autonomía, hace caso omiso de estas realidades. De hecho, Serbia no tiene una estrategia viable para integrar a los dos millones de kosovares en sus instituciones políticas y en su vida pública.
Está claro que la ONU no puede resolver los problemas estructurales de Kosovo, es decir, su necesidad de desarrollar una economía viable y de comenzar a relacionarse con la UE: el motor más poderoso con que cuenta la región para hacer reformas y desarrollarse económicamente. Pero esto no significa que ahora la comunidad internacional y la UE deban dejar que Kosovo se las arregle solo.
Las relaciones entre su mayoría albanesa y su minoría serbia siguen siendo precarias. De manera que es urgente establecer salvaguardas sólidas para proteger a las minorías, sobre todo a la serbia. La supervisión de la independencia de Kosovo por medio de una importante presencia internacional, tanto civil como militar, será esencial para garantizar que la provincia cumple las obligaciones que determina la propuesta de acuerdo.
Lo que ahora necesitamos es voluntad para adoptar y aplicar el plan de Ahtisaari. El Consejo de Seguridad decidirá el estatus de Kosovo, pero es la Unión Europea la que tendrá que convivir con éste y con Serbia. De hecho, la suerte de Kosovo está inextricablemente unida a la de la propia UE. Un Kosovo fuerte y estable precisará de una Europa cohesionada y unida. Si la UE se divide respecto a un problema situado en su centro geográfico -y en el de sus intereses-, su credibilidad como actor en el ámbito internacional respecto a cuestiones que superen los límites de sus fronteras saldrá gravemente perjudicada. Además, sólo una UE unida podrá incorporar a Rusia a una política balcánica coordinada.
Esto significa que la UE tampoco puede dejar que Serbia se las arregle sola. Debe dejar claro que está dispuesta a apoyarla -y también al conjunto de la región- en la materialización de sus pretensiones europeístas. La seguridad de Europa está ligada a la integración de Serbia, tanto como las aspiraciones de ésta lo están a la UE.
Sin embargo, el precio del apoyo de la UE no puede cambiar: los principales criminales de guerra Ratko Mladic y Radovan Karadzic deben ser entregados al Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex Yugoslavia (TPIEY) instalado en La Haya. Hoy como ayer, el primer paso hacia la integración europea de Serbia es una cooperación plena con esa instancia.
Serbia tiene un brillante futuro dentro de la UE, pero para acceder a él debe romper con su propio pasado, tanto respecto a Kosovo como en lo tocante a las atrocidades de la época de Milosevic.
Joschka Fischer, ex ministro de Exteriores y vicecanciller de Alemania, es profesor visitante en la Escuela Woodrow Wilson de la Universidad de Princeton.
Traducción de Jesús Cuéllar Menezo.
© Project Syndicate / Institute of Human Sciences, 2007.
(http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Fin/partida/Kosovo/elpporopi/20070501elpepiopi_6/Tes) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 09 mayo 2007 : 18:13:56
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IS PARTITION THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME FOR KOSOVA?
By Patrick Moore
Many commentators have suggested that the Serbian-dominated north of Kosova will break off from that province and become a part of Serbia if the Albanian majority declares independence.
The idea of partitioning Kosova along ethnic lines is nothing new. Some Serbian officials and academics toyed with the idea in the early decades of the 20th century as a way of dealing with the Serbs' declining demographic position there. More recent partition projects were associated with the Serbian Academy of Sciences in the mid-1980s.
In addition to securing Serbian-majority areas and cultural and religious sites for the Serbian state, the partition planners have generally sought to keep control of as much of the province's mineral wealth for Belgrade as possible.
Some forms of de facto partition already exist in Kosova. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when ethnic Albanian politicians held sway in communist Kosova after decades of tough Serbian rule, many Serbs left the province. They said they were victims of intimidation and various forms of pressure to sell their land, although the Albanians claimed the Serbs were happy to take the money and move to better farms in Vojvodina.
In the wake of the 1998-99 conflict, much of the Kosovar Serbian population fled their homes for Serbia proper or for what was emerging as a heavily Serbian territory north of the Ibar River, which divides Mitrovica into northern Serbian and southern Albanian halves. Various Serbian enclaves remain throughout Kosova, but their existence is often precarious.
Some Serbian refugees and displaced persons probably will never go back to their former homes in what are now heavily Albanian areas like Pristina. The Serbian ethnic-cleansing campaign of 1999 in particular made heavy use of "human intelligence" on the ground that only local Serbs could supply. Many Serbs who cooperated with former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's security forces subsequently fled because they feared the wrath of their Albanian neighbors.
Those Albanians also remember that it was the Serbs of Kosova who formed the bedrock of support for Milosevic in his rise to power in the mid-1980s and subsequently helped keep him there.
There has, moreover, been little communication across ethnic lines since 1999. The younger generations of Serbs and Albanians literally do not speak each other's languages because they never experienced the joint school or military systems that Yugoslav-era generations did.
Traditionally, few Serbs bothered to learn much Albanian, but prior to the late 1980s, most Kosovar Albanians with anything more than very basic schooling knew some Serbo-Croatian. All Kosovar males who served in the Yugoslav military learned at least enough Serbo-Croatian to conduct basic conversations and probably developed their skills further if they were posted to Croatia or Bosnia or somewhere else far from home.
The international community has long ruled out partition as an option, saying that Kosova's future will be determined for the province as a whole. Some observers have warned that if foreign powers ever do allow the Serbian north to secede, they will pave the way for similar partition attempts in the Presevo Valley, Macedonia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Whatever the merits of a Balkan domino theory might be, there is at least one realistic scenario for Kosova that leaves open the possibility of partition in the not-too-distant future. According to that view, Russia will continue to stall on any serious consideration by the UN Security Council of UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan for conditional independence for Kosova. Moscow will go on calling for holding debates, arranging fact-finding trips, appointing new negotiators, and doing whatever else can be done to delay things.
In the meantime, according to this scenario, the Kosovar Albanians will become increasingly impatient. Before young hotheads or organized radicals take matters into their own hands and renew the violence that shook the province in March 2004, the political leaders will issue a unilateral declaration of independence. This will be endorsed as the only practical alternative to protracted instability by several members of the international community, including probably the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, and some other states that have already indicated their support for Kosovar independence.
Most of the EU member states will bicker among themselves and not be able to act together, as has often happened in the past. Serbia will use its old connections with the Nonaligned Movement and its corps of experienced diplomats to ensure strong support for its position among the developing countries. This could prove useful, not only in the Security Council but also in the General Assembly, if and when Pristina seeks membership in that body. The Kosovars have few seasoned diplomats to plead their case except for publisher and negotiator Veton Surroi.
At this point, so the theory goes, Russia and Serbia will make it clear that they have been stalling in hopes of triggering a declaration of independence by the Kosovars without Security Council approval. Serbia will then invoke the council's Resolution 1244, which specifies that Kosova is part of Yugoslavia. (Yugoslavia was changed to Serbia in the text after Milosevic's rump Yugoslavia ceased to be.) As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has noted, the Western countries never meant the reference to Kosova being part of Yugoslavia seriously but simply included it in 1244 as a sop to Russia and Greece.
But that will not make any difference at this stage. According to this scenario, Belgrade, backed by Moscow and perhaps Beijing, will announce that it will invoke what it considers its rights under 1244 and send its security forces and other officials into northern Kosova to protect the Serbian population there from the "illegal" regime in the south.
The partition will then be sealed, perhaps with the assistance of foreign peacekeepers guarding the new boundary lines to prevent any direct clashes between Serbian and Kosovar Albanian forces.
The new Kosovar state will try to observe the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan and protect the Serbian enclaves and cultural properties because it knows that its international standing depends on it. But the enclaves will likely fade away as the young in particular move to the north, to Serbia proper, or even further away still. The cultural properties will probably have to be protected behind much barbed wire and guarded by French or Greek troops.
One of the lessons of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts of the early 1990s was that Serbian populations outside Serbia had difficulty accepting the possibility that Serbs could have happy and productive lives in states that they did not control. That is clearly the case in Kosova, too, particularly after 1998-99. It is probably too much to expect that any Albanian-dominated Kosovar state would ever attract even the grudging allegiance of the province's Serbs.
Partition would be a bitter pill for the Albanians to swallow. They have said repeatedly that they will not accept it, but they might find themselves with little choice. With the political limbo of the UNMIK period behind them and a new legal system in place, they will then get on with their own lives and go into business as they have in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, or Croatia. Neither they nor their former neighbors are likely to miss each other.
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 82, Part II, 4 May 2007.) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 10 mayo 2007 : 16:11:05
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GERMANY WARNS KOSOVA AGAINST UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, WHILE KOSOVA SECURES FRESH SUPPORT IN UN
German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung on May 4 expressed confidence that the UN Security Council will back a proposal granting Kosova independence from Serbia, Radio-Television Kosova reported the same day. However, the AP also quoted Jung as saying that "a unilateral declaration of independence would be a mistake for the moment," and as urging Kosovars to be patient in their pursuit of independence. "Our goal is to finish discussions [on a UN resolution] by the end of May," Jung said. Germany itself is not a member of the Security Council, but it is nonetheless a key player in international efforts to resolve the status of Kosova. Germany is one of the six members of the Contact Group leading diplomatic efforts, currently holds the EU's Presidency, and German diplomats head the international community's missions in Kosova and in Bosnia.
Jung was in Kosova to visit German troops in the roughly 16,000-strong NATO-led force in the region. Of the 35 states that have sent troop contingents to Kosova, Germany has one of the largest. The current number -- which changes each week -- is roughly 2,300. A number of European states have warned against a unilateral declaration of independence, but the United States has made clear it would support such a move if the Security Council were to veto the UN blueprint.
Another member of the 15-strong UN Security Council has said it will back a UN proposal granting Kosova independence from Serbia, Kosovar media reported on May 3. Radio-Television Kosovo reported that an unnamed Panamanian official has assured Veton Surroi, a member of the team negotiating Kosova's future, that Panama supports the plan drawn up by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari and believes that a decision should be made now instead of reopening talks. Surroi also indicated after meeting with Panama's deputy foreign minister, Ricardo Duran, that this is Panama's official position. To pass, the plan requires Russia and China not to veto the plan, and a total of nine votes. The extent of support for the proposal is unclear. The United States and the EU have both backed the proposal for supervised independence for Kosova.
Together, Washington and EU member states have six votes. However, Slovakia's political elite has sent mixed signals, and Kosovar Albanian media recently reported with concern a May 3 commentary in the German newspaper "Frankfurter Rundschau" that claimed, without providing sources, that Slovakia -- along with Russia -- will "definitely" oppose such a proposal. If Slovakia votes with its EU peers and Panama backs the proposal, a resolution would require two additional votes from among China, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, Qatar, Russia, and South Africa.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 83, Part II, 7 May 2007.)
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 14 mayo 2007 : 21:03:34
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Cuidado con Kosovo
ANDRÉS ORTEGA
El País, Madrid, 14/05/2007
Dadas las prisas de Washington y Londres, Kosovo -hoy aún formalmente provincia de Serbia, pero realmente protectorado internacional- se puede convertir rápidamente en un nuevo Estado en Europa, pero con el alto riesgo de acabar en un nuevo enfrentamiento, en una partición y en un agujero negro. Para esto la OTAN no hizo una guerra, sino para evitar una limpieza étnica. El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU va a empezar a negociar una propuesta occidental de resolución que apoye el objetivo, o plataforma, de la "independencia supervisada" por la comunidad internacional que propugna el mediador Martti Ahtisaari. Si Rusia no la veta (lo que resulta improbable, pese a las presiones para que si Moscú no lo aprueba al menos se abstenga), la UE presentará un frente único, y los problemas que se plantean se suavizarán, aunque no desaparecerán. Si Rusia lo veta, el problema puede ser mayúsculo: Pristina anunciará unilateralmente su independencia; americanos y británicos correrán a reconocer el nuevo Estado, y la UE se dividirá. Entonces, según diplomáticos europeos, no hay que excluir que algunos países, incluida España, retiren las tropas allí destacadas en misión de paz para no encontrarse en medio de un enfrentamiento abierto entre serbios y albanokosovares.
El informe de Ahtisaari considera que "las partes no son capaces de llegar a un acuerdo", y hay que acelerar la independencia formal de una Serbia de nuevo radicalizada. "¿Por qué?", preguntaban algunos rusos en el reciente II Foro de Bruselas organizado por el German Marshall Fund y la Fundación Bertelsmann. Pese a las relaciones históricas con el mundo ortodoxo serbio, a Moscú no le importa tanto Kosovo, sino su propia posición en Europa y en el mundo. Rusia está moviendo sus peones, dentro de su nuevo tablero mundial. Aunque así sea, Moscú puede esta vez tener razón. "Reconocer a Kosovo sin el Consejo de Seguridad es jugar con el fuego", señaló en Bruselas el que fuera enviado de la ONU para los Balcanes y actual titular sueco de Exteriores, Carl Bildt, que pidió "tiempo", y consideró el de Ahtisaari "un buen plan, sólo que no va a funcionar". Y, efectivamente, tiempo se necesita. La afirmación de Ahtisaari, apoyada por EE UU, de que "la independencia es la única opción para un Kosovo políticamente estable y económicamente viable" no se basa en ningún argumento. Es necesario un compromiso aceptable para todos, aunque tarde en alcanzarse.
Primero se exigió a Kosovo que cumpliera ciertos estándares antes de darle un estatuto definitivo; luego los estándares a la vez que el estatuto; y ahora, casi sin explicación, el estatuto pasa por delante de unos mínimos que cumplir para acceder a la independencia. El Kosovo independiente estará regido por bandidos y mafias y dominado por la corrupción, lo que le convertirá en un agujero negro y Estado fallido en medio de Europa, si es que no acaba uniéndose una débil Albania. Es más, con o sin el veto ruso, lo más probable es que los serbios de Kosovo, inseguros ante una posible limpieza étnica en sentido contrario al de 1999, se atrincheren, con tropas serbias preparándose al otro lado de la frontera, y acaben exigiendo, o imponiendo, una partición.
Todo esto no tiene que ver con proyectar los demonios españoles sobre aquello, sino con la realidad de Kosovo, respecto a la cual la comunidad internacional puede estar cometiendo graves errores. El primero es que, aunque Ahtisaari afirme que su plan no sienta precedentes, los crea. Como opinan algunos europeos, la independencia no tiene por qué ser un premio a otorgar automáticamente a los pueblos que han sufrido. Rusia teme que se convierta en precedente para otros casos que le afectan directamente, por no hablar del Kurdistán iraquí, en su día atacado con armas químicas por Sadam Husein. Quizás por eso está Moscú negociando con Moldavia una salida pacífica a la disputa sobre el Transdniéster, otro agujero negro. Sería un ejemplo. En cuanto a Bosnia, no se puede decir que haya sido un éxito. Más bien lo contrario. Con una independencia acelerada, en vez de arreglarse, el problema de Kosovo se puede agravar.
aortega@elpais.es
(http://www.elpais.com/articuloCompleto/internacional/Cuidado/Kosovo/elpepiint/20070514elpepiint_9/Tes) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 17 mayo 2007 : 13:57:12
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Ahtisaari's Kosovo proposal: Unfair and peace-preventing
Johan Galtung, Hakan Wiberg & Jan Oberg
Since February this article has circulated quite a few dailies but been printed only in Swedish Aftonbladet and Danish Jyllands-Posten.
It has been submitted - one at a time - to the following who either did not reply - the majority - or declined: The Guardian (Comment Is Free and Features), The Wall Street Journal (as response to a pro-independence letter), The Sunday Telegraph, The Washington Post, New York Times, International Herald Tribune, Politiken and Berlingske Tidende (Denmark), Dagens Nyheter (Sweden).
What do you think could be the reasons that none of these distinguished free media showed the slightest interest in it?
A) It's badly written.
B) The authors don't really know what they talk about.
C) The authors think there are other solutions than the one suggested by powerful Western governments, including those that bombed Serbia and Kosovo in 1999.
D) The newspaper editors don't believe that the Kosovo issue is or will become important.
E) The article is critical of the media coverage of this conflict.
F) Editors are overburdened and read only some of all submitted articles, often going for well-known, powerful people's views.
G) If this type of views began to spread, people might begin to question whether NATO's bombing was the right thing to do.
H) Everybody knows that Kosovo is a unique case in world politics. There are no alternatives to making it independent and, thus, really nothing that merits a discussion.
I) Nothing is said here that has not already been stated in thousands of articles about Kosovo.
J ) Other reasons?
We welcome your views, not only about the article but also on how you think the free media handle conflict, war and peace - here.
Lund (Sweden), May 11, 2007
The western world has a free press, and a free press can have many perspectives. Why, then, has the story of Kosovo been so uniform the last 15 years? And why is Martti Ahtisaari’s so-called mediation of Kosovo’s future status – and the media coverage of it – so partial and non-objective?
Fair reporting would include perspectives of the Serbs, Romas, and other minorities in Kosovo, not only the majority Albanians.
It is indeed true that Serbia under Milosevic ruthlessly repressed the Kosovo-Albanians. The other side of the coin is that they were extremely inclined toward nationalism and secession since their collaboration with Mussolini. When, in 1974, Tito gave them probably the highest autonomy any minority has enjoyed, it was seen by many Serbs as anti-Serb, rewarding their rebellion the same year. Further, it is indeed noble to care for minority rights but the international community never cared equally about equally repressed Serb civilians in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.
It is indeed true that Serbia had much military and police power. But reports consistently omit that the quite successful non-violent struggle of the Kosovo-Albanians was destroyed by the US and Germany when, from 1993, they clandestinely began arming Kosovo-Albanian extremists and created KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, behind the back of the non-violent leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.
It is indeed reasonable that leading Serbs should be tried as possible war criminals. But reports consistently omit that Kosovo’s present Prime Minister, Agim Ceku, was Croatian Army commander in the Medak Pocket in 1993 where every human being and animal was killed; that as such he participated when some 200 000 Serbs citizens of Croatia were driven out in 1995.
Ceku was a KLA leader and NATO did not disarm KLA. The world turned the blind eye when 200 000 Kosovo-Serbs were forced out; then KLA instigated violence in Southern Serbia and the war in Macedonia.
It is indeed true that some 800 000 Kosovo’s Albanians fled Kosovo in 1999. They did so because a) war raged between Serb troops and KLA with it 20 000 well-armed fighters, b) armed Serbs chased them out, and c) NATO bombs fell for 78 days. Evidence in support of President Clinton’s argument for the bombing – that Milosevic had a Hitler-like plan to expel 1,5 million Albanians - has never been produced. Most media amplified this psycho-warfare manipulation.
Kosovo’s Albanians returned; the Serbs did not. Thus, Europe’s largest refugee problem is in Serbia. It’s a Himalayan fiasco and moral defeat for the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE – the governors of Kosovo - that they have failed to create conditions conducive to the rightful return of Serbs, Roma and other minorities.
It is indeed true that Albanians in Kosovo have suffered. But to argue that this suffering means a) that Serbia has lost its sovereignty over the province forever (a sovereignty emphasized in UN Security Council resolution 1244) and b) that Kosovo must therefore become the second independent Albanian state in Europe is dangerous exceptionalism. What, then, about the suffering in Tibet, Chechenya, Kurdistan, Palestine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam, the Basque Province, Northern Ireland, Northern Cyprus, Republika Srpska, etc.?
Shall they all become independent by NATO bombs followed by Ahtisaarian “mediation” magic?
It is particularly bizarre in the case of Serbia. In 2000 the citizens of multi-ethnic Serbia non-violently deposed Milosevic, their wartime leader. Croats, Muslims and Albanians still celebrate theirs. Kosovo’s present leaders were wartime leaders, and we must be absolutely sure they are neither war criminals nor mafia before rewarding them with an independent state.
Mr Ahtisaari’s proposal is commissioned power politics, devoid of professional mediation and conflict-resolution. It’s the long-term result of a few facts: that the international community never understood Yugoslavia’s complexities, that it didn’t facilitate a negotiated solution in the early 1990s when a solution was possible, that is never used the same principles to solve the same problems and that it believed peace would emerge from disregarding one party, bombing a disputed territory out of a state and occupying it.
Advocates of independent Kosovo should have used creativity and empathy.
Imagine Ahtisaari had offered Serbia things such as economic compensation for the bombing and the sanctions, payment for taking Kosovo property out of Serbia, rent for the gigantic American Bondsteel military base, and common Serb-Albanian border patrol.
Imagine he had suggested negotiations about autonomy within Kosovo for the northern Serb-dominated parts and opened an expressway for Serbia and Kosovo to the EU.
Imagine that he had denied the wartime leaders in Kosovo the huge new army they want; it will destabilise the region and threaten Serbia and other neighbours.
Before blaming Serbs and Serbia for protesting the Ahtisaari plan and Western policies, find a sovereign state whose peacetime leaders would not protest such arrogance. Mr. Ahtisaari’s plan is un-fair, un-intellectual, and un-viable. As a tool for Western political short-sighted interests, it will create instability, human misery and, most likely, violence.
The authors are Associates of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, TFF, in Sweden – www.transnational.org. Each have followed developments and worked periodically with the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia for more than 30 years. |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 23 mayo 2007 : 16:51:42
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KOSOVA MAY NOT HAVE STATE SYMBOLS BY INDEPENDENCE DAY WHILE DEBATE OVER BOSNIAN SYMBOLS CONTINUES
Kosova's prime minister, Agim Ceku, on May 18 told local journalists that Kosova will not have decided on its state symbols by the time it gains independence. Ceku said independence will come "soon"; he has previously predicted the UN Security Council will pave the way for Kosova to gain its independence in May. "We have to be realistic because we cannot have our symbols in a few weeks, as that requires time...and political consensus," Ceku said. "We have to define new symbols that differ from those we identified with and grew up with."
The issue is a practical one as well as a matter of identity, since Kosovars' current travel documents will expire when the UN Mission in Kosova winds up its operations. Under the plan being discussed by the UN, Kosova would be granted independence but would be under the temporary supervision of an EU-appointed representative of the international community. The plan also stipulates that state symbols should not represent just one ethnic group. Ceku was speaking after a meeting of the Unity Team, which is representing ethnic Albanian interests in international negotiations on the future status of Kosova. A spokesman for the Unity Team, Skender Hyseni, told the media that there are disagreements about whether new passports for Kosovars should be provisional or permanent. Hyseni denied that the region's politicians have said a decision would be taken in May. "We said that it would be good if [the process] ended in May," Hyseni said.
The speaker of the Republika Srpska's parliament, Igor Radojcic, on May 18 criticized a proposal for the symbols used by Bosnia-Herzegovina's other autonomous region, the Muslim-Croat Federation, Banja Luka Radio reported the same day. The federation has proposed using the state's symbols as temporary emblems. Radojcic said the proposal is a politically motivated attempt to signal that the country's regions should not have their own symbols. The country's politicians are currently embroiled in a dispute about the constitution, with the Bosnian Muslims' most senior leader calling for the Republika Srpska to be abolished. The Constitutional Court in late March ruled that all flags and emblems in the country must be inclusive in nature, forcing the country's two autonomous regions to choose new symbols. The Republika Srpska has already done so.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 92, Part II, 21 May 2007.)
Sobre la qüestió dels símbols a Kosovo vegeu en aquest mateix fòrum "Kosovo i els símbols nacionals" (http://www.casadelest.org/foro/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=668).
Sobre la cuestión de los símbolos en Kosovo véase en este mismo foro: "Kosovo i els símbols nacionals" (http://www.casadelest.org/foro/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=668). |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 25 mayo 2007 : 23:19:43
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National Identity New Challenge for Kosovo
Albanian, Serb or Kosovar? Kosovo struggles for an identity
By Krenar Gashi in Pristina
Balkan Insight
24 05 2007
Kujtim Salihu, A Kosovo Albanian student, is leaving for an international competition in Vienna but has no idea what nation he will be representing.
“My ID card says Kosovo UNMIK,” said Kujtim. But that is a designation that pleases no one. Kujtim, for example, says he is Albanian and that Kosovo is just a geographical region where Albanians live.
Many of his fellow-countrymen disagree with him. They consider themselves to be members of a Kosovar nation. A UN decision on Kosovo’s independence is fast-approaching, but a consensus on this thorny issue looks as far away as ever.
International attempts to mediate between politicians in Kosovo and Serbia over the region’s status failed so a UN diplomat suggested independence under international supervision. Although Russia disagrees, the Security Council is likely to go along with him and create an independent Kosovo whatever nation the people living in it decide they belong to.
Fadil, who emigrated to the United States during the 1999 fighting between Serbia and NATO that led to Kosovo’s status as a self-ruling part of Serbia, does not see himself as Albanian at all.
“I’m a Kosovar,” he said proudly, and welcomes elements in the UN plan that say Kosovo should have its own anthem and flag. And these key symbols have to be decided on as soon as possible, says Nexhmedin Spahiu, a political analyst and advocate of the Kosovar identity.
“Very soon it might happen that Kosovo’s president will meet the president of Serbia and Kosovo won’t have its own flag at the meeting”, he wrote in a recent column.
Popular debate over what the flag should look like, and what anthem they should pick, has become widespread. Many artists have designed flags.
But many residents feel they already have a flag – the red banner of Albania with its double-headed eagle.
“I will never feel anything special for the flag of a future Kosovo state,” said Kujtim. “I will teach my children that our flag is the Albanian flag.”
Kosovo Albanians have a particular affection for the Albanian flag because during communist times they were barred from using national symbols. The flag became associated with a striving for freedom in all senses.
But they had no actual connection to Albania, which had a very isolationalist foreign policy, from World War Two until the late-1990s. Some people in Kosovo say they have grown apart from their ethnic kin and cannot be counted as part of the same nation.
“We are just very different to the Albania Albanians,” said Fadil.
Politicians have promised that Kosovo will be a state for all its citizens, whatever their ethnicity. And that, along with the new symbols, will create a whole new nation automatically, said Spahiu. He pointed at Switzerland and the United States as examples of nations made up of more than one ethnic group.
“The UN proposal is the primer for a Kosovar nation, as it explicitly states that Kosovo should have its national symbols. This means that Kosovo will become both a state and a nation,” he told Balkan Insight.
“When the majority of people living in one territory decide to be part of a political construction, part of a state, then this state can be called a nation. Individuals may not feel they are members of this new nation but this nation will be created if it has the majority of the people.”
But it may prove a struggle to convince people from both sides of Kosovo’s ethnic divide that they are Kosovar first and anything else second.
“I will never declare myself a Kosovar,” said one young Kosovo Serb. “That would mean I was betraying my nation and becoming an Albanian.”
And some Kosovo Albanians feel the same way.
“If Kosovo Albanians become Kosovars, then I will register myself as a member of the Albanian national minority living in Kosovo”, wrote Bardhi, a student, on the Prishtina-TEAM internet forum.
Krenar Gashi is BIRN Kosovo Editor. Balkan Insight is BIRN’s online publication.
(http://www.birn.eu.com/en/84/10/3061/) |
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Enviado - 09 junio 2007 : 13:05:35
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Rusia impide el consenso sobre la independencia de Kosovo
A. C. - Heiligendamm
EL PAIS, Madrid, 09/06/2007
Rusia bloqueó ayer una declaración del G-8 en favor de la independencia de Kosovo, en clara oposición a los planes occidentales respecto al futuro de la provincia serbia de mayoría albanesa. El presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, insistió en que no puede haber una resolución sobre el estatus de Kosovo sin el acuerdo de Serbia y advirtió que minar la integridad territorial y la soberanía de un Estado era un precedente peligroso.
No prosperó tampoco la propuesta de Nicolas Sarkozy, que propuso una nueva ronda de negociación en los próximos seis meses, antes de que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU adopte una resolución sobre Kosovo.
(http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Rusia/impide/consenso/independencia/Kosovo/elpepuint/20070609elpepiint_18/Tes) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 12 junio 2007 : 11:56:05
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El mediador de la ONU afirma que la "única salida posible" para Kosovo es la independencia
EE UU sugirió este fin de semana que reconocería la independencia de Kosovo si se estancaba el proceso
ELPAIS.com / AFP - 12/06/2007
La posible independencia de Kosovo no abandona la agenda internacional. Si este fin de semana era el presidente estadounidense George Bush el que sugería el reconocimiento de Kosovo como Estado independiente si se estancaba el proceso, hoy, el mediador de la ONU, Martti Ahtisaari ha afirmado que "la única salida posible" es la independencia.
Ahtissari, en una comparecencia frente a la Comisión de Exteriores italiana, ha señalado que continuar con las negociaciones no conducirá a ninguna "conclusión" del problema. "Ha llegado el momento -ha añadido Ahtissari- de que las naciones impulsen una solución rápida y de que elijamos entre un proceso ordenado dentro del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, o uno desordenado fuera de este marco".
El mediador de la ONU ha hecho mención a la división entre Washington y Moscú después de que Bush admitiese que reconocería la independencia de Kosovo si no avanzaban las negociaciones. El presidente ruso, Vladimir Putin, ya ha mostrado su apoyo a Serbia que rechaza, por el momento, la independencia de la región.
(http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/mediador/ONU/afirma/unica/salida/posible/Kosovo/independencia/elpepuint/20070612elpepuint_12/Tes) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 14 junio 2007 : 13:20:23
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G8 MEETING ENDS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON KOSOVA
PROMPTING FRUSTRATION IN KOSOVA, MIXED REACTION IN SERBIA
The leaders of the world's leading industrialized states, the Group of Eight (G8), failed at their summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, to agree on how to proceed in efforts to resolve the final status of Kosova, international media reported on June 8, at the end of the three-day summit. The closing communique said that there were "different views on substance and on the way forward" regarding Kosova's future, while the summit's host, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, said at the closing conference that talks on Kosova were "constructive" but not "easy," adding that while "time is pressing." the G8 leaders want a "consensus-based solution." Russia appears to have reiterated in private, as it has in public in recent weeks, that it is prepared to veto a UN Security Council resolution that imposes a solution on Serbia. Asked on June 8 if Russia threatened to use a veto, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said, "I think one could say it like that."
The outcome of the meeting disproved claims carried by Reuters on June 7 that the G8 leaders had agreed to a proposal by Sarkozy that Belgrade and Prishtina should return to the negotiating table for six months, at the end of which, in the absence of any agreement, the UN would adopt the Ahtisaari plan.
The summit communique gave no indication of the course of discussions, but Sarkozy's late attempt to broker an agreement -- which broke with the previous French position that there is no reason to delay a decision -- not only dominated reports on the summit, but also appeared to be the focal point of diplomatic efforts, with Sarkozy saying that "sherpas" -- diplomats -- and the "political directors" of the eight countries' foreign ministries "worked for several hours overnight on Kosovo." Sarkozy's own comments raise doubts about the prospect of Russia accepting his proposal. "We cannot have a delay to let Belgrade and Pristina hold talks unless all the actors, notably the Russians, consider that the independence of Kosovo is an inevitable outcome," he said. Russia has given no indication that it is prepared to accept independence for Kosova.
Kosovar Albanian politicians responded to the apparent lack of progress at the G8 summit with a chorus of calls for Kosova to be granted independence immediately, according to reports in the Kosovar and international media. "We cannot wait forever," Kosovar Prime Minister Agim Ceku told AP on June 8. "Give us clarity, give us freedom, and let us go." According to AP on June 8, Veton Surroi, a key member of Prishtina's negotiating team, said, "Kosova cannot be kept hostage by a veto threat," while the region's main opposition figure, Hashim Thaci, said that "the time for independence is now. Every day that is wasted is bad, it could cause new dilemmas." The head of the UN Mission in Kosova (UNMIK), Joachim Ruecker, told local journalists after meeting with Kosovar Albanian leaders on June 8 that they responded very calmly to Sarkozy's proposal, the news service KosovaLive reported the same day. In Serbia, comments by political leaders focused on French President Sarkozy's suggestion of a time-limited return to the negotiating table. The speaker of Serbia's parliament, Oliver Dulic, said a delay would be good because it would present "an attempt to move forward the negotiating process," AP reported on June 8. That upbeat assessment was not shared by Slobodan Samardzic, the minister for Kosovo-Metohija, as Serbs call the province. Samardzic told Radio-Television Serbia on June 8 that the Kosovar Albanian leaders would simply slow down talks if the Sarkozy process were adopted. "Why should the Albanian delegation negotiate with Belgrade at all, if it seems that, should an agreement not be reached within six months, it would gain independence for Kosovo-Metohija?" he asked.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 106, Part II, 11 June 2007.) |
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Enviado - 28 junio 2007 : 20:47:33
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RUSSIA REJECTS UN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOSOVA WHILE BRITAIN HINTS AT DECISION WITHOUT rUSSIA
Russia on June 20 rejected as "unacceptable" a new draft UN resolution that would delay a UN decision on the future for Kosova for four months, international media reported the same day. The new draft called for a final round of bilateral talks between Belgrade and Prishtina during those months, but stated that, if they failed to reach an agreement, the UN would then accept a plan paving the way for Kosova to gain independence "unless the Security Council expressly decides otherwise after conducting an evaluation." Russia's ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, said the new formula would not "provide sufficient incentive for the two parties to negotiate seriously." The author of the UN's plan for the contested province, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, held 15 months of fruitless talks before concluding that the UN should allow Kosova to become a fully fledged state after a period under international supervision. Russia has been urging an indefinite deferral of a UN decision, calling instead for new bilateral talks between Belgrade and Prishtina and insisting that no solution can be imposed on Serbia. This is the third resolution drafted by the UN Security Council's three Western veto-carrying members -- the United States, Britain, and France -- each with concessions to reflect Russia's concerns. As in the second draft submitted on May 31, this proposal included watered-down references to the Ahtisaari plan, stronger calls for Kosova to meet international standards, and a commitment to appoint a UN envoy to oversee refugee issues.
Russia has drafted one resolution, but has refrained from deeper negotiations. Churkin said on June 20 that he expects that to remain the case until the "difference of principle" is overcome, AP reported the same day. The draft was also rejected by both Belgrade and Prishtina. Kosovar Prime Minister Agim Ceku told local and international media that further talks are unnecessary, while Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica told the news agency Tanjug that "any attempt to hide the project of independence for the province [Kosova] behind a several-month delay is unacceptable."
Britain's deputy ambassador to the UN, Karen Pierce, indicated on June 20 that Europe and the United States might be prepared to recognize Kosova's independence even without Russian support, international media reported the same day. Pierce urged Russia to engage more deeply in discussions, but added: "That's not to say other routes are not available if that partnership doesn't work." "I think it's fair to say that one way or another, Kosovo independence is going to be inevitable," Pierce said, according to Reuters. "It is much better that that is reached through a managed process, with proper and adequate guarantees for the Kosovo Serb and other minorities in Kosovo." The United States has consistently said that independence for Kosova is "inevitable" and a leading U.S. State Department figure has on one occasion said Washington would back a unilateral call for independence.
However, Washington and Prishtina have since both avoided talk of a unilateral declaration, stressing instead their desire for an international consensus. The draft UN resolution circulated on June 20 specifically sought to forestall any early move by Prishtina, demanding "that the parties refrain from making any unilateral declarations regarding final status" during the 120-day period of bilateral talks. With discussions at the UN seemingly at an impasse, diplomats at the UN are reportedly increasingly suggesting that the prospects of an agreement with Russia hinge on talks that U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold on July 2.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 114, Part II, 21 June 2007.)
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 29 junio 2007 : 14:28:54
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EU WARNS KOSOVA AGAINST 'HUGE STEP BACKWARDS', BUT PRESIDENT WARNS KOSOVA CANNOT BE KEPT 'HOSTAGE'
The EU's envoy to Kosova, Stefan Lehne, on June 21 warned Kosova not to make a unilateral declaration of independence, saying that such a step would be "irresponsible" and "a huge step backwards" that "would take away all the goodwill that you have received," local and international media reported the same day. Lehne, who was speaking after meeting Kosovar President Fatmir Sejdiu, said unilateral action would "not help you overcome the remaining obstacles, but build many, many more." Lehne said a decision on Kosovo "needs the best possible basis, the strongest legitimacy available -- and that is a [UN] Security Council resolution." A range of European countries have expressed concern at the possibility that Kosova might take matters into its own hands in the two months since a leading member of the U.S. administration indicated Washington would support a unilateral declaration by Kosova.
Since then, U.S. officials have focused on stressing the need for an international consensus, with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried saying on May 16 that "we see no advantages whatsoever of taking action outside of the [UN] Security Council, we see only disadvantages in every way".
Lehne said he expects Kosova's status to be decided soon, but added that "historic processes do not follow schedules like Swiss railways."
Kosovar President Sejdiu reiterated after his meeting with EU envoy to Kosova Lehne that Kosova seeks international consensus on its future, but said there are alternatives to a UN resolution. "We are in favor of a joint resolution, but we do not agree that Kosova should remain hostage to those who can block the process and prevent a status solution that reflects the will of the people," Sejdiu said, in a clear reference to Russia, which has indicated it might veto a UN resolution that would formally separate Kosova from Serbia. "We would like to have a UN resolution, but if not, there are other alternatives." Sejdiu added that each day brings evidence that "the chances of a joint resolution are being exhausted" and that Kosova should not face "the dilemma of negotiating on other variants and solutions that would lead to indefinite negotiations." The latest setback was Russia's rejection on June 20 of a third Western-sponsored draft resolution. The leader of the opposition, Hashim Thaci, who was the Kosovar separatists' political leader during the 1998-99 conflict with Serbia, on June 21 reiterated his position that Kosova should "achieve independence working together with Washington and the European Union," Radio-Television Kosova reported the same day. "We don't want to build an independent but isolated Kosovo, but an independent Kosovo that will be integrated into the EU and NATO tomorrow," Thaci said after meeting Lehne. However, Kosovar politicians are warning of mounting pressures to reach a resolution, with Prime Minister Agim Ceku warning on June 20 of a "crisis of trust" among Albanians. In recent days, veterans of the conflict and the radical Self-Determination movement have announced separate rallies to voice their opposition to the continuing delays in resolving Kosova's status.
Self-Determination has called supporters onto the streets on June 30; the veterans have yet to announce a date.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 115, Part II, 22 June 2007.)
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Enviado - 03 julio 2007 : 01:56:11
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Moving Beyond Status: Kosovo’s Quest for a Democratic State
Preoccupation with final status means little attention has been paid to vital questions concerning good governance
By Kristie Evenson in Split
Balkan Insight
27 06 2007
Kosovo’s future status has been an ongoing preoccupation of Europeans and Europe-watchers for the past few years. The complex and emotionally charged task of settling final status for the territory has--understandably--consumed the international community with debate over the best policy and strategy to achieve it.
However, in the push to get to this point, the most important dimension of the Kosovo question has not been addressed: whether the territory can establish sound and functioning institutions that will enable the impoverished region to survive and flourish.
This is a mistake. Clarifying and implementing the steps that Kosovo should take to become a modern, democratic state requires immediate attention. The stalemate over status may be resolved in the very near future, yet the conclusions of Freedom House’s report, Nations in Transit 2007: Kosovo, indicate that resolution alone may not be enough for the territory’s leaders to finally address the critical task of building vital institutions and developing sound governance practices.
In 2006, status talks dominated Kosovo’s political space, and efforts to continue building the basic institutions of government became a secondtier priority for both Kosovar and international actors. While the authorities have taken some new steps i towards improving governance in the territory, the overriding focus on status has left Kosovo stalled in achieving meaningful democratic reforms.
At present, Kosovo resembles a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime—a situation not uncommon for post-conflict countries and territories where the development of basic institutions is still in its early stages.
The region’s ministry of interior and ministry of justice, for example, were only formed last year, and more time will be needed for them to function effectively. Nor is it surprising that the ability to build and run institutions has been hampered by a complex chain of responsibility between the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, and the local authorities.
Of concern, however, is the fact that there was little interest in and impetus for moving beyond status talk politics in 2006. Instead, Kosovo’s policymakers often used the unresolved question of status as a reason for delaying vital but controversial legislation in such areas as decentralization, electoral process, and access to information.
Even when legislation was adopted to address specific problems, the territory’s implementation record in 2006 was lackluster. The government’s fight against corruption, for example, was practically nonexistent, despite the magnitude of the problem in Kosovo.
The establishment of an agency to combat corruption was heavily delayed, then underutilized once established, and the political will to empower the agency still remains in question.
Status talks have also dominated most media and civil society organizations. Rather than pushing the government to increase its performance and adhere to stated commitments, most continue to view status as the elixir for Kosovo’s growing list of problems.
Clearly status needs to finally be decided, as further delay will continue to provide an excuse for those unwilling to press for substantive changes. But gaining resolution of the much-debated status issue is unlikely to bring dramatic changes to the quality of life experienced by the average citizen of Kosovo.
Until Kosovo’s policymakers get serious about building a state--the subject of so many Albanian Kosovars’ dreams--the issues of unemployment, social welfare, and security cannot be addressed.
More than ten years after the Dayton Accords, Bosnia remains an unfortunate example of an independent state that lacks many domestically-operated and viable institutions.
In Kosovo’s equally complex case, the risks are similar: without clear domestic desire, leadership and ideas, Kosovo is likely to gain some level of supervised independence, but will not be able to build the accountable institutions necessary to function as such. International and regional support for Kosovo must be structured in a way that Kosovo’s leaders are held to account as the territory takes tentative steps into the community of nations.
Kristie Evenson serves as the analytical advisor to Freedom House’s Nations in Transit. Balkan Insight is BIRN`s online publication.
(http://www.birn.eu.com/en/89/10/3423/) |
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Enviado - 05 julio 2007 : 12:49:30
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KOSOVAR ALBANIANS RALLY TO DEMAND INDEPENDENCE
Roughly 500-600 Kosovar Albanians rallied on June 30 in central Prishtina to demand independence for Kosova and to protest against the perceived failure of Kosova's political leaders to lead the region to statehood, local and international media reported. There had been fears that the march could turn violent, as a much larger rally organized in February by the same group, the Self-Determination (Vetevendosje) movement, ended in fatal clashes with UN police. In the event, the only violence was "artistic," as Vetevendosje had promised, with protesters stamping on effigies of the province's leaders and throwing toilet brushes and paper into the courtyard of the Kosovar parliament. "We are here to protest because we recognize only the language of self-determination, while the [Kosovar] negotiating team recognizes only the language of negotiations with Serbia," AFP quoted a Self-Determination leader, Glauk Konjufca, as saying.
Western powers are calling for a fresh round of bilateral talks between Belgrade and Prishtina, a suggestion consistently and unanimously rejected in public by Kosovar leaders. However, Self-Determination's criticism does in part echo the increasing number of commentaries in the region's newspapers questioning the unity and continued mandate of the negotiating team.
Self-Determination, which is demanding a referendum on independence, has rejected all international initiatives, including a UN package proposing supervised independence. Konjufca said the package proposed by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari "has brought about the division of Kosova" and would entrench Serbia's control over northern Kosova, where most Serbs live. The rally was held two days after Serbs gathered outside Prishtina to mark one of the key dates in their history, the Battle of Kosovo Polje, and on the eve of an informal meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush, the key supporter of Kosovar independence, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the key supporter of continued Serbian sovereignty over the UN-administered region.
Kosovar political leaders and media have expressed little optimism that the meeting will produce any breakthrough.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 121, Part II, 2 July 2007.) |
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Enviado - 11 julio 2007 : 22:34:04
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Kosovo Leaders Seek Solution Outside UN
11 07 2007 Brussels. - Kosovo’s prime minister expressed pessimism on Wednesday that the UN will be able to agree on a plan for the territory’s independence, even as the European Union’s foreign policy chief pledged progress.
Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku said it appeared unlikely the UN Security Council could conclude an independence arrangement with Serbia in the face of opposition from Russia, a veto-holding member of the security council. Ceku called on international decision makers to offer a "brave approach" towards the status of the majority-Albanian Serbian region.
"It seems that an acceptable solution cannot be found in the Security Council. For us, it is not enough when countries say that they wait for a resolution. We have to stop pretending that the Security Council has answers to all of the questions," Ceku said.
Ceku and Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu met EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, who had met with Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic on Tuesday. On Wednesday, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica rejected a new US-backed draft resolution because it would lead to independence for Kosovo.
Solana confirmed Wednesday that the EU is ready take over administration of Kosovo from the UN even before the international body settles on what to do about Kosovo. The EU is preparing to send hundreds of police and justice officials to replace the UN mission which has run Kosovo since 1999.
A plan by UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari would establish a process giving Kosovo supervised independence from Serbia.
But Solana said the EU is ready to implement just parts of Ahtisaari's proposal if that is necessary. He said he does not share the pessimism expressed by Kosovo’s leaders.
"Kosovo people and Kosovo leaders deserve this outcome," Solana said.
Sejdiu stressed Kosovars were growing impatient.
"We cannot be forever hostages of some country’s hesitations in the Security Council. We might have to find other alternatives, but in cooperation with the international community," Sejdiu said.
(Source: BIRN. - http://www.birn.eu.com/en/92/15/3563/) |
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Enviado - 12 julio 2007 : 18:26:00
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EE UU y la UE proponen aplazar la independencia de Kosovo cuatro meses
El nuevo borrador pretente incluir a Rusia en el acuerdo de la ONU
SANDRO POZZI - Nueva York
El País, Madrid, 12/07/2007
Las potencias occidentales en el Consejo de Seguridad perfilaban ayer un nuevo borrador de resolución sobre Kosovo. En él se matiza bastante el apoyo a la independencia supervisada de la provincia serbia administrada por la ONU planteada por el enviado especial, el ex presidente finlandés Martti Ahtisaari. Las partes tendrán cuatro meses para alcanzar un acuerdo negociado. Belgrado considera inaceptable el nuevo texto.
El objetivo de la nueva versión es incluir en el acuerdo a Rusia, que amenaza con vetar toda decisión que vaya contra los intereses serbios. EE UU, como copatrocinador, quiere que se adopte una decisión antes de que acabe la próxima semana. "De una manera u otra habrá un cambio hacia la independencia", admitió el embajador estadounidense ante la ONU, Zalmay Khalilzad.
Washington acepta que se dé a serbios y kosovares una oportunidad de retomar las negociaciones, como pedía Moscú. Por lo tanto, tendrán 120 días para intentar un acuerdo. EE UU quería incluir en el texto de resolución que el plan de Ahtisaari entrara en vigor si las partes fracasaban. En el último borrador, según las primeras filtraciones, se eliminaría ese automatismo y no entrarían en vigor todas las disposiciones del plan.
"Sería una aplicación progresiva", explicaron fuentes diplomáticas. El embajador italiano Marcello Spatafora señaló que el propósito es dejar que las partes negocien y valorar después el resultado. Si se optara por esta vía, podría ser necesaria una nueva resolución que permita activar el resto de las disposiciones propuestas por Ahtisaari. "Estamos haciendo un esfuerzo para alcanzar un compromiso aceptable", añadió.
El borrador iba a ser presentado ayer por la tarde a la delegación rusa, según indicaron fuentes diplomáticas, para que pudiera circular el viernes entre el resto de los países del Consejo de Seguridad y someterlo a consultas la semana próxima. "Estamos empezando a negociar con los rusos, que hasta ahora decían siempre no a cualquier propuesta sin discutirla", indicaron fuentes diplomáticas europeas.
Matanza en Srebrenica
Belgrado ha anunciado que rechaza el texto. El primer ministro, Vojislav Kostunica, dijo que "es la preparación de la independencia de Kosovo" y reiteró que no está dispuesto a renunciar a una parte importante de su territorio.
(http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/EE/UU/UE/proponen/aplazar/independencia/Kosovo/meses/elpepuint/20070712elpepiint_14/Tes) |
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Enviado - 20 julio 2007 : 23:24:35
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MOSCOW CONTENT TO BLOCK UN KOSOVA RESOLUTION
By Victor Yasmann
Once again the Western powers have attempted to find the right formula for compromise on Kosova, and once again Russia has rejected it. On July 12, Russia turned down a third draft resolution on Kosova based on a plan submitted by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari that provides a framework for independent statehood under the supervision of the European Union.
The latest version, taking into account Russian objections to the previous proposals, extends to four months the amount of time allocated for talks between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians on the future status of the province. The proposal, circulated at the UN by French and British delegates, also reportedly contained a condition under which the Ahtisaari plan would no longer automatically go into effect if the two sides failed to reach an agreement.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing journalists on July 12, said the last document differed little from the previous versions aside from its wording. "Behind the rather intricate diplomatic language of the draft resolution, there is a conclusion that after 120 days, whether or not the sides reach an agreement, the Ahtisaari plan will come into effect," he said. "And as you know we can only support a draft resolution that is acceptable to both sides, Pristina and Belgrade. So far we see no such agreement."
Essentially, Lavrov made clear that there is little room for compromise on Russia's part, unless Serbia agrees to independence for Kosova, a development most pundits consider unrealistic.
In Belgrade, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica quickly rejected the new draft proposal, and back in Moscow, Konstantin Kosachyov, the chairman of the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, said the "situation in Kosovo does not require an immediate solution."
Nevertheless, Lavrov assured journalists, "the problem of a decision on the independence of Kosovo has not been taken off the agenda." Regardless, the latest Russian rejection has already led UN envoy Ahtisaari and Lavrov to engage in a new round of polemics. Speaking in Helsinki, Ahtisaari said Moscow's reluctance to work out a compromise could further harm Russia image abroad. "Rather than strengthening its international position, Russia only weakens it," he said.
Lavrov, however, dismissed Ahtisaari's remark. "If he really said this, I consider his statement to be inappropriate. Maybe such a statement could reduce another country's international status, but not Russia's," Lavrov said on July 13. "If, in the course of considerations, one of the parties cannot accept these proposals [by Ahtisaari], negotiations should continue and they should be assisted by an impartial international mediator."
Lavrov's comments are in keeping with the position Russia has long held on the issue, one that has led it to hint that it might veto the plan if it reaches the UN Security Council.
As recently as July 9, Lavrov said that any solution not agreeable to both Serbia and Kosova "cannot make it through the Security Council." Prior to that, responding to recent comments by U.S. officials, Lavrov said in a June 26 interview with RTR that "statements that that independence for Kosovo is inevitable do not convince us."
Although most pundits agree that Moscow's veto threats are no bluff, they differ in their interpretations of the Kremlin's hard-line stance. When considering Moscow's motivation for its position, most cite Moscow's desire to extract concessions on other issues, to prevent a separatist trend within the Russian Federation, and to defend the inviolability of countries' territorial integrity.
Other analysts believe that Russia seeks to use the possibility of an independent Kosova as leverage against neighboring states that seek closer ties with the West. President Vladimir Putin, for instance, has repeatedly said that an independent Kosova could serve as a precedent for the frozen conflicts in Georgia, whose pro-Moscow regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia seek independence, and in Moldova, whose pro-Moscow Transdniester region also wants statehood.
In reality, however, Moscow is currently less fearful of seeing independence movements sparked within its ethnic republics, such as Chechnya, and does not really want to alter the status of breakaway republics in CIS states either.
If, for example, the independence of Kosova were declared (a development that many consider inevitable) Russia would logically have to keep promises it has already made to the leaders of the breakaway republics and recognize their independent status. But in doing so, for example, regarding Abkhazia, Russia would also be forced to define its position on the hotly contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the source of a bitter armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1988-94.
But whatever decision Moscow makes on Karabakh, whether it be recognition or ignorance of its independent status, it can be assured of angering either Armenia or Azerbaijan.
Russia understandably would like to avoid such a political headache, and will seek to preserve the status quo rather than risk taking a stance on the principle of self-determination as opposed to territorial integrity.
There is also another factor in Moscow's persistence on the Kosova issue. It relates to Russia's role in the Balkans in 1990s, when the country, under President Boris Yeltsin, cooperated with NATO and the United States in trying to resolve the Yugoslav crisis.
At that time, then-Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin flew to Belgrade to convince late Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to deal with the West. But in hindsight, Moscow now looks upon its decision as an embarrassing example of weakness and concession and would like to make amends.
As Sergei Karaganov, the head of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and a political adviser to Putin's administration, noted in a commentary on kremlin.org on 16 June, "Many in Moscow now want American and European colleagues to pay the full price for their games in Kosovo, although they do not want to admit it publicly."
In seeking to make up for its retreat from the Balkans in the past decade, Moscow has located the "weak link" in the West's position on Kosova. Russia realizes that any unilateral declaration of independence for Kosova that does not follow UN procedure will not be recognized by all members of the European Union, and could cause a rift within the bloc. Russia designed its strategy on Kosova based on this calculation.
A good way of describing this strategy can be found in a recent comment by Aleksei Pushkov, a pro-Kremlin political analyst for NTV, who said on his show "Postkriptum" on 7 July that Russia should not "help the U.S. and EU escape from the difficult situation in Kosovo." He also listed reasons for testing the West's mettle on Kosova.
First, he said, Russia has previously tried to cooperate with the United States and NATO -- particularly in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001 -- and has come away disappointed. He said that if Russia does not get the concessions it seeks on Kosova, it "will not see reciprocal steps toward us neither on the issue of U.S. missile-defense elements in Europe, nor on other issues on which we differ."
Second, the situation over Kosova belongs to a category of "who will overplay whom." The Western media writes about it in terms of the EU being hostage to the Russia position and that Russia should be not allowed to define EU foreign policy, Pushkov said, but this is the language of competition, not cooperation. Therefore, if Russia were to alter its position on Kosova toward compromise "it would be perceived [by the West] not as act of partnership, but as the defeat of a competitor who surrendered to pressure."
Pushkov's third point was that Russia's confrontation with the West on Kosova is a matter of principle. The main criteria, according to Pushkov, is whether Russia will return to the international arena as an independent player. "Putin wants to turn the Kosovo [issue] into a demonstration that Russia has regained its clout. If we retreat, we will once again we be considered to be feeble," Pushkov wrote. "If we stand, our claims to a role of significance will be justified."
In the end, even a brief analysis of Moscow public-opinion leaders' statements on Kosova shows that the Kremlin -- due to its interpretations of the country's ambitions and national interests -- is not interested in a quick resolution of the Kosova problem.
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 128, Part I, 16 July 2007.) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 21 julio 2007 : 00:52:18
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El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU fracasa en el intento de definir un futuro para Kosovo
El Grupo de Contacto sobre Kosovo será ahora el encargado de seguir adelante con el proceso negociador
ELPAIS.com
EFE - Naciones Unidas - 20/07/2007
El intento del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU de avanzar hacia la posible independencia de Kosovo se vino este viernes abajo por la oposición de Rusia, con lo que la tarea de diseñar el futuro de esa provincia serbia se ha trasladado fuera de la ONU.
Estados Unidos y los cinco países europeos que presentaron una última resolución sobre Kosovo se vieron obligados a retirarla ante la imposibilidad de vencer la abierta amenaza de Rusia de ejercer su derecho de veto. Tras poco más de una hora de consultas en el seno del Consejo, los embajadores de los países que presentaron la resolución anunciaron que trasladaban la responsabilidad de seguir adelante con el proceso negociador al Grupo de Contacto sobre Kosovo.
En el texto, los países patrocinadores aseguraron que el grupo que conforman EE UU, Rusia, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Francia e Italia será ahora el encargado de organizar un período de negociaciones de 120 días entre albaneses y serbios para definir el estatus futuro del territorio. La base de ese diálogo debe ser el plan entregado en marzo por el mediador de la ONU, el finlandés Martti Ahtisaari, que propone una independencia tutelada de la provincia serbia.
Oposición rusa y serbia
"Al pueblo de Kosovo se le debe dar la oportunidad de lograr su desarrollo político y económico. Tenemos la voluntad de ayudarlos a alcanzar ese objetivo", agrega la declaración. En su opinión, una pronta resolución del estatus final del territorio también le conviene a las aspiraciones de Serbia de integrarse a la Unión Europea (UE) y dejar atrás los conflictos de la pasada década. Los ministros de Exteriores de la UE tienen previsto discutir el asunto en su reunión del 23 de julio, señala la declaración.
La resolución patrocinada por EE UU, Bélgica, Francia, Alemania, Italia y el Reino Unido establecía el traslado de la responsabilidad de administrar la provincia de ONU a una misión de la UE. También se abría un período de 120 días de negociaciones entre albaneses y serbios. Pero desde un principio Rusia se opuso al texto, al considerar que favorecía la opción independentista, y tras las consultas de este viernes tampoco cambió de parecer.
Rusia y Serbia se oponen de plano a la independencia de la provincia, a la que Belgrado como mucho está dispuesta a otorgarle una amplia autonomía. La previsible falta de consenso en el Consejo de Seguridad avivó en las últimas semanas los sentimientos independentistas de los albano kosovares, que constituyen el 90% de la población.
En Pristina, el primer ministro kosovar, Agim Çeku, ha declarado que se debería proclamar la independencia el próximo 28 de noviembre, al considerar fracasado el intento de lograr una salida soberanista a través de la ONU. Evitar una declaración prematura es una de las prioridades de la comunidad internacional ante el temor de que una respuesta violenta serbia pueda reabrir un nuevo conflicto.
Se estima que tan sólo en Kosovo hay unas 400.000 armas ilegales, no destruidas después de la guerra de 1999 y que podrían ser retomadas por elementos extremistas. Kosovo se encuentra bajo administración de la ONU y protección de fuerzas de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) desde 1999, cuando una campaña aérea de la alianza militar puso fin a la represión serbia de los albano kosovares.
(© Diario EL PAÍS S.L. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Consejo/Seguridad/ONU/fracasa/intento/definir/futuro/Kosovo/elpepuint/20070720elpepuint_11/Tes) |
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Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 22 julio 2007 : 13:31:23
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Kosovo
Ignacio Ramonet
LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE
Juillet 2007
Non réglée depuis huit ans, l’épineuse question du Kosovo s’installe de nouveau au cœur de la politique internationale. Le président des Etats-Unis, M. George W. Bush, a alarmé les chancelleries en déclarant, grisé sans doute par un accueil triomphal à Tirana (Albanie) le 10 juin, qu’il fallait savoir dire « assez ! » quand des négociations se prolongeaient trop. Selon lui, le Kosovo doit bientôt déclarer unilatéralement son indépendance, que Washington reconnaîtra sans attendre le verdict du Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) (1).
On se demande pour quelles raisons, en Palestine, cinquante ans n’ont pas suffi pour créer un Etat indépendant (avec les tragiques conséquences que l’on sait), et pourquoi, en revanche, il faudrait régler l’affaire du Kosovo au plus vite.
Dans les Balkans, précipitation diplomatique est parfois synonyme de catastrophe. On se souvient combien la hâte de l’Allemagne et du Vatican à reconnaître, en 1991, la sécession de la Croatie favorisa la dislocation de l’ex-Yougoslavie et le déclenchement de la guerre serbo-croate, suivie par la guerre de Bosnie. Sans minimiser le rôle néfaste de l’ancien président Slobodan Milosevic et des extrémistes partisans de la « Grande Serbie », il faut admettre que des puissances européennes portent une responsabilité dans ces affrontements, les plus meurtriers sur le Vieux Continent depuis la seconde guerre mondiale. La précipitation favorisa aussi la guerre du Kosovo en 1999, quand des Etats européens et les Etats-Unis refusèrent de poursuivre les négociations avec Belgrade (2), décidèrent d’éviter le débat au sein du Conseil de sécurité, puis, sans mandat de l’ONU, usèrent de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN) pour bombarder pendant plusieurs mois la Serbie et contraindre ses forces à quitter le Kosovo.
La résolution 1244 de l’ONU mit fin, en juin 1999, à cette offensive, et plaça le Kosovo sous administration des Nations unies, tandis que des unités de l’OTAN – la Force de maintien de la paix au Kosovo (KFOR), forte de dix-sept mille hommes – en garantirent désormais la défense. Cette résolution 1244 reconnaît l’appartenance du Kosovo à la Serbie. Ce qui est décisif, car le principe adopté par les puissances impliquées dans les récentes guerres des Balkans a toujours été de respecter les frontières intérieures de l’ancienne République socialiste fédérale de Yougoslavie. Au nom de ce principe furent refusés et combattus précisément les projets de « Grande Croatie » et de « Grande Serbie » qui menaçaient de démanteler la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Et c’est sur ce principe que s’appuie aujourd’hui la Serbie, soutenue entre autres par la Russie, pour refuser le plan proposé par le médiateur international Martti Ahtisaari.
L’indépendance sera peut-être la solution inévitable pour le Kosovo, tant sont énormes les obstacles à son maintien dans le cadre administratif de la Serbie. Mais ce chemin ne saurait être envisagé qu’en concertation étroite et prolongée avec Belgrade, soucieux par ailleurs de la protection de la minorité serbe demeurée sur place.
Une indépendance précipitée, comme la réclame le président Bush, non négociée dans le cadre de l’ONU, pourrait entraîner la constitution, à courte échéance, d’une « Grande Albanie », ce qui relancerait automatiquement les irrédentismes croate et serbe aux dépens de la Bosnie. Sans parler du précédent international explosif que cela constituerait pour de multiples entités tentées de proclamer, elles aussi, unilatéralement, leur indépendance. A savoir : la Palestine (Israël), le Sahara occidental (Maroc), la Transnistrie (Moldavie), le Kurdistan (Turquie), la Tchétchénie (Russie), l’Abkhazie (Georgie), le Haut-Karabakh (Azerbaïdjan), Taïwan (Chine), voire, en Europe même, le Pays basque et la Catalogne (Espagne, France), pour ne citer que ces cas. M. Bush est-il prêt à garantir ces indépendances comme il déclare vouloir le faire pour le Kosovo?
Nous avons sous les yeux les hallucinants dégâts causés au Proche-Orient par les initiatives irresponsables de l’actuel président des Etats-Unis. Sa lourde incursion, maintenant, dans un théâtre aussi explosif que celui des Balkans, l’un des plus dangereux du monde, consterne et atterre.
(1) International Herald Tribune, 11 juin 2007.
(2) Accusé de conduire une politique de répression massive contre les Albanais du Kosovo, environ 90 % de la population et en majorité de confession musulmane.
(http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/07/RAMONET/14915) |
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alazaro
Envíos 10057 |
Enviado - 25 julio 2007 : 01:03:30
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KOSOVAR ALBANIANS SAY NEW APPROACH NEEDED
Kosova's president, Fatmir Sejdiu, said on July 17 that the UN should seek "alternative routes" to decide the future of the UN-administered Serbian province, local and international media reported. "If there is no solution through the UN Security Council -- a very quick solution -- alternative routes should be sought, but in cooperation with the international community," Sejdiu said. Another member of the five-member team negotiating the region's future on behalf of Kosovar Albanians, Hashim Thaci, indicated that he believes it is already time for an alternative approach, telling journalists on July 17 that the UN "has failed to find a solution for Kosova's status" and that "the role of the UN Security Council has been weakened." Neither commented on the prospect of further talks outside the UN, but they and other members of the negotiating team have in the past said they believe the previous UN-brokered talks exhausted the possibilities for compromise. Serbia has not indicated how it would react if the EU were to withdraw the issue of Kosova's future from the UN. But at a press conference held after a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said on July 17 that "any further talks between the Serbian government and representatives of the Albanian majority in the province [of Kosova] would not need a new resolution to take place." Kostunica repeated a recent refrain of Serbian diplomats, saying there is plenty of scope for "an unconventional solution in the form of a compromise," but he gave no hints as to what that compromise might be.
AG
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 130, Part II, 18 July 2007.)
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KOSOVO/KOSOVA/KOSOVË: Actualitat / Actualidad
Tema bloqueado
